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Foreword 
The Chesapeake Bay is widely 
acclaimed as one of the Nati0n's 
priceless nat,iral resources. Since 
the fir~t of its original inhabitants 
arrived on its shores, it has been an 
abundant provider of seafoods: 
oysters, crabs, clams, and finfishes. 
It was once the principal means 
of transport and commerce for those 
dwelling upon its shores; today, it 
is a part of a great commercial 
shipping system with principal 
harbors at Baltimore and Hampton 
Roads, and a connection via the 
Chesapeake and Delaware Canal with 
Philadelphia. 
It has become the center of 
recreational boating on the East 
Coast, and provides water-based 
recreation for millions who reside 1n 
the adjacent region. 
Many of the smaller communities 
are almost wholly dependent on the 
Chesapeake, both economically and 
culturally. It is only natural that 
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the Chesapeake Bay should have a 
great popular appeal, enhanc ed in 
recent years by the two bes t-s e lling 
books, William Warne r's "Beautiful 
Swimmers", and James Michener's 
"Chesapeake". 
Along with this notabl e public 
interest in the Bay, there has be en a 
growing perception that not all the 
uses to which it has been put are 
\JOrking for its long range best 
interests. Oil spills have des troyed 
waterfowl and waterfowl habitat. 
Municipal and industrial wastes hav e 
deposited poisonous wastes on parts 
of the Bay's bottom. Run-off from 
farmlands as well as urban 
developments has added to the 
siltation problem; excessive 
fertilization has caused increases in 
the growth of one-celled plants at 
the expense of rooted forms. 
All these human uses of the Bay, 
some of them competitive, have rais ed 
many questions about the future of 
the Bay and what can be done about 
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it. Recognizing that there are 
differing opinions about the same 
questions, the Citizens Program for 
the Chesapeake Bay, Inc., deemed it 
useful to secure the advice and 
counse l of s cho lars living and 
working near the Chesapeake. The 
historical background, both ancient 
and recent, and social, economic, and 
natural dimensions of human use and 
dependence on the Bay would be 
explored; and the results made 
available to the officials 
responsible for decisions about Bay 
use, and to the public as well. 
Thanks to the initiative of Mr. 
George Hagerman, formerly Executive 
Director of the Citizens Program for 
the Chesapeake Bay, Inc., the present 
volume is the product of that 
scholarly effort. We believe the 
ideas and informed discussions that 
have been brought together in th.is 
collection of essays will indeed 
strengthen the foundations of a more 
complete understanding of the 
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Chesapeake Bay--its past, present, 
and future. 
The components have been brought 
together in a summarization chapt e r 
by Dr. Maurice Lynch, who with Ms. 
Ann Hayward Rooney-Char, has been 
primarily responsible for the 
direction of this project. The 
Citizens Program for the Chesapeake 
Bay, Inc., a non-profit orga nization 
engaged in stimulating public 
interest in and serving as a f or um 
for discussions of Chesapeake Bay 
issues, is most grateful to the 
sponsors, Virginia Foundation for th e 
Humanities and Public Poli cy and 
Maryland Committee for the 
Humanities, the respective scholars 
and the institutions with whi ch th ey 
are affiliated, and to all the othe r s 
who have given valuable assistance, 
for having made this work possible. 
John S. Gottschalk, President 
Citizens Program f or the 
Chesapeake Bay, Inc. 
Preface 
We are witnessing renewed 
interest in the Chesapeake Bay. 
Using as their model an earlier 
humanities project on land use 
supported by the Virginia Foundation 
for the Humanities and Public Policy, 
the Citizens Program for the 
Chesapeake Bay responded to public 
concern for the Bay's future by 
· sponsoring an in-depth scholarly 
appraisal of the historical and 
ethical dimensions of society's 
relationship with the Bay. The 
papers in this volume are one result 
of that project. 
Some readers familiar with Bay 
studies will find these papers 
incongruous since aquatic biologists, 
ecologists, and lawyers often 
monopolized discussion of the Bay. 
Why, indeed, are philosophers, a 
literary critic, and historians, 
among others, writing about the ~ay? 
How do the insights and perspectives 
of scholars in the humanities 
contribute to debates over the 
present problems and future uses of 
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the Chesapeake _Bay? 
These questions are answered by 
the papers themselves which explore 
the traditions and values that lie at 
the heart of individual attitudes and 
community policies governing the way 
we think about, use, and deve lop 
natural resources. Our traditions 
and values were derived from 
philosophical and religious ideas, 
from our cultural heritage in the 
broad sense, and they are mirrored in 
the literature of both early and 
recent studies. We tend to forget 
that lawyers and ecologists are 
relative newcomers to the discussion. 
Based as they are on the 
humanities, these papers are 
analytical and inquiring, and they 
emphasize historical, ethical, and 
theoretical issues rather than 
precise problems or immediate 
solutions. We have all had enough 
experience with immediate answers to 
complex questions to understand that 
the immediate answers may not always 
provide the best solutions and may 
create additional problems as well. 
The humanities are not remote from 
practice, however. The goal of these 
papers is to place the current 
problems associated with the Bay in 
the context of the idea of nature , of 
the history of people's relationship 
with the Chesapeake Bay, of the 
development of an ethic that goes 
beyond random practice. The result 
is better understanding leading to 
enlightened debate to legitimate 
differences of opinion and informed 
solutions to problems. 
These questions are answered, as 
well, by the purpose of the 
humanities councils of Maryland and 
Virginia, who provided major 
financial support for the project. 
The councils' purpose is to enlarge 
public ~nderstanding and use of the 
humanities by relating the 
perspectives and insights of history, 
philosophy, literature, and other 
humanistic disciplines to questions 
of public concern. The councils are 
independent, non-profit organizations 
which award matching grants in 
support of educational projects. The 
views expressed in these articles are 
not necessarily those of the Virginia 
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Foundation or the Maryland Committee 
which are interested only in 
promoting understanding and not in 
particular conclusions. 
We trust that you will find the 
approach represented here to be 
thoughtful and provocative, and that 
debate about the Chesapeake Bay will 
benefit from the insights of 
philosophers, historians, and 
anthropologists, among others. The 
Maryland Committee and the Virginia 
Foundation are firmly convinced that 
the perspectives of the humanities 
will render Bay-related problems and 
dilemmas more amenable to public 
understanding and solution, and 
future public policy decisions 
concerning the Bay more reflective of 
human needs and experience. 
Robert C. Vaughan 
Executive Direct or 
Virginia Foundation for 
the Humanities and Public 
Policy 
Hilda L. Smith 
Acting Executive Director 
Maryland Committ ee for the 
Humanities 
Using the Chesapeake Bay - A New Approach 
Maurice P. Lynch Professor of Marine Science C ollege of William and Mary 
Gloucester Point, Virginia 
Introduction 
It was with some trepidation 
that I began this commentary on the 
process of developing a Chesapeake 
Bay use ethic. 
At the initiation of the project 
the steering committee determined 
that a fresh look at the problems 
involved in the use of Chesapeake Bay 
was needed. One way to ensure this 
"new look" was to select scholars 
from disciplines that had not 
"studied the Bay to death." To this 
extent marine scientists, estuarine 
ecologists, fisheries biologists, 
resource economists, environmental 
lawyers, etc. were excluded from the 
list of scholars who had been 
recommended for participation. 
The committee did, however, select 
prominent Chesapeake Bay scholars 
with long-term involvement in Bay 
resource use and allocation problems 
to serve as primary reviewers for the 
papers. In addition, several members 
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of the committee and staff did have a 
direct involvement in resource 
problems involving the Bay. My 
duties as Project Director were 
simple, a) provide background to the 
individual scholars, b) bring them 
together periodically for 
"stimulating" discussions, and c) 
encourage them to complete the ir 
papers in a timely fashion. 
These duties were a pleasure to 
perform. The exchange of id ea s 
between scholars with different 
perspectives during the periodic 
conferences was an intellectual 
challenge to all, particularly 
myself. Individual discus s ions and 
correspondence were a r e freshing 
respite from day to day obligations. 
At one session, however, the 
need for a synthes is or sununary essay 
was discussed. The steering 
committee deviated fro1:1 its decision 
to take a new look and accepted an 
offer made by me (while in a state of 
intellectual euphoria brought on by 
the vigorous debates of two 
philosophe rs) to prepare such a 
sunnnary . After successfully 
comple ting the last of my original 
charge s (the completed essays sit 
before me ) I now wond e r what got into 
me . I was schooled as and have 
practiced at being a scientist. I 
norma l l y dea l only with testable 
hypotheses and facts used in their 
t es tings. what business do I have in 
trying to deal with ethics? 
Ethics to me are pers onal, they 
guide me i n my r e lationships with 
o thers and the way I act and conduct 
mys e lf. They are not something that 
are looked at in my professional 
s tudies . What have free amino acids 
in an oyst er, or stress physiology of 
the blue crab to do with ethics? 
As I pondered the question of 
"why me?", the more it seemed 
appropriate for a Bay oriented 
scientist to make some summary 
comment, not because I could add 
a nything to the es says of the 
sc hola rs, but I could emphasize the 
need to take a new look at the 
pr ocess by which decisions on Bay use 
a r e made. 
Be fore focu s ing on the various 
essays developed during the study, I 
wish to digres s and comment on the 
rol e of the scientist or more 
s pecifically the scientific or 
techn i cal advisor in matters relating 
to uses of Chesapeake Bay. A 
f r equent type of question asked of 
Bay s c ientists is exemplified by the 
fo llowing: 
"Just how much wetlands do we 
r eally need in Chesapeake Bay?" 
At f irs t gl a nce th is s eems to be 
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a perfectly reasonable question to be 
put to a scienti s t , particularly one 
directly involved in wetlands 
studies . There a r e a number of 
studies which have addres s ed the 
value s of different wet l and t ypes . 
Scientists are able t o es timate the 
amount of energy export ed by given 
marsh systems. Why can't this be put 
together, if not immediat ely, then 
soon? 
This question and que stions of a 
similar ilk, however, are imposs ible 
to answer as phrased. Why? Because 
the question of what is needed i s not 
a scientific or t echnical question, 
but a political, social or e t hi c a l 
question. 
Before a scientist or t ec hnica l 
advisor can even begin to t e ll how 
much wetlands are need ed, he or she 
has to know what the we t land s mus t 
support. 
If society through the politica l 
process determines that what. i s 
needed from Chesapeake llay i s 
x bushels of oysters 
y barrels of cra bs 
z lbs. or rock fish 
m numbers of geese 
etc. 
then scientists ca n begin t o t e ll 
what is needed to support s uch a seL 
of objectives. 
The determination of the 
specific objectives of Chesapeake Bay 
uses is what is necessary be fore 
management can start attaining the 
goal of a well managed system. 
The role of science in 
determining the specific objec tives 
or uses is only to indicate which are 
scientifically or technically 
attainable or possibly what may be 
the impact of alternative choices. 
The objectives or uses tha~ 
eventually become established as 
those desired for the Bay must be 
determined by society as a whole. It 
is in this context that a use ethic 
for Chesapeake Bay assumes an even 
more important role. 
Ove r the past decade the nation 
as a whole has become sensitized to 
the environment. A reflection of 
this is seen in legislation at the 
national level that r equires a 
written assessment of the 
environmental impact of major federal 
projects. Many states have similar 
r equirements for their projects. 
Although the initial adjustment to 
the environmental impact assessment 
process was frustrating to many (some 
of the initial written assessments 
were the most turgid, irrelevant, 
prose ever put together), the process 
now appears to be a functional part 
of planning, as was the economic 
analysis so near and dear to the 
project planners of the preceding 
decades. In fact, because of the 
over emphasis on environmental 
impact, the newly incorporated 
economic impact analysis now brings 
these two aspects of planning into 
equal if not always harmonious 
perspective. 
In the absence of a set of 
clearly articulated or understood 
national, regional or local goals and 
objectives, perhaps it is time to add 
an ethical impact analysis to the 
environmental and economic impact 
assessment process. Not only would a 
requirement for an ethical impact 
analysis as part of the planning 
process ensure that humanistic 
principles are exposed during the 
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decision making process, but the 
employment opportunities for 
philosophy majors and others in the 
humanities field would be greatly 
improved. 
Perhaps the alleviation of our 
concerns about the environment lies 
in a "Triple E Impact Statement," 
where Economics, Environment and 
Ethics are all laid out f or eve ryone 
to see. 
Those of us that became involved 
in this project recognize the debt we 
owe to the participants in the 
Piedmont Environmental Council land 
use ethic project. Their succes sful 
projectl was "the initial s timulus 
that resulted in a decision to ap ply 
a similar process to the Chesapeake 
Bay. 
Very early, during proj ec t 
planning and scholar selecti on 
stages, it became apparent tha t the r e 
were some very real differenc e s 
between what we faced and what the 
Piedmont land use ethic scholars 
faced. These differences included: 
1. The system being vieweJ, th e 
Bay. 
2. A natural integra l sy s Lc.: 11,, 
the Bay, under the 
governance of two states . 
3. Differences in per s pectlve 
of the system between the 
citizens of the respective 
states. 
4. The wide geographic 
distances encompassed by the 
Bay. 
I hope to expand on these 
differences and the impact they had 
on the conduct and outcome of the 
study as I develop my summary and 
commentary because some of these 
differences are, in my opinion, 
central to any resolution of the 
competition between uses of 
Chesapeake Bay. 
One difference did impact the 
conduct of the study. Because of the 
wide distances separating 
participants, we were unable to 
interact as frequently as those in 
the Piedmont study. The Piedmont 
scholars through their frequent 
(almost weekly) interactions became 
much more conversant with the 
developing view points of their 
fellow scholars as they were 
developing their own essays. The 
Chesapeake Bay study participants did 
come together several times, but the 
essays in this collection were much 
more independently developed. When 
the individual essays are read, the 
r eader must keep in mind that this 
proj ec t is just a beginning of the 
process, definitive answers are not 
provided, nor were they sought. 
What is The Bay? 
What is the Chesapeake Bay or 
the Chesapeake Bay System? We chose 
to use a broad definition for the 
system. We included both the 
mainstem of the Bay from Conowingo 
Dam in the North to the Bay mouth in 
the South and the major tributaries 
to the head of tide (the fall line). 
This took us to Richmond on the James 
Riv e r, Fredericksburg on the 
Na ppahannock River, Washington, D.C. 
on the Po tomac Rive r and many places 
be tw~e n and beyond. 
As the resident naturalist, I 
attempted (in two or three easy 
l e ssons) to explain the ramifications 
of estua ~ine circulation, anadromous 
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fish runs, spawning migrations of 
blue crabs and a number of other 
factors related to use problems. 
Fortunately, most of the scholars had 
read (or <lid r ead) William Warner's 
Beautiful Swimmers so they had some 
understanding of why some management 
uses were in actual or potential 
conflict with others. 
As pointed out by a number of 
the scholars, A Chesapeake Bay Use 
Ethic cannot just concern itself with 
what happens in or on the water. The 
use of land, both adjacent and 
remote, greatly effects the Bay. I 
am relieved that it is not my charge 
to resolve this problem, but those 
persons who also reviewed the 
Piedmont land use ethic for new 
approaches mutit keep thi s factor in 
mind when reconciling la11d us e <1 1H I 
Bay use problems. 
Mark Sagoff's dil emmd regard ing 
the efficiency of plantir g co r n a t 
$2,000 per acre as oppos ed to ga rden 
apartments at $100,000 an acre in 
Anne Arundel County Maryland2 may be 
a land use problem to some, but to a 
fisheries biolog.ist or aqu,1ti c 
resource manager the potenLia l 
impacts might range far b ,,yo tHl 
Maryland's borders. 
The Bay is not a s 11,1p l e syst em 
from a scientific perspec tive. Qui ck 
fixes for "local" problems may work 
as long as the local "problems" are 
few and far between. Eventually, 
however, the sheer numbers of local 
problems sets the scene whereby my 
fix is your breakdown, 
Most Marylanders view the 
Chesapeake as two subsystems, an 
upper Bay from the "Bridge" at 
Annapolis north to Conowingo and a 
lower Bay from the bridge south to 
the Potomac River. Beyond that is 
Virginia and the Atlantic Ocean, mere 
appurtenances to their Bay. 
A Virginian, even i{ oriented 
towards the water is apt to think 
first of the "River" (it took me 
several years to discover there is 
more than one "River" in Virginia). 
For most Virginians, there is, 
however, only one River, be it the 
James, York, Rappahannock, or Potomac 
(only those Virginians who remember 
the casinos at Colonial Beach, 
watermen that fish the Potomac and a 
few public officials in Virginia 
appear to be aware that Maryland owns 
the Potomac to the Virginia shore). 
In fact, a number of residents of 
Northern Virginia identified 
Chesapeake Bay as being in Maryland 
during a survey by an advertising 
firm trying to sell Virginia seafood. 
Why this difference in 
perspective and identification with 
r egard to Chesapeake Bay? Look at a 
map. Chesapeake Bay dominates the 
state of Maryland. With the 
exception of a small area west of 
Frederick and Hagerstown, the 
Chesapeake Bay is Maryland. In the 
case of Virginia, however, there is 
only a relatively narrow portion of 
the Commonwealth east of Interstate 
Route 95 which identifies with the 
Bay and its tidal tributaries. 
Burt Kummerow's discussion of 
the attitudes of St. Mary's City3 
towards the Bay can be contrasted to 
Virginia's premier restored area, 
Colonial Williamsburg, in which a Bay 
orientation is essentially 
non-existent. 
An attempt to develop a use 
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ethic for the Chesapeake must 
£onsider the diverse geography of the 
area. Major deep water ports at 
Hampton Roads and Baltimore, the 
Guinea Marshes of Glouces t e r and the 
exten s ive we t land s of P oc:01aok e Sound, 
the farmlands of the East e rn Shore , 
the beaches at Virginia Beach, major 
metropolitan areas of Baltimore and 
Washington, Norfolk, Portsmouth, 
Newport News and Hampton, waterfront 
residential homesites comple t e ly 
surrounding rivers on Maryland's 
western shore all are tied togeth e r 
by the Bay and its tributari es. The 
different geographic settings are 
intimately linked with attitudes on 
the Bay and questions of its 
appropriate use. Several of the 
scholars looked on the dif f e r e nce s in 
views of th~ Bay by segments of the 
Bay community. Burt Kumme row chose 
to expand on a single communities' 
approach4 while Bill Harris chose to 
develop the perspective o f a ma jor 
segment of the Bay's overa ll 
populations. John Balling a ttempted 
to find a way to reconcile dif fer e nt 
views of management confli c t by 
emphasizing that "Bay's don't have 
problems; people do"O. 
What Did We Do? 
Is the development of a use 
ethic for Chesapeake Bay an 
insurmountable problem? The Citizens 
Program for Chesapeake Bay did not 
think so. There was, however, 
considerable debate about the mix of 
scholars and their approach to the 
issues both during the selection 
process and during the early meetings 
of scholars and the steering 
committee. What emerged is not the 
answer. What was produced provides 
us with starting points in our 
approach to considering ethical 
i mplications in management of the 
Bay. 
Four of the scholars have looked 
to the pas t for guidance in dealing 
with today's problems~ 
Greg Waselkov and Steve Potter 
found indications that the 
prehistoric peoples of the region 
operated within an ethical framework. 
They describe the Indian settlers in 
the Chesapeake region as believing 
their world a unified whole. They 
felt accountable for their actions 
and strove to maintain a balance 
between themselves and nature. The 
Indian ethic is compared in general 
terms to that of the systematic 
a pproach to environmental problems 
proposed by some modern 
conservationists?. The lack of 
written records of the prehistoric 
Ind ians prevents us, however, from 
comprehending the intricacies of 
their ethical imperatives. 
Bill Wroten took a brief but 
f ascinating look at some of the Bay 
or water related factors that have 
helped make this region what it was 
throughout the modern European and 
subsequent American period of 
influence8. In reading his essay for 
insights into a use ethic, two items 
immediately jump out ahead of the 
others: 
a) When the Chesapeake Bay was 
only supporting its resident 
population there was no apparent 
overharve~ting of the fisheries. The 
g reat oyster wars and oyster booms 
only come when the major market for 
this product was outside of the 
region. 
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b) During the early days of 
modern history, the Bay and its 
tributaries were a unifying factor. 
People were brought together by the 
Bay, their commerce and communication 
was only possible because of the Bay. 
In later years with a major part of 
the domestic commerce and travel 
shifting to railroads and highway s , 
this was no longer the case. 
Is it possible that our problems 
with the Chesapeake began at the 
point when the Chesapeake wa s no 
longer necessary for everyone in the 
two states, and the only people 
needing the Chesapeake were the 
watermen and those engaged in long 
distance (overseas and coastal) 
commerce? Is part of our concern for 
Bay now being stimulated because many 
of our citizens are returning to the 
Bay, not for commerce and 
transportation, but for recreation or 
residence? 
Our fourth "historian," Burt 
Kummerow, took a look at a Bay region 
microcosm, St. Mary's County9. 
Perhaps the answer to an appropriate 
use ethic for the Bay does lie in a 
strong sense of tradition and 
commitment to a quality of li fe c l os e 
to the water. 
Other areas of the Bay r egion 
are like St. Mary's County, out of 
the mainstream of regional 
development until the last few 
decades. My own adopted home in 
Gloucester County has only within the 
last few years had to provide traffic 
lights. Perhaps these areas with 
close ties to the Bay and a strong 
sense of tradition can provide the 
nucleus around which an appropriate 
modern ethic can be developed. 
Historians deal with facts, and 
to some extent those ideas that 
influenced the course of events in an 
observable fashion. In order to 
determine thoughts, ideals, 
philosophies (even ethics), one must 
go to the written archives of a 
period. Mary Blair has gone to the 
literature, both of the Bay and of a 
broader American tradition, to see 
how our past and present American 
writers have treated the natural 
world in general and the Bay in 
particularlO. It is easy for me to 
toss off words like "traditional ways 
of life" when discussing what I like 
about Gloucester County, the Northern 
Neck, the Eastern Shore, or St. 
Mary's County. Mary Blair's sharp 
look at the ways in which nature is 
symbolized, however, forces one to 
examine what is truly meant by this 
"traditional" view of things. The 
Chesapeake Bay is still a natural 
system. How this system has been 
viewed in the past (and present) is 
the key to isolating from the 
"traditional" way of life these ideas 
or views which can be used in 
development of an ethic for the Bay. 
Will Michener's symbolization of 
the Bay as Eden in Chesapeake have a 
greater impact on development of 
future use ethics of the Bay than 
William Warner's exquisite essay on 
the blue crab and the waterman that 
make a living from the Bay by 
pursuing the Beautiful Swimmers. 
Perhaps the key to a Chesapeake Bay 
use ethic is her recommendation with 
regard to a symbol of Chesapeake Bay 
around which we can build, develop, 
or rally an ethic that; 
"Whatever this symbol is, 
let it suggest to us 
that not all will be easily 
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revealed in the first 
glance and that we are not 
only recipients but care-
takers of this place." 
Is Michener's paradise or 
Warner's matter of fact description 
the only views presently holding sway 
in the Bay? What is the "traditional 
view of the Bay" among different 
groups? No Gallup or Roper Poll 
exists to provide this information. 
Two of our scholars examined the 
view or views which groups hold on 
the Bay and the implications that 
differences or similarities of these 
veiws may have on development of use 
ethics. 
Dr. Bill Harris's look at a 
segment of the Black community in the 
Bay regionll (faculty at historically 
minority institutions of higher 
education) indicated general 
similarity of values, rights and 
ideas of utility exists between the 
Black and White segments of the Bay 
community. As a result no 
immediately apparent bar to 
participation in development of a 
universal or widely applicable ethic 
exists for either group. Concerns 
with "fairness" a concept within 
which the Black community 
incorporates redress of historical 
inequities will probably be of grea t 
concern to the Black community 1vhile 
of much less concern to the White 
community. 
John Balling, rather than 
examining the perceptions of a given 
group, looked at the psychology of 
perception of problems in general and 
environmental problems in 
particularl2. He argues that there 
are severe limitations to our ability 
to deal with complex problems, 
particularly those dealing with the 
environment. In order to cope with 
this diversity of perceptions, we 
must utilize improved decision making 
models to improve communication 
between disparate and often competing 
viewpoints. Resolution of 
conflicting views, or if that is not 
possible, reasonable compromise, may 
require that the "best" solutions to 
Bay problems yield to "acceptable" 
solutions. 
One advantage of having the 
experience of the Piedmont study 
group was our ability to use their 
definition of an ethic around which 
to frame our discussions. 
"An ethic is a set of 
prescriptions and proscriptions 
grounded in fundamental judgements 
about what constitutes a good 
society. It expresses ideas of 
goodness, rightness and 
obligation ..... 12. 
Our study group had the good 
fortune to contain two philosophers 
(persons according to my Websters 
".,.who reduce the principles of 
philosophy to practice in the conduct 
of life; hence ••• those who meet or 
regard all vicissitudes with 
calmness"). 
Alan Fuchs and Mark Sagoff 
independently examined a number of 
approaches to "rational" examination 
to conflicting uses of the 
Chesapeake. Policies based on 
utilitarianism, free market forces, 
or on goals of efficiency and equity 
were found wanting in addressing the 
problem inherent in competing uses of 
a common resource such as the 
Chesapeake. Alan Fuchs proposes that 
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policies developed through a 
procedure of "justice as fairness" in 
which "just" decisions, free of self 
interest are made, would prevent the 
"tragedy of the commons" from 
overwhelming the Chesapeakel3 
Mark Sagoff argues, however, 
that the basis for environmental 
decision making on problems of the 
Chesapeake must include a commitment 
that preservation and protection of 
natural resources is the right, 
moral, ethical thing to do, and that 
this commitment cannot be eroded by 
being subjected to an economic or 
efficiency yardstick no matter how 
much we attempt to quantify aesthetic 
or other "intangible" benefits 14 • 
What are the moral, right, 
ethical considerations that Mark 
Sagoff finds necessary to incorporate 
into our decision making. Morris 
Yarowsky looked for these in art, 
both painting and sculpture. He 
found, however, that art even with 
its potential for imagery and 
statement has been in the past an 
ineffective force for conservation. 15 
He theorizes, however, that this 
need not be so in the future. A 
world in which painting·· •.• is the 
sort of activity that stands as a 
model for the entire society; it is a 
non-wasteful, non-destructive and 
generally non-utilitarian activity. 
The imaginative usage of simple 
resources is in fact the paradigmatic 
strategy of our present philosophy of 
conserving and enhancing our 
habitat ..... may not be a bad world in 
which to live. 
In many ways John Hutchison sums 
up what I personally believe is the 
crux of the entire problem of Bay 
management, " •• We must first 
establish what we are trying to 
achieve in Bay management before we 
try to develop operational 
rules ••• "16. Fortunately .. before this 
s umming up, John proposed a number of 
ethical guides, some. very specific 
and others general that are relevant 
for use in the interim while 
attempting to establish our 
management goals for the Bay. 
What Does It Mean? 
The question that heads this 
section is one that each reader will 
really ha ve to answer for his or her 
self. Some may find that the 
contributions are too independently 
constructed to be of much value, 
others may find that only one or two 
have any relevance to them. 
As, at first, an interested 
spectator and later a prospective 
commentator, I have an advantage that 
many readers lack. I was there while 
it was happening. I find a 
satisfying relationship between the 
papers that encourages a belief that 
the Bay citizens will use this 
project as a beginning of development 
of a new use ethic for the Bay 
region. 
I am going to attempt to 
describe this relationship as I 
understand it. In doing so, I must 
absolve any of the individual authors 
of blame for my interpretations of 
their statements. I am doing what I 
would urge of every reader. Read all 
of the contributions, then from your 
own perspective, summarize those 
portions of the papers that have 
meaning to you in a single statement. 
If the statement is of value, use it! 
If you do, the next phase of this 
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project has begun! 
--We see that although not 
specifically articulated or 
formulated, ethical considerations 
have been important in Chesapeake Bay 
use decisions in the past. Prior to 
the early 20th century the dependency 
of the people of the region on the 
Bay from the native Indians through 
the English colonists and the early 
days of the U.S. dictated that the 
Bay and its resources be treated with 
respect. 
It was only after the majority 
of the population in the regi on lost 
its dependency on the Bay that over 
exploitation and misuse of resources 
took place. In isolated r egions of 
the Bay, however, some communiti es 
retained an intimate relationship 
with the Bay and maintained the 
unwritten code of ethics through to 
the present in what is considered as 
a "traditional" way of life. 
The Bay is a complex and 
resilient natural system, these 
features have served to keep it in a 
condition that until recently did not 
generate concern even though there 
was no conscious effort to preserve 
or protect the system. The 
laissez-faire policies and 
philosophies which have dominated 
many facets of public and private 
policy have, in fact, e ncouraged 
activities that created adverse 
impacts on the system. 
Our examination of appropriate 
thematic literature and art 
reinforces our belief that past 
actions had ethical components that 
are observable in contemporary works. 
Unfortunately, these observable 
ethical components are probably 
reflective of accepted norms and did 
not greatly influence actions in 
regard to Bay policies during the 
period of "disengagement" from 
depending on the Bay. More recent 
works of literature and possibly some 
contemporary art reflect a return of 
interest or intimacy with natural 
sys t ems, although with specific 
reference to the Bay some of this is 
hi ghly idealized and romanticized. 
This new orientation may reflect 
a new category of intimacy and 
de pende ncy on the Bay. Early 
dependency was economic, the new 
de pendency for many is recreational, 
aesthetic and philosophical. 
It is apparent that in recent 
times traditional models and 
philosophical frameworks of decision 
making have failed to prevent 
deterioration of the Bay and its 
resources to the point where large 
segments of the Bay community are 
concerned. The complexity of the 
ecological problems are compounded, 
with regard to r eaching simple 
solutions, by a wide spectrum of 
perceptions of the problems and of 
the relationships of individuals to 
the Bay itself. These diverse 
perceptions, however, are not 
complicated to an unresolvable point 
by racial, ethnic, religious or 
philosophical considerations 
unrelated to the specific problems 
under consideration. 
Alternative models of decision 
making do , exist that can be applied 
to Bay problems and philosophical 
frameworks or processes exist that 
can replace the inadequate models and 
frameworks used in the past. 
In addition, there is an 
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awareness that a problem exists and a 
very real desire on the part of some 
segments of the community to resolve 
the problem. The environmental 
movement of the pa st decade has made 
large segments of the population 
sensitive to environmental issues. 
These segments are sufficiently 
conversant with ecologica l 
considerations so that e thical 
guidelines for dec ision making can be 
understood and incorporated into the 
management process.--
Concluding Cooooent s 
This has been an interesting 
project for me. I hope the r eaders 
find the new ideas on how co dea l 
with the management is sues of 
Chesapeake Bay as stimulating as I 
have. 
The Chesapeake Bay r egion is a 
nice place to live. I am an 
optimist. I think that we , the 
people living in the region, can kee p 
it a nice place. It will req uire 
study, work, vi~ilence and overall a 
consideration of the effects of our 
actions. 
A use ethic for Chesapeake Bay 
would be the single most important 
factor in how the Bay turns out in 
the next several decades if it can be 
developed and articulated. 
I owe a debt of gratitude to the 
personnel that participated in this 
project that I doubt I can repay. I 
hope my summary and comments on their 
work is acceptable to them even 
though it is a poor portrayal of 
their intellectual achievements. 
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In 1607, Chesapeake Bay was an 
Algonquian sea. Over two hundred 
Indian communities dotted Captain 
John Smith's map of "Virginia."l 
These Indians had developed a complex 
social organization and lived in 
permanent villages set amongst their 
fields. They dwelt in harmony with 
their environment, hunting and 
gathering a diverse range of animals 
and plants and setting by a surplus 
for lean seasons. The Bay, at times 
during the year, yielded fish in 
abundance and with such annual 
regularity that the Indians could 
rely on their catch as surely as they 
did their maize harvests. When 
Nature turned capricious and hur-
ricanes or premature frosts disrupted 
carefully laid plans, the Indians 
turned to the Bay, garnering a meager 
but adequate sustenance from a 
storehouse which never failed those 
who understood its contents. 
Chesapeake, the Algonquian 
"country on the big river, n2 was the 
scene of an intricate and fruitful 
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development of Indian society and 
culture through millenia of interplay 
with the environment. Indian life 
was intimately tied to the land 
and water; both were sources of 
subsistence and ident ity to the 
prehistoric inhabitants. Our 
comprehension of that past place is 
clouded by ethnocentric accounts 
written by invading English colonists 
and obscured by the incompleteness of 
the archaeological record. No matter 
how difficult the task, attempts to 
learn about the past inhabitants of 
this country are relevant, especially 
for current attempts to reconcile our 
acqQisitive society to the limits of 
the environment. The past lends 
perspective to age-old questions and 
perhaps provides insights on modern 
dilemmas. Let us explore this world 
of the past to the extent our 
archaeological knowledge permits. 
To accurately comprehend how 
people with a very different culture 
than our own survived in a radically 
dissimilar environment in another 
time, we must recognize that the 
world has changed a great deal in the 
past 15,000 years. Imagine that as 
we stood on the shore of the Bay, 
time suddenly and rapidly reversed 
itself. We would first notice paved 
roads and shoreline cottages dis-
appear. As the seasons reeled by in 
reverse sequence and we counted down 
the years, motorized boats would be 
replaced by skipjacks, only to be 
superseded by caravelles, and then 
dugout canoes. The huge monoculture 
fields shrink into mule-plowed 
tobacco and wheat fields, which are 
in turn supplanted by mixed fields of 
maize, sunflowers, and squashes, 
tended by women with digging sticks. 
By now we notice that the twentieth 
century pine / hardwood forests have 
changed into predominantly deciduous 
woodlands, wher.e the undergrowth is 
periodically controlled by Indian-set 
brush fires . Finally, we perceive 
that the shoreline has been gradually 
extending all the while. We still 
occupy the same point in the 
universe, but the world is far 
different from the one we once knew. 
THE PAST 
Paleo-Indian Hunter-Gatherers (13,000 
- 8,000 B.C.) 
On the steep, forested hills of 
the interior Coastal Plain are found 
the earl i est evi dence of human 
occupation, the distinctive Paleo-
Indian fluted pro jectil e points 
made of stone. Their sparsely 
sca t t ~red di stri bu t i on t hr oughout 
the area pr obably i ndica t es t hat 
b d w , y ur g 
period f r om 13 , 000 t o 8 ,000 B.C., 
hunting and gathering the varied 
na t ur a l r e sour ce s afford ed by t he 
ance stral Sus queha nna River and its 
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tributaries.3 Keep in mind, however, 
t hat the envi r onment of 10 , 000 years 
ago differed markedly from the 
present. Most nota bly, the modern 
interior uplands were then even 
further inland, high above sea level. 
This was due to Pleistocene glaci-
ation which transferred immense 
quantities of the earth's oceanic 
waters to the continental ice sheets. 
Temperatures were considerably cooler 
during glacial episodes; conse-
quently, the vegetation consisted of 
boreal and sub-arctic species, as did 
the fauna. Archaeologists do not yet 
comprehend more than the barest 
outlines of Paleo-Indian life in 
eastern North America. Virtually all 
Paleo-Indian sites originally located 
near shore or along major water 
courses of Late Pleistocene times are 
now submerged. Recent work at 
several inland sites in Pennsylvania 
suggests that caribou hunting and 
gathering of wild plants sustained 
seasonally migrating bands of 
Paleo-Indians. 
Archaic Foragers (8,000 - 1,100 B.C.) 
Low sea levels lingered for 
another six or seven thousand years. 
Global warming and consequent melting 
of the continental ice sheets 
grad~ally drowned the lower reaches 
of the Susquehanna River. While 
estimates of submergence rates vary, 
from 1.2 to 3 meters per 1,000 years, 
the gene r a l consens us among geol -
ogists is that the rapid sea level 
rise occurring be t ween 8 , 000 and 
l, 100 B.C . l ater decelerated but 
ont · nu d pr s nt . 4 w· -h - o 
m-ny c h o ogi ~1 it 
lost under the waters of the 
encroaching Bay, we s ee only a 
di s tor t ed por tion of se tt l emen t and 
subsistence pat t e rns. Any s i tes 
dating within approximately the first 
5,000 years of this period oriented 
towards the use of marine-estuarine 
resources are now under water. 
Climatic conditions changed 
during this period from cold and wet 
to cool and dry,5 with corresponding 
changes in vegetation and animal 
communities of the Bay area. The 
mixed coniferous forest of the Late 
Plei stocene was supplanted by 
hemlock, and a northern hardwood 
forest of birch, beech, and oak.6 
Large animal species, such as 
mastodon and caribou, disappeared 
from the region, leaving behind the 
modern fauna. 
Artifacts known to date from the 
Early and Middle Archaic periods (c. 
8,000-3,000 B.C.) are scattered 
throughout the coastal plain, but are 
somewhat more common near major 
streams. Since no undisturbed sites 
of this age have been found in the 
Chesapeake Bay region, archaeologists 
must base their interpretations on 
artifacts found on the surface of 
cultivated fields, in eroded areas 
and in other disturbed contexts. 
These finds primarily consist of 
distinctive projectile points used to 
tip spears and darts, propelled with 
the aid of the atlatl, or spear-
thrower. Presumably, the yearly 
round of these Archaic peoples 
involved careful s cheduling of their 
hunting and collecting activities to 
take advantage of seasonally abundant 
resources found along the ever-
expandi ng margi ns of ~he Bay , i n 
rive r s, swamps and upla nds . 
From 6,000 to 3 ,000 B.C. h 
climate fluctuated between warm-moist 
and warm- dry , while the coastal plain 
hardwood forest ( domi nated by whi t e 
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oak, beech and tulip tree) became 
well established throughout the 
region.7 By about 3,000 B.C. the sea 
level was approaching its present 
height, leading to increased salinity 
and sedimentation in the streams and 
rivers feeding into the Bay. Newly 
formed inland marshes and brackish 
streams were colonized by oysters and 
other estuarine species expanding 
their ranges. The earliest evidence 
f or extensive prehistoric use of 
marine mollusks in the upper Bay are 
two large oyster shell middens in 
Kent County, Maryland, radiocarbon 
dated to 3615 B.C. and 3115 B.c.8 
The spread of oysters into these 
estuaries (which had previously been 
freshwater rtvers) offered the local 
Indian inhabitants a dependable and 
easily gathered protein source to 
which they had frequent recourse in 
sparse seasons. Near the mouths of 
secondary tributaries where natural 
oyster reefs occurred, bands of Late 
Archaic people repeatedly camped, 
leaving heaps of oyster shells and 
other refuse which overlapped and 
covered large areas, in some 
instances many acres. 
Excavations at the archae-
ological site of Plum Nelly 
(radiocarbon dated to 2155 B.C. and 
1955 B.C.),9 located near the 
confluence of the Potomac River and 
the Chesapeake Bay, indicate how some 
shell mi ddens were formed. During 
the Late Archaic (c. 3,000- 11,000 
B.C. ) occupations of this s i te , pi t s 
were dug fo r r oast i ng oys t ers, so f t-
s helled c l ams, and o t he r mo l lusks. 
A.fte th v sop n d m th h t 
d empt y 
l ng 
pit or onto nearby piles. As other 
pits we r e dug and she lls di scarded, 
they intruded upon ea r l r pi t s ·a nd 
shell piles, forming a continuous 
series of thin shell lenses. Thus, 
an apparently homogeneous layer of 
shells is actually the end result of 
sequential prehistoric occupations. 
Although mollusk remains are 
quite abundant, their contribution to 
the diet of Late Archaic peoples is 
easily overestimated due to the large 
proportion of discarded shell 
relative to the meat obtained from 
each shellfish. Less conspicuous are 
the bones of important game species, 
including white-tailed deer, beaver, 
raccoon, squirrels, opossum, 
passenger pigeon, and box turtle. 
Venison apparently was a staple of 
the diet. Remains are mainly of 
young deer, suggesting that Late 
Archaic hunters used a stalking 
technique and killed less wary, 
inexperienced deer.10 Included among 
the bones is the skeleton of a foetal 
deer, so evidently there was no 
proscription on hunting pregnant 
animals. Charred acorns and hickory 
nutshells were also found in the Late 
Archaic stratum at Plum Nelly. 
Based on the distribution of 
other Late Archaic archaeological 
sites, Late Archaic hunting and 
gathering bands moved seasonally, 
staying in the vicinity of the Bay 
and associated estuarine resources 
during winter and spring and moving 
inland for the summer and fall. 
Woodland Sedentary Agriculturalists 
(1,100 B.C. - A.O. 1600) 
Early Woodland lifestyle did not 
differ radically at first from its 
predecessor. The major difference 
from Late Archaic times is the 
invention or introduction of pottery 
manufacture in the Potomac Valley 
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about 1,100 B.C. However, by 750 
B.C., several changes in settlement 
and subsistence patterns had 
occurred. The majority of archae-
ological sites were small inland 
campsites; next, in terms of 
abundance, are small shell middens. 
Finally, there is an occasional very 
large shell midden. Judging from 
this distribution, Early Woodland 
people moved about in small col-
lecting parties made up of extended 
families or a few cooperating 
families. These bands concentrated 
their efforts on the interior forests 
and riverine environments with 
periodic assembly at large estuarine 
campsites.11 Food remains found at 
Early Woodland sites include oyster 
shells, bones of deer and some fish 
species, and hickory nuts. 
By 400 B.C. the climate had 
become moist and mild and the 
Chesapeake Bay marine-estuarine 
system had nearly reached its modern 
form and limits. Oyster beds and 
reefs extended further up the major 
river systems than at any time 
previous and thrived. Immense 
Potomac River shell middens, such as 
at Popes Creek on the Maryland shore 
and White Oak Point in Virginia, 
attest to the intensive gathering of 
oysters during the time span from 300 
B.C. to A.O. 200. One school of 
thought maintains that early Middle 
Woodland settlement types included 
semi-permanent base camps situated in 
an estuarine zone, with smaller, 
short-term campsites located in the 
freshwater zones to exploit 
seasonally abundant food resources 
(particularly the spring runs of 
herring, rockfish and shad). This is 
basically an elaboration of the 
settlement and subsistence pattern of 
the latter half of the preceding 
Early Woodland period. An alter-
native view portrays the coastal 
plain peopled with separate 
societies, occupying different 
locales with corresponding 
differences in lifeways in each 
locale.12 
During the last half of the 
Middle Woodland period (A.D, 200 -
800), a distinctive pan-Chesapeake 
cultural tradition developed, where 
heretofore the material culture had 
remained essentially uniform 
throughout the Middle Atlantic 
region. Sites attributable to this 
period are commonly found along the 
estuarine portions of rivers, with 
the largest and most intensively 
occupied lying adjacent to coves or 
embayments with large oyster beds. 
The increase in sheer number and size 
of both large and small sites of this 
period is an intimation that popu-
lation had risen.13 Food remains are 
varied. Oysters and quahogs are 
found at coastal zone sites, while 
freshwater mussels are found at 
interior riverine sites. Vertebrate 
remains recovered are sturgeon, 
turtle, turkey, squirrel, raccoon, 
cottontail, bobcat, and the 
ubiquitous deer. From the site of 
Plum Nelly come charred plant 
remains, including hickory nut, 
acorn, pokeweed, holly, hackberry and 
a seed from the genus Prunus (which 
includes cherry and plum). Although 
no archaeological evidence has yet 
been found, there is some speculation 
that domesticated plants were 
introduced into the Chesapeake Bay 
region during this time. 
Late Woodland period (A.D. 
800-1600) villages became progres-
sively larger and more permanent. In 
A.D. 1607-1608 Captain John Smith 
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visited large villages of 12 to SO, 
or rarely as many as 100, houses 
scattered along coves or streambanks, 
with the houses interspersed among 
fields of maize and smaller plots of 
beans, pumpkins and tobacco. There 
were also smaller, satellite hamlets 
and temporary hunting, fishing, and 
shellfish gathering camps. The 
majority of coastal plain villages 
were unfortified, although those near 
the Fall Line (the point where rivers 
leave the Piedmont and flow, often 
through a series of rapids, into the 
Coastal Plain) were often more 
compact and surrounded by palisades. 
According to early seventeenth 
century English observations, the 
generalized seasonal round was 
comprised of the following 
activities. In early spring the 
Indians hunted several forest animals 
such as squirrels and turkeys, and 
caught fish in weirs . Later in the 
spring crabs and oysters, fish, 
turtles, acorns, walnuts and 
mulberries were eaten. During the 
summer various small mammals, more 
fish, berries, tuckahoe and green 
maize were eaten. In the later fall 
and early winter months, deer were 
taken by means of communal drives and 
surrounds involving hundreds of 
hunters, with the newly harvested 
maize, dried fish, smoked oysters and 
a plenitude of nuts filling out the 
remainder of the diet. Fall harvest 
surpluses sustained the Indians 
through late winter.14 
The first English settlers 
marveled at the natural abundance 
they found -- " • • • multitudes of 
fish, banks of oysters, and many 
great crabbs ••• "15 By that date the 
Indians had acquired a detailed 
knowledge of the Bay environment 
through the rigorous necessities of 
survival for millenia, aided only by 
a simple technology. Astute 
colonists took note of curious 
Indians customs, emulated the 
otherwise despised aborigines, and 
survived. For instance, in April of 
1607, George Percy wrote: 
We came to a place (Cape Henry] 
where they [the Natives] had made a 
great fire and had been newly 
roasting oysters. When they 
perceived our coming, they fled away 
to the mountains and left many of the 
oysters in the fire. We ate some of 
the oysters which were very large and 
delicate in taste.16 
In less than a year, starving 
Englishmen were dispersed among the 
Indians living on oysters and 
· bartered corn. 
English accounts also mention 
several means by which Indians caught 
fish from the waters of the 
Chesapeake. Fishing from canoes, 
either in daylight or by fires set in 
the canoes, was done with spears, 
nets, or bows and arrows attached by 
lines. During anadromous fish runs, 
stick and brush weirs were employed. 
The familiar stand-by of pole, hook 
and line was also used. Fish caught 
by Virginia and Maryland coastal 
Indians included sturgeon, gar, 
herring, shad, rockfish, catfish, and 
perch, to name just a few. Crabs, 
scallops, mussels and periwinkles 
were also eaten. 
A Cultural Relativist Ethic 
Can we define an Indian use 
ethic of the Chesapeake Bay? Such a 
goal is exceedingly elusive, partly 
because Indian attitudes undoubtedly 
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evolved as their environment and 
culture changed through the 
centuries, and partly since we know 
so little about them. Archaeology 
seldom tells us what people thought 
or why they acted in such a way. 
Historical sources, in this case, 
promote a biased view of the Indians 
which, more often than not, portrays 
their customs as irrational or 
hopelessly barbarous. For instance 
John Smith, a generally perceptive 
chronicler of the early Jamestown 
colony, left no doubt that he 
considered some Indian rituals to be 
at least ludicrous and certainly 
unchristian. He describes a 
superstition that they use 
in stormes, when the waters are rough 
in the Rivers and Sea coasts. Their 
Conjurers runne to the water sides, 
or passing in their boats, after many 
hellish outcryes and invocations, 
they cast Tobacco, Copper, Pocones, 
or such trash into the water, to 
pacific that God whom they thinke to 
be very angry in those stormes.17 
The historic Algonquian Indians 
(belonging to such groups as the 
Powhatan, Chickahominy, Nanticoke and 
Pocomoke) lived in a world animated 
by spirits which they dared not 
offend if they hoped to hunt 
successfully or survive their next 
dugout canoe voyage across the Bay. 
Such beliefs may seem pointless or 
silly taken out of their cultural 
context, but they were the underlying 
rationalizations for a way of life 
which flourished for thousands of 
years. It is a simple matter to find 
similar beliefs held by most modern 
Americans. For example, the maxim 
which warns against eating shellfish 
in months without "r" in their names 
derived from the danger of spoilage 
during hot summers before refrig-
eration. Although no longer a 
compelling rule of thumb, the saying 
is still widely quoted and believed. 
Another instance is the low esteem in 
which eels and periwinkles are here 
regarded, both usually considered 
inedible or nearly so. Both are 
considered delicacies i n Europe. 
Nothing inherent in eels or 
periwinkles determines the attitudes 
we hold. To a world which exi sts for 
its own sake, in spite of us, we 
supply meaning in the form of our 
culture, the unified expression of a 
people's place in nature. To 
recognize the legi timacy of anothe r 
person's culture and the sincerity of 
his beliefs is to subscribe to a 
cultural relativist perspective; all 
cultures deserve to be understood on 
their own terms, not peremptorily 
judged according to our standards , 
If we approach Indian culture as 
cultural relativists, we gain some 
insights on their attitudes toward 
Chesapeake Bay and their total 
environment , The Indians believed 
that their world was a unified whole; 
they felt accountable for their 
actions and strove to maintain a 
delicate network of relationships 
between themselves and all other 
elements of nature. In this regard, 
the Indian ethic closely resembles 
the systemic view of the environment 
propounded by modern conservation-
ists. However, in at least one 
regard, prehistoric Indian and modern 
conservationist are at odds, At 
times, Indians were profligate 
exploiters of natural resources, a 
serious contradiction of the popular 
image of Indians as primeval 
harbingers of the conservationist 
movement. The archaeological 
evidence of a foetal deer skeleton 
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and other young deer remains from 
archaeological sites suggests that 
Indian hunters did not consistently 
allow animals to reach reproductive 
age. Jamestown colonists noted, 
the Deere they kill ••• all 
the yeer long, neither sparing yong 
nor olde, no not the Does readie to 
fawne, nor the young fawnes, if but 
two days ould,18 
Apparently the Indians could not 
afford to allow fawns and pregnant 
does to provisionally escape, on the 
chance that they might be found at 
some later time. Perhaps the limited 
deer population was being too heavily 
exploited to feed and clothe an 
increasing human population, There 
is some documentary evidence that 
hunting pressures increased even 
further after the arrival of English 
colonists, The Maryland Assembly 
repeatedly passed, throughout the 
late seventeenth century, acts 
prohibiting trade with the Indians 
for any meat except venison and wild 
fowl, suggesting that Indian hunters 
turned to domestic animals when the 
wild game supply became depleted,19 
Although one might suppose that 
the prehistoric Indians, with their 
simple technology, were not capable 
of seriously depleting the apparently 
boundless aquatic resources of the 
Bay, there is some evidence to the 
contrary. At the deepest Late 
Archaic levels of the Nomini Creek 
sites are found some extremely large 
oyster shells, The average size of 
the oysters suddenly decreased during 
the Early Woodland period and 
remained small until Historic times. 
Such a pattern strongly suggests that 
t he Indians rapidly gathered all of 
the easily acces s ible oysters (those 
growing on reefs and in shallow 
beds), and, by constantly revisiting 
a few prime oyster gathering 
locations, maintained pressure on 
certain segments of the Bay's oyster 
population. The Indians did not 
"overexploit" their natural 
resources, in the sense of gathering 
more than they needed. In fact, they 
probably did not believe that 
resources were finite; their 
experiences showed that resources 
renewed themselves if treated with 
respect and so long as the gods and 
spirits were propitiated.20 Waste 
would have been foolish and improper 
and was not condoned. 
THE PRESENT 
While archaeology in the 
Chesapeake Bay area has a vast 
potential, there is an immediate 
threat to the source of archae-
ological information. Sites, both 
prehistoric and historic, are rapidly 
being destroyed by man and nature. 
Relative to inland areas, the coastal 
zone contains a disproportionate 
number of archaeological sites. Over 
800 local sites have been nominated 
to the National Register of Historic 
Places, affording some protection, 
but there are still thousands of 
sites which have yet to be located 
and recorded by archaeologists. An 
estimated 6,500 prehistoric sites 
exist along the Maryland coast, 
although few are protected from 
future threats of destruction.21 
Indeed most have already been damaged 
to some extent. 
The most pervasive type of 
destruction has been the plowing of 
sites in agricultural fields. The 
upper six to twelve inches of most 
sites are now thoroughly disturbed. 
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Fortunately, the modern trend toward 
ever-deeper plowing has been slowed 
by widespread adoption of no-till 
practices, which also reduce losses 
from soil erosion. 
Another serious threat is the 
construction of houses and 
recreational facilities . Most of 
these structures are vacation or 
retirement homes built on or near the 
shoreline, just where archaeological 
sites are most prevalent. On spots 
where bands of hunters and gatherers 
lived, laying down layer upon layer 
of shells and other debris, a 
construction crew will normally 
bulldoze away such troublesome 
material to find a suitably sterile 
subsoil upon which to pour concrete 
footings. Thus in a few hours the 
fragile evidence of a past people is 
lost forever. Private developers 
seem unaware of the benefits which 
may accrue from preserving 
significant archaeological sites. 
Rather than merely attaching 
psuedo-Indian or pseudo-Colonial 
names to developments or country 
clubs, they might protect actual 
Indian and Colonial sites for present 
and future generations. Only an 
increased interest in and awareness 
of our dwindling cultural resources 
by county planning boards and 
individual contractors will possibly 
stem the virtually unrestricted 
development of Chesapeake Bay 
shorelines. 
Another source of site destruc-
tion used to be the quarrying of 
shell middens during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. 
Several of the largest shell middens, 
such as the ones at Popes Creek, 
Maryland, and a 100 acre site at the 
mouth of Nomini Creek, Virginia, were 
particularly affected by quarrying. 
The shells were crushed and used for 
road beds, mortar and agricultural 
fertilizer. Fortunately, substitutes 
have replaced archaeological shells 
for all these purposes. 
Of all the threats to archae-
ological resources, relic collecting 
is one of the most difficult to 
control. This activity destroys the 
integrity of archaeological sites by 
the removal of artifacts in a 
non-scientific manner. A common 
pursuit for many people is to collect 
perfect projectile points from 
prehistoric sites, and this adversely 
affects the archaeological resources 
in two ways. Because the styles of 
projectile points changed through 
time, they serve as one of the most 
common ways of dating prehistoric 
sites. With the removal of 
projectile points from a site, the 
chances of accurately interpreting 
the occupational history of the site 
are considerably reduced. Secondly, 
the fragmentary artifacts left by 
collectors are a misleading repre-
sentation of the prehistoric 
activities which occurred at sites, 
which makes the archaeologist's job 
of interpretation much more dif-
ficult. Worse still is the 
destruction by those individuals who, 
without proper archaeological 
training, dig into sites. Artifacts 
found in uncontrolled excavations 
have virtually no scientific value. 
Aside from the passage of legislation 
prohibiting the collecting of 
antiquities irrespective of land 
ownership, the only other, and much 
preferable, recourse is to educate 
the public concerning the delicate 
and finite nature of our remaining 
archaeological resources. 
II-9 
The final major threat to 
Chesapeake archaeological sites is 
shoreline erosion, which has 
increased in recent decades as 
protective shore line vegetation and 
marshlands have been removed or 
altered. Attempts to control 
shoreline erosion by groin emplace-
ment, sea walls, and riprap fill can 
further damage archaeological sites. 
However, coordina ted planning by 
engineers and consulting archae-
ologists can lead to shoreline 
stabilization , perhaps even including 
maintenance of shoreline vegetation, 
which will help preserve coastal 
archaeological sites . 
FUTURE ETHICAL USE OF THE BAY 
Even though many of the ethical 
intricacies of Chesapeake Bay use by 
the Algonquians and their prehistoric 
forebears still elude us, our 
responsibility is clear. Their past 
is our heritage; as common members of 
a unique species we learn and benefit 
from all chapters of human evolution 
and history . The destruction of 
archaeological sites, although often 
caused by ignorance, is a severe 
threat to the region's cultural 
resources . It is effectively 
completing a process begun centuries 
ago at Jamestown , when a European 
invasion decimated Indian populations 
and destroyed Indian cultures. Now 
we are busily engaged in erasing the 
last vestiges of our predecessors in 
this country. Preservation of 
significant archaeological sites is a 
step toward recognizing the value of 
cultural variety in our increasingly 
homogeneous world. And, in a small 
way, it recognizes the traditions and 
accomplishments of a people, the 
original inhabitants of Chesapeake 
Bay. 
But how shall a respect for the 
past guide our use of the Bay? From 
a practical perspective, there is 
undoubtedly much still to be learned 
about our ancestral Bay-users which 
is relevant to current concerns. 
Just as the Algonquians provided the 
first English colonists with the 
information they needed to survive in 
a new environment, so might they 
suggest how we can become 
reacquainted with ours. The 
intellectual poverty of any 
philosophy which justifies Man's 
attempts to dominate the environment 
should be obvious to all thinking 
individuals. As an alternative, the 
Indians' conception of Man as simply 
one element of the ecosystem, leaving 
aside their religious associations, 
is worthy of emulation. This need 
not involve a nostalgic adoption of 
primitive life-style. For modern 
Americans to adopt seventeenth-
century Algonquian culture because of 
a vaguely perceived sentimental 
attachment to the past would be 
inexpedient. Algonquian culture 
constantly evolved and adapted to 
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changing conditions and so must ours. 
However, certain elements of their 
ethic do seem relevant. For 
instance, a seventeenth-century 
Powhatan and a modern Virginian might 
be equally impressed by the 
complexities of an ecologist's 
explanation of Chesapeake Bay biomass 
systemics and equally at a loss to 
relate this concept to their daily 
activities. Even though they lacked 
a detailed ecological knowledge, the 
Indians were able to satisfy their 
needs without wreaking havoc with 
their environment, and still 
cultivate a love of nature. Such an 
ethic, if widely accepted and coupled 
with the vast amount of new 
information on the Bay, would be much 
preferable to the present situation, 
with innumerable individuals com-
peting for short-term gain. The link 
between past and present may at times 
seem tenuous, but unless we adopt a 
use ethic which, like that of the 
Chesapeake Algonquians, emphasizes 
respect and renewal, our culture will 
very soon belong only to the past. 
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Heritage and Historical Aspects of the Chesapeake Bay 
Dr. William H. Wroten, Jr., Professor Emeritus of History, Salisbury State College, 
Salisbury, Maryland 
Every region, every area of the 
world in some way has had its 
influence on man, and the impact of 
a specific geographical environment 
often determines the very funda-
mentals of daily life as well as 
the manners and morals of its 
inhabitants. In his book, The 
First Americans, Thomas Jefferson 
Wertenbaker recounts that early 
settlers from England thought to 
establish an English life-style on 
American soil, and soon found that 
their new life would be dictated by 
the physical attributes of the land 
on which they settled. In this way 
the early settlers in the Tidewater 
areas of the Chesapeake Bay were 
affected, and in turn, themselves 
affected the Bay area. 
A submerged lower valley of the 
Susquehanna River, the Chesapeake 
Bay, has played a principal part in 
the social, governmental, religious, 
economic and military life of its 
people. This great inland sea, 
handsome and historic, is the largest 
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body of water of its type in America 
and some say on earth. It splits 
both Maryland and Virginia into two 
parts, and although it is part of the 
mind and soul of a majority of 
Marylanders and many Virgini~ns, it 
offers recreation and leisure to 
hundreds of thousands of other 
Americans. The Bay is certainly a 
major reason for the value per acre 
of Maryland being among the highest 
in the nation, averaging over 
$2,000.00. 
The Bay is entirely within the 
boundaries of two states--Maryland 
and Virginia, although some of its 
major tributaries flow from other 
states, namely New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware and West 
Virginia. It has played a major role 
in the history of Maryland and 
Virginia but because of the size of 
the Bay waters in proportion to the 
size of the state itself, the 
influence has been greater in 
Maryland in various ways . 
Like other large water areas, 
the Bay has its own personality and 
character and moods. Now charming 
and gentle, now violent and 
ill-tempered, it is shaped by the 
tides and the winds. The ever-
changing surface provides constant 
variation in color and wave, and the 
progress of the seasons brings change 
to the interior of the waters as 
well, as evidenced by the lives of 
the watermen as they alternate 
between oystering, fishing, clamming 
and crabbing. 
The shifting patterns of the Bay 
with the constant effects of the 
varied weather conditions have 
wrought many changes over the years. 
Many shoreline or island communities, 
once thriving, have passed into 
oblivion, or at best are barely 
surviving. Gone completely are the 
communities of Holland, Barren, 
Sharps and Poplar Islands, all of 
which were settled years ago. Sharps 
Island, at the mouth of the Choptank 
River, was once hundreds of acres in 
size. Now it is completely under 
water and the only reminder of its 
existence is the lighthouse which 
leans like the Tower of Pisa from the 
effects of the winter ice masses. 
Barren Island, close to but off 
the shores of Hooper Island (first 
mentioned by Europeans when Captain 
John Smith sailed through Hooper 
Straits in 1608), now serves 
primarily as a barrier between the 
great forces of the Bay and some of 
the communities of the Hooper Island 
area. Barren Island has decreased in 
area from about 6,500 acres in 1660 
to 150 acres today. When Barren 
Island is finally washed away by the 
Bay waters, what will be left to 
protect the people of Hooperville, 
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Honga, Fishing Creek? Will they be 
next in the Bay's game of checkers? 
Poplar Island (including Coaches 
and Jefferson islands) at the 
entrance to Eastern Bay on the way to 
the Miles River, and separated from 
the mainland of the Eastern Shore by 
the shallow Poplar Island Narrows, is 
now owned by the Smithsonian 
Institution. Today the Island is 
inhabited only by a caretaker and a 
few visiting research personnel. 
Each year, foot by foot, its 
shoreline falls prey to tides, winds, 
waves and ice of the Chesapeake. 
When it, too, completely disappears 
the mainland of Talbot County will be 
unprotected. For unless the present 
patterns of the Bay change, it is 
only a matter of time before Poplar 
Island erodes into history. 
Geologically speaking, in a few 
thousand years the Delmarva Peninsula 
may be entirely eroded away and the 
waves of the Atlantic will be taking 
their toll on the mainland of 
Virginia and Maryland. 
The last of the present 
examples--Holland Island--is in its 
way unique when compared to the 
others. Whereas Poplar, Barren and 
Sharps islands once had a few 
families inhabiting them, Holland 
(before World War· I) could boast 
almost a thousand inhabitants. Once 
it was a typical prosperous 
watermen's community with church, 
school, stores and dwellings. 
Although some of the land is still 
above water, most of it has 
disappeared, and at present time 
claims as its only building a shelter 
for duck hunters. The only other 
sign of civilization is the old grave 
yard. A few years ago the author was 
fortunate enough to sail one day with 
a former native of the Island. When 
Capt. Major Todd's daughter asked, 
"Dad, where did you live?" the 
Captain raised his arm, pointed his 
finger to the Bay waters and replied, 
"Out there, about a half-mile." 
It was not long after World War 
I that the Island families began to 
pack up their belongings and stack 
them on the family workboats for the 
move to the mainland. A well-known 
"landmark" on main street in 
Cambridge (MD) is a small building 
moved from Holland during the 
migration and now used as a small 
eating place to serve breakfast and 
lunches. 
There are a few former Holland 
Island watermen, although in their 
eighties, still plying the waters of 
the Chesapeake to oyster and seek the 
blue crab. Decades may have passed 
but they hold to their rich heritage 
of the waterman's life. 
The two islands--Tangier, 
Virginia, and Smith, Maryland--still 
support small communities of proud, 
independent people. Each year acres 
of land from these Islands are lost 
to the Bay, and more people move to 
the mainland. Like many other 
watermen's areas these are becoming 
major attractions for tourists. 
In many ways the towns on the 
mainland shores along the Bay have 
seen changes similar to the islands, 
although they may not have 
disappeared to the bottom of the 
waters. Rare would be an area that 
cannot point out a community along 
the waterfront that underwent major 
changes because of the drama played 
out by the Bay. 
III-3 
Reedville, Virginia, comes to 
mind, as do Crisfield and Annapolis 
in Maryland. Reedville, on The Great 
Wicomico River, is one of the busiest 
commercial fishing ports on the 
Atlantic Coast. The large fish 
factories are active periodically 
when the fleet of bay and seagoing 
trawlers return with their menhaden 
or as an old Eastern Shoreman would 
say "alewives ". But what i mpresses 
one as he approaches the harbor by 
water, besides the noticeable aroma 
of fish products (meal and oil), is 
not so much the large fleet (if it is 
in) or the fish factories, but the 
number of abandoned buildings, 
wharves, and pilings. The decline of 
the menhaden alo~g the Atlantic coast 
helped to bring this change. It is a 
depressing scene, a sorry sight of 
what once was an active fishing 
community of many individual 
watermen; now the area is primarily 
the fish factory. 
About the middle of the last 
century, across the Bay and a little 
to the north of Reedville on the 
Little Annemessex River, Somers Cove 
was about to become Crisfield and the 
"Sea-Food Capital of the Country," 
described by one gentleman as "the 
rough and reeking headquarters of the 
oyster and crabbing fleets." Before 
the century ended, Crisfield was 
probably the biggest "boom-town" on 
the Chesapeake with all the good and 
bad characteristics one associates 
with such, be that mining, oil, or 
cattle towns. But by the middle of 
the present century the bountiful 
gifts of the Bay which had made 
Crisfield--oysters and crabs--were no 
longer available in such enormous 
quantities. Soon Crisfield, like 
Reedville, was characterized by 
abandoned boatyards, wharves, and 
oyster-crab houses. The boom days 
had passed . 
In the decades of the 1870's and 
80's the oyster became one of the 
most valued seafood products of the 
Atlantic Coast. During these years 
of record-breaking harvests, when the 
business ran into multi-millions of 
dollars, the Chesapeake and its 
tributaries became the battleground 
between oyster pirates (as many of 
the oystermen were referred to) and 
the Maryland Oyster Navy, newly 
created to bring peace to the Bay. 
As the demand for the bivalve 
increased, the two groups of 
watermen-- tonger and dredger--were 
feuding like the cattle ranchers and 
homesteaders of the same period on 
the western frontier. The tongers in 
their small boats using hand-tongs 
had been applying their trade for 
almost two centuries, staying for the 
most part in shallow waters of their 
own counties. But the dredge boat 
captains recognized no boundaries and 
considered any and all parts of the 
Bay open waters, and began to even 
invade the oyster beds that tongers 
considered their domain. It stands 
to reason that an individual tonger 
working with a pair of tongs could 
not reap as large a harvest as a 
schooner of many tons, with its 
rather large dredges (scoops) when it 
sailed across the oyster bars. 
So the tongers began to arm 
themselves against the invading 
dredgers and soon Maryland had its 
Oyster War. When the State of 
Maryland created the Oyster Navy and 
' police to protect tongers and bring 
peace to the Chesapeake, many of the 
dredge boat captains took to illegal 
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operations, especially at night when 
it was most difficult for the police 
to catch them. Now both sides with 
crews and vessels well armed would 
fight it out rather than surrender. 
Although conflicts between 
Maryland and Virginia watermen and 
between watermen of different 
counties within Maryland would 
continue for many more decades, the 
hey-day of Maryland's Oyster War had 
passed by the 1890's. For various 
reasons, among them the work of the 
Oyster Navy and the possible "over 
harvesting" of the oyster in the 70's 
and 80's, brought a change to the 
life of the waterman and the 
boom-towns they had helped to create, 
The oyster bonanza seemingly was 
worked out--generally speaking each 
decade after 1890 was showing the 
graph of production on a major 
downward trend. 2 
Annapolis, because of its 
central location in the Maryland 
colony, and because it was located on 
the Bay, became the capital in the 
1690's. For the rest of the colonial 
period and for a couple of decades 
into the 19th century it was not only 
the governmental center of Maryland 
but the social and cultural center as 
well, Its location and excellent 
harbor made it an important 
collection and distribution point of 
the Bay's resources--receiving the 
nickname of "Crab-Town", Except in 
the years before and around the time 
of the American Revolution, Annapolis 
has never been a major commercial 
port. And the day of the oysterman 
and crabber has given away to the 
tourists visits to historic Annapolis 
and the Naval Academy, and to the 
pleasure boatman for it is truly the 
sailing capital of the Chesapeake. 
One source reports: "Annapolis is 
said to have the largest concen-
tration of boatyards of any harbor in 
the United States ••• restoration of 
the waterfront areas ••• may make 
Annapolis 'as significant to 
Americans as Williamsburg and Mystic 
Seaport.'" 
Whereas many communities along 
the Bay shores have regressed, 
numerous articles and books have 
already been written about the 
history and economic growth of both 
Baltimore and the Hampton Roads 
Complex. These two areas were slow 
to develop in colonial times but in 
more modern days have become two of 
the great shipping and industrial 
ports of world commerce. 
From the very beginning, the 
Chesapeake having divided Maryland 
into an Eastern Shore and a Western 
Shore (and in Virginia to a much 
lesser extent), the Bay and its 
tributaries were the major lines of 
transportation and communication 
until well into the 20th century. 
The first major settlements and 
plantations were established along 
the shores because this tidewater 
region was most suitable for travel 
and commerce, both locally and for 
contact with foreign ports. Until 
modern times, ocean-going vessels 
could sail into harbors at 
Chestertown on the Chester River, 
Oxford on the Tred Avon, Vienna on 
the Nanticoke, Londontown on the 
South River, and Port Tobacco on Port 
Tobacco River up the Potomac to 
mention a few towns that were but are 
no longer important shipping centers. 
And probably as important as any 
other factor in the economic 
development of Maryland and Virginia 
in the colonial period is the fact 
III-5 
that ocean-going vessels could sail 
right up to the various plantation 
shores to load tobacco and other 
items for shipment to Europe or the 
West Indies. In those early days the 
arrival of the "tobacco fleet" was a 
day of great excitement. 
Later, with the coming of the 
steamboat some of the old ports 
slowly died away and their end was 
realized with the rapid development 
of railroad lines in the late 19th 
century and the more recent 
development of the highway systems of 
the 20th century. These two modes of 
transportation could better tap 
regions not located on rivers, and 
more important in the thinking of the 
present day, give faster delivery of 
goods and people. Yet, for most of 
man's settlement on the Chesapeake, 
from the establishment of Jamestown, 
Virginia, in 1607 and the 
establishment of a trading post on 
Kent Island, Maryland, in 1628, 
hundreds of communities had 
communication with each other and the 
rest of the world by way of their 
Bay. 
Before the railroads became the 
major haulers of inland goods from 
the new frontiers, and the super 
turnpikes were still in the far-away 
future (maybe the Cumberland Road 
could be considered an exception), 
water transportation was the means. 
In Maryland and Virginia, farsighted 
individuals tried to find means of 
connecting these outlying regions to 
the Chesapeake Bay. There were three 
important ventures of this nature. 
First, there was the Susquehanna and 
Tidewater Canal at the head of the 
Bay which reached the markets of the 
Susquehanna basin. The canal was 
completed in 1839 with the Maryland 
portion enabling the traders to 
overcome the obstacle of Smiths Falls 
and help the growth of Port Deposit, 
Maryland. For about f ifty years 
there was much activity as the barges 
brought the grains and lumber from 
Pennsylvania to the port of 
Baltimore. In the long run, once the 
railroad systems began to spread out, 
the canal could not compete and 
operation ceased about 1890. Just a 
shor t distance away another canal 
made its connection with the Bay. 
The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal was 
probably first proposed by Augustine 
Hermann as early as the late 1600's. 
However, construction for such a 
waterway did not begin until the turn 
of the 19th century and opened for 
traffic in 1829. The federal 
government purchased the canal about 
100 years later , improving upon it in 
many ways since. It is now a 
sea- level waterway, enlarged to a 
width of 400 feet and a depth of 35 
feet. The well-used canal not only 
shortened the distances between 
Philadelphia and Baltimore-Norfolk, 
but also is vital to pleasure boaters 
as a major part of the inland 
waterway between the Northeast and 
Florida . 
Historically, the best known of 
the three canals is the Chesapeake 
and Ohio, running from the District 
of Columbia on the Potomac to 
Cumberland, Maryland. The idea of 
having some system of waterways 
connecting the Chesapeake Bay with 
the Ohio River Valley was planned 
even as early as the days of George 
Washington. Although land trans-
portation through improved roads, 
especially with construction of the 
Cumberland Road, was helping to 
open up the New West, such 
transportation was still costly. 
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Water transportation, which basically 
had been the cheapest mode, found 
support among influential people, but 
until the 1820's there were still too 
many doubts and fears associated with 
undertaking such a bold venture to 
drum up the necessary political and 
especially financial support. 
The undreamed of success of the 
Erie Canal in New York State in 1825 
changed that. To see much of the 
trade and commerce which once came tQ 
the tidewater region going down the 
Hudson River to New York concerned 
the business and political leaders of 
Maryland and Virginia. On July 4, 
1828, President John Quincy Adams 
broke ground for the C & 0 Canal. 
(On the same day in Baltimore, 
Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the 
last surviving signer of the 
Declaration of Independence was 
breaking ground for the future 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the 
first of the nation's major rail 
networks.) Although there were short 
periods of rapid construction, 
overall progress was very slow 
because of financial and building 
problems. It was not until 1850 that 
Washington was connected with 
Cumberland, where the canal finally 
came to an end, and years after the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad had 
already arrived. The canal remained 
in operation until 1924--transporting 
primarily grain and coal--but it was 
never a financial success. (Even 
Coxey's Army used it for part of its 
famous march on Washington in 1894). 
In the end it too could not compete 
with the Iron Horse or motor truck. 
The Chesapeake and Delaware is the 
only one able to hold its own with 
the more modern means of transpor-
tation. Today the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Canal and its towpath is a 
National Historic Landmark to be 
enjoyed primarily by the hikers and 
bikers. 
During the canal building era, 
water transportation on the 
Chesapeake was a scene of activity 
and progress with change, During the 
18th and 19th centuries, various 
sailing craft of the watermen, the 
commercial schooners and famous 
Baltimore Clippers helped to make the 
Bay, its ports and shipyards centers 
of economic value, Before the close 
of the 19th century the oyster 
industry of the Bay was reaching 
record harvests and almost every 
river and Bay community had some 
association with the "bivalve" and 
the sailing fleet--especially places 
like Crisfield, Annapolis and 
Baltimore. From the late 19th 
century to the 1820's, or perhaps we 
should say the coming of the Yankee 
Clipper of New England, the Baltimore 
Clipper reigned supreme for speed on 
the high seas. The Baltimore Clipper 
achieved fame at home and abroad, 
The steamboat started early on the 
Bay but decades were to pass before 
it surpassed the sailing craft as the 
principal hauler of the area. Even 
today, though smaller in number, the 
beautiful, famous skipjacks of 
Maryland's oyster fleet still must 
dredge the oysters on certain days 
using only power of the wind on the 
sails--no motors are permitted on 
these commercial vessels, On some 
days, however, motor driven "push 
boats" may be used to move the 
skipjacks, The only skipjack to be 
built in almost thirty years will 
join the declining number of oyster 
boats this season. 
However, before the War of 1812 
with Great Britain was over, regular 
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steamship services were in operation, 
In Maryland the first service 
connected Baltimore with Frenchtown 
on the Eastern Shore, which in turn 
was connected to Philadelphia by a 
well traveled road, During the 
latter part of the 19th century and 
well into the 20th century, a large 
but rather simple system of steamboat 
routes connected just about every 
area of the Bay from its head to the 
Norfolk port at its mouth. The inner 
harbor of Baltimore (famed today for 
its rebuilding and cultural-economic 
progress) probably will not again see 
the activity of the days when Light 
and Pratt Streets were centers of the 
produce markets and literally every 
square foot of water and wharf space 
was taken up ' by commercial sailing 
craft and steamboats ferrying freight 
and people to and from bay and 
foreign ports. 
With the building of the Bay 
bridges and the dual highways since 
1952 all of this has changed, The 
steamship lines and power-freight 
craft have disappeared like the 
commercial sailcraft before them, 
Now the Bay and its large ports are 
taken over by the ocean-going vessels 
heading for Baltimore or Hampton 
Roads areas (occasionally one docks 
at Cambridge), the small workboats of 
the watermen, and the thousands of 
pleasure boats, both sail and power, 
Except for the Baltimore and Hampton 
Roads areas, there are no major ports 
on the Chesapeake, From time to time 
in recent years these two major 
harbors of the Bay have had economic 
booms and busts. Yet each still has 
the major resources to continue to be 
rated among the principal ports of 
the world. The Bay with all its 
assets should have even heavier boat 
traffic in the future--both 
commerical and pleasure. This should 
be true whether or no t the energy 
problem permits the f ossil fuel 
vessels to sail. Today, however, 
nei ther of the ports (for various 
reasons) is a ble to handle properly 
the number of vessels seeking 
products ( especially coal), as seen 
by the number of craft often anchored 
near the two major crossings of the 
Bay. "Commerce is the Lifeblood of 
Baltimore, and the Bay a vital 
artery. Here, as elsewhere, the 
Chesapeake 's health depends on man's 
good will ... 3 And an added related 
Bay traffic potential is the LNG 
unloading platform extending quite a 
distance into the Bay (at one of the 
narrowest points of the Bay) just 
north of Cove Point Light and south 
of t he Nuclear Plant at Calvert 
Cliffs. The platform is a mons t rous 
structur~, and although just recently 
completed at enormous expense is 
being l i ttle used because of economic 
and foreign problems. 
The earl y explorers and settlers 
of the Chesapeake wrote of the Bay's 
abundance of food from shellfish to 
waterfowl; yet there was to be no 
major economic exploitation of these 
resources until about two and 
one-half centuries later. The people 
may have enjoyed the fruits of the 
"Land of Pleasant Liv i ng" but few 
crabs and oysters were marketed 
elsewhere. After the Civil War and 
the rise of the United States as an 
industrial nation with the increase 
in city populations and the great 
advances in rapid transportation, 
refrigeration and canning techniques, 
the seafood industry mushroomed into 
a multi- mill i on dollar business in 
the Bay region. A number of 
communities became prosperous in a 
short period of time. The best 
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example (to repeat) was Crisfield 
which because of the railroad 
connection and the ability to supply 
shellfish--especially oysters--
changed from an area of a few 
isolated families to a beehive of 
oyster houses with trainloads of the 
Bay's delights being shipped to the 
metropolitan areas of the East Coast. 
Just before the turn of the century 
was probably the heyday, when the 
period from the late 1870's to the 
early 1890's saw record harvests of 
oysters, never again to be equalled. 
At that time about 15 million bushels 
annually were recorded only to drop 
to about 4 1 / 2 million bushels by 
1904. Since that time, although 
there have been periods of increased 
harvest, the overall trend has been 
downward. A noticeable sight along 
the wharves of the bay towns are 
abandoned oyster houses which once 
employed thousands of shuckers 
readying the oysters for the packing 
process. From time to time the 
edible blue crab--soft and hard--and 
the softshell clam (Maninoe) have 
helped the various communities see 
hope but the "glory" days are gone. 
Cambridge is an example of a 
community hoping for a "rebirth." 
Prior to World War II, Cambridge 
(which some consider to be the town 
in Michener's book, Chesapeake) was 
the largest town on the Delmarva 
Peninsula south of Wilmington, 
Delaware. But because of the decline 
of its important seafood and truck 
farming industry and the major 
decline of water transportation, it 
has not been able to keep pace. 
Incidentally, both Crisfield and 
Cambridge have rail lines that come 
to a dead end at the water's edge; 
and Crisfield tops Cambridge by 
having a dual highway beginning at 
the entrance to town and like the 
railroad tracks ending a short 
distance away at the shoreline, 
The great dependence on water 
transportation made necessary the 
means of maintaining the watergoing 
craft, thus the need for ship~s 
carpenters and shipyards, Hundreds 
of communities point with pride to a 
fading tradition associated with 
shipbuilding from the early 1600's to 
the present "Captain Jim" Richardson 
of Lloyds, Maryland. During most of 
the colonial period the emphasis was 
on small bay boats, but toward the 
end of the period a small number of 
boatbuilding centers were beginning 
to lay keels for ocean-going vessels, 
About the time of the American 
Revolution the craftsmen of the bay 
were skilled enough to adapt a new 
type of vessel--the schooner--to the 
characteristics of the Bay. Because 
of their ability to create fast 
vessels, more than 200 Maryland 
privateers used bay-built craft to 
inflict great damage to British 
commerce, while vessels for the new 
American Navy were sliding down the 
railways to do combat with the 
British Navy. 
Before long the Baltimore 
Clipper, so named because of its 
association with that port, was being 
built in shipyards at Fells Point and 
also on both sides of the Bay from 
Baltimore to Hampton Roads, 
Today, except for major yards in 
Baltimore and the Norfolk-Newport 
News area, most shipbuilding activity 
along the Chesapeake is limited to 
skilled craftsmen in small 
individually-owned boatyards, for 
example, Deltaville, Virginia, or 
Hooperville, Maryland, Today, as a 
tourist attraction a small vessel is 
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being constructed at Baltimore's 
Inner Harbor, 
This great Bay is part of every 
American's heritage for it was one of 
the first areas to be explored by the 
Europeans in the Golden Age of 
Discovery; the first of the English 
permanent settlements; and the scene 
of some of the most crucial sea and 
land battles of our history. It 
served as a major highway in the days 
of the great sailing vessels, and 
remains a vital avenue for seagoing 
commerce, harboring such shipping 
centers today as Hampton Roads 
Complex and Baltimore. On its shores 
were established some of the 
principles many Americans consider so 
important a part of our 
heritage--religious freedom and 
respresentative government, 
There has been much debate as to 
who may have been the first European 
explorer to visit the tidewaters of 
the Chesapeake--maybe John Cabot at 
the end of the 15th century--maybe 
not until Giovanni da Verrazano 
sailed along the Atlantic coast in 
1524--we know he touched the Atlantic 
shores of this region, but did he 
sail into the Chesapeake? In the 
1580's Sir Walter Raleigh wanted his 
colonists to settle in the protected 
haven of the Chesapeake rather than 
off the North Carolina coast, but we 
do not know whether they even entered 
the waters. Did Francis Drake enter 
the Bay while sailing along the coast 
in the 1580's? 
The Spanish (or to be more 
definite, Jesuits from Cuba) estab-
lished a short-lived mission on the 
York River in 1571 or 1572. A member 
of the 1572 voyage is supposed to 
have given us our first description 
of the Chesapeake which he said was 
called "Bay of the Mother of God" and 
that men who had sailed far and wide 
said it was the best and largest port 
in the world. In 1573 another 
Spanish voyager entered the Bay which 
the captain called "Bahia de Santa 
Maria." But as the Bay did not have 
mineral wealth, was not the sought 
after passage to the Pacific, and 
Spanish enemies had not settled here, 
Spain had no interest in the region. 
In 1588 during the war with England 
(Spanish Armada era) a voyage was 
made in search of English settlers 
and this time it is believed that the 
Spanish captain may have sailed to 
the head of the Bay before leaving, 
having discovered no English. In 
1603 the English entered the scene 
when an English ship seeking 
survivors of the ill-fated Raleigh 
colony (Lost Colony of Roanoke) 
sailed up Bay at least as far as the 
present Maryland-Virginia boundary in 
Tangier Sound. 
Four years later in 1607 the 
seeds for the future United States 
were planted with the first permanent 
English settlement at Jamestown on 
the shores of the James River. The 
following year Captain John Smith of 
that colony made his important 
exploration of the Bay. During two 
voyages of the spring and summer, 
Smith and his crews in a small open 
boat sailed along most of the Bay's 
shoreline and up a few of its 
tributaries--bringing back much 
valuable information. 
The Spanish returned again to 
discover that the English settlement 
at Jamestown was too strong to attack 
and they returned to the Caribbean 
yielding the bay area of Spanish 
claim to the invading English. 
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After the exploration by Captaio 
John Smith, and the retreat of the 
Spanish, the Bay area was a natural 
choice for future settlements by the 
English . William Claiborne, a 
resident of the Virginia colony, saw 
the possibility of using the upper 
Bay as a base for both trading posts 
and settlements which he established 
on Kent Island in 1631. Within three 
years (1634) Lord Baltimore's 
colonists established St. Mary's 
City. Maryland was the fourth 
English colony on the mainland and 
was to be the third of the so-called 
original 13 colonies. Thus out of 
the first three of the 13 original 
colonies, two had their beginnings on 
the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. 
These tidewater 
colonies--
centering their development around 
the Chesapeake and its tributaries--
contributed much to the roots of 
American civilization. In Virginia 
the very foundations of our precious 
representative government--the 
people-chosen legislative system was 
established in 1619--the first in t he 
New World. 
And although Maryland was a 
colony founded by a Catholic 
nobleman, and members of that faith 
could find haven along the shores of 
the Bay, this aspect of Maryland 
history has been over-emphasized at 
the expense of something of greater 
significance. The colony of Maryland 
under the plans and guidance of the 
first three Lord's Baltimore (that is 
the period between 1632 and 1692 ) was 
probably the most tolerant of all the 
colonies where religion was 
concerned--Freedom of Conscience was 
in a sense a major principle that 
Cecil Calvert, 2nd Lord Baltimore, 
desired for his colony and its 
settlers. As long as Lord Baltimore 
was in control, religious toleration 
functioned. Catholics, Jews, 
Quakers, Puritans, Anglicans, 
Presbyterians and Labadists were 
welcomed to the Chesapeake shores. 
Probably Maryland's greatest 
contribution to America was the 
famous Toleration Act (Act Concerning 
Religion of 1649). Even those driven 
out of other colonies, such as New 
England and Virginia, found a place 
which one Quaker from New England 
called the "End of Controversy." It 
was not along the shores of New 
England but the Chesapeake that a 
number of religious groups found 
their places in the New World--George 
Fox, founder of the Society of 
Friends, visited Quaker meetings on 
both sides of the Chesapeake before 
William Penn established 
Pennsylvania. Along the banks of the 
Pocomoke River, Francis Makemie 
founded the "mother" church of 
Presbyterianism. Francis Asbury and 
his friends at the famous Christmas 
conference in Baltimore established 
the Methodist Church in America. 
After the American Revolution, John 
Carroll (cousin of Charles Carroll of 
Carrollton) was ordained as the first 
Roman Catholic bishop of the United 
States. (About the same period of 
time Asbury at the Christmas 
conference was chosen the first 
Methodist bishop in the United 
States.) And later still, in the 
1820's, a sermon was preached in 
Baltimore which was to give birth to 
the Unitarians in America. Probably 
not until Pennsylvania was 
established in 1680's was there a 
colony as tolerant as Maryland. 
In one case women gained greater 
recognition with the appointment of 
Margaret Brent as executrix of 
Governor Leonard Calvert's estate in 
Maryland. In some respects one may 
claim that she was the first of a 
long line of women who have fought 
for their rights. 
Later historical events which 
took place in the Chesapeake Bay area 
and which shaped our nation's history 
were the military campaigns of 
Yorktown and Fort McHenry, the 
burning of Washington, D.C., and the 
battle between the Monitor and the 
Merrimac.4 
On the York River at Yorktown, 
Virginia, in 1781, General George 
Washington and the Continental Army 
with the aid of the French fleet 
under Admiral Francois DeGasse forced 
the surrender of the British Army 
under Lord Cornwallis in the battle 
of the Chesapeake, thus for all 
intents and purposes ending the 
American Revolution and ending our 
long struggle for the recognition of 
the ideas the Declaration of 
Independence had proclaimed. 
In the War of 1812, sometimes 
referred to as the Second War for 
Independence, numerous battles and 
raids on land and sea were fought 
along the shores of the Chesapeake, 
in fact, although the area may not 
have been a major battle front in the 
Revolution, it was in the War of 
1812. Rare was t he community on 
either side of the Bay which did not 
boast some engagement--however 
small--with the British Force. Of 
the many, Caulk's Field in Kent 
County; Georgetown in Kent County; 
Havre de Grace in Cecil County; and 
St. Michaels in Talbot County, all 
claimed to have helped turn the tide 
of victory for the American forces. 
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The two which have received the 
most recogni t i on are Washington-
Bladensburg and Bal timo r e. The 
Battle of Bladensbur g wa s a land 
engagement but t he Bri t i sh had made 
major use of t he Patuxent River for 
the advancement to Washington. The 
first was a major defeat for the 
America n forces permitting the enemy 
to occupy our capital and even enjoy 
a meal that Dolly Madison had 
pr epared for the President at the 
White House. Although Washington was 
of little, if any , military 
significance , the British did put 
bu i ldings t o t he t orch a nd the fact 
our capital had been captured and the 
government forced to retreat dealt a 
blow to America 's morale. 
On the ot her hand the Battle of 
Baltimore was a gain for both the 
Ame r ican military forces and morale. 
The British wanted revenge against 
Baltimore for it was the center of 
privateers and their major weapon 
against British commer ce-- the 
Baltimore Clippers. The repelling of 
the British land invasion by way of 
North Point at the mout h of the 
Patapsco and t he more famous defense 
against the British attack on Fort 
McHenry in the heart of Baltimore 
were military victories, Francis 
Scott Key desc r ibed this in verse in 
the words of "The Star Spangled 
Banner." The Battles of the 
Chesapeake were of great significance 
i n ending the War of 1812 . 
In the Civil War, one first 
thinks of the great generals, both of 
the Blue and Gray, and the terrible, 
bloody land campaigns, However, 
there were a few significant naval 
battles between Union and Confederate 
forces as wel l as the attacks and 
blockage running of the famous 
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Confederate ships , the Florida, 
Alabama and Shenandoah, Important 
though the river battles on the 
Mississippi and Mobile Bay may have 
been, none had the overwhelming 
impact of the battle between the 
"Ironclads" at Hampton Roads, If the 
defeat of the Virginia (Merrimac) by 
the Monitor did not turn the tide of 
possible Southern victory to eventual 
total defeat, at least it was to help 
bring about a major change in naval 
warfare, and in shipbuilding--the 
wooden sailing craft as an instrument 
of war was doomed, 
The Civil War also brings to 
mind an historical spot along the 
shores of the Bay which played a 
different role, but which has long 
s i nce disappeared . True, today there 
is still a Point Lookout at the mouth 
of the Potomac, and State of Maryland 
maintains a State Park in the 
vicinity . But the Point Lookout, 
where the famous Union Prisoner of 
War Compound was located, extended 
much further out into the water where 
the Potomac joins the Bay. The old 
Point Lookout Fort is now part of the 
Bay's bottom. 
These are rather well known 
events of American history that were 
played out in the Bay area, The 
people of the Chesapeake Bay region, 
in adapting themselves to the nature 
of their environment, helped shape 
our American heritage , and are justly 
proud of their accomplishments, 
Proud also are they of the varying 
details of their waterways and 
shorelines, and the ebb and flow of 
their tides, Allan C, Fisher Jr., an 
assistant editor of the NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC, recently wrote: 
For most of my life I have 
lived near or on the Chesapeake Bay, 
largest estuary on the East Coast, a 
place of surpassing beauty and, to 
the eye at least, remarkably 
unspoiled despite - ecological 
problems.. We who are privileged to 
dwell there, even in the cities on 
its shores, feel the Chesapeake 
imparts something special to our 
lives. At our doorstep we savor 
tranquility and changelessness. 
Walking, sailing, touring, we enter a 
more gracious past, return to the 
founding years. Fish and crab are 
still there to be taken, osprey and 
eagle still there to watch, and when 
autumn turns the shores into gantlets 
of flame for our boats to run, we 
welcome the beloved invaders, the 
more than 800,000 waterfowl that 
winter on the Chesapeake each year, •• 
Many people live like that 
on the Chesapeake and its tribu-
taries. But--there 's trouble brewing 
in our demi-Eden. 
This huge estuary is a very 
complicated ecological system ••• 
Ecological problems, even 
personal problems, invariably are 
forgotten when I ~ail the Chesapeake. 
I adopt an old Bohemian proverb: 
"Don't worry, just wonder," My 
Chesapeake is still so very lovely, 
with so little visible sign of 
malaise, that I become intent on 
clouds and wind, leaping fish and 
crying gulls, the scent of waves and 
the set of a sail • . • 
Over a hundred-year period, 
Maryland has lost approximately 
25,000 acres of Chesapeake shoreline 
to erosion, and Virginia has lost 
20,000 acres. The Corps of Engineers 
says the Bay has 410 miles of shore 
with critical erosion problems. 
My Chesapeake, unfortu-
nately, is ephemeral. In the grand 
scheme of geologic time, perhaps 
10,000 or 20,000 years from now, 
sediment from its rivers and shores 
and vanishing islands will fill it 
in, and it will be no more. Nothing 
man can do can arrest that fate. 
Long before then, will my 
Chesapeake be a dead inland sea? 
Will we have poisoned it? I don't 
think so. Man is not the unthinking, 
insensitive despoiler he once was. A 
thousand years from now, I believe 
shad and rockfish will seek out 
Chesapeake rivers to spawn, oyster 
spat will drift slowly down to the 
bottom through clean waters, foolish 
crabs will rise to the dip nets of 
watermen, ospreys will plunge intc 
blue waters, and Canada geese will 
ride the north wind to haven on my 
sheltered cove.5 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Although t he writer has spent most 
of his life on or very near the 
waters of the Chesapeake Bay that 
he dearly loves, this paper is not 
an attempt to present in any way 
an ethic--a moral judgment of how _ 
the past peoples of the Chesapeake 
Bay should have l i ved . Every 
individual has the right to judge 
those people by his own 
present-day standards, but as a 
person trained in the study of 
history the writer feels he should 
state what WAS and not SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN. Reserved for the reader is 
the privilege to draw conclusions. 
This paper is a brief hi storical 
perspective of the Chesapeake 
Bay--a presentation of a few 
important events associated wi th 
the region and an introductive 
acquaintance with some of the 
Bay's people. It i s hoped the 
readers will want to know more 
about the Bay and its people--past 
and present . If this paper has 
any value in the project "Use 
Ethics of the Chesapeake Bay" i t 
is as an historical background to 
the papers which follow. 
2. For a good, brief story of the 
Oyster War, see Jack Wennersten 
articles in the NATIONAL 
FISHERMAN, Vol. 61, No. 4, pages 
50-52, 94; Vol. 61, No. 5, pages 
46- 48; Vol . 61, No. 6, pages 
40-42. 
3. Allan C. Fisher, Jr . (photographs 
by Lowell Georgia) , "My 
Chesapeake-- Queen of Bays", 
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Vol. 158, No. 
4 (October , 1980), pages 466-467. 
A well presented article, highly 
recommended to ever yone interested 
in the Bay . 
4. A batt l e between Lord Baltimore's 
ships and William Claiborne's in 
the Pocomoke Sound area in 1635 is 
said to have been the first naval 
battle in what were to become 
United States waters. · The Battle 
of the Severn, between Lord 
Baltimore's forces and those of 
the Maryland Puritans in 1655 is 
said to have been the first land-
sea engagement. 
5. Fisher, op. cit., pages 431, 446, 
461, 467-.- For anyone interested 
in the results of a recent survey 
poll (individuals and special 
interest groups) concerning the 
Chesapeake , see Patricia S. 
Florestano and Patricia A. 
Rathburn, ATTITUDES OF SPECIAL 
INTEREST GROUPS AND THE GENERAL 
PUBLIC ON CHESAPEAKE BAY ISSUES, 
Publication #UM-SG-TS-80-04, Sea 
Grant Program, University of 
Maryland, February 1980. For 
individuals interested in a 
lengthy study where in the 
"decision-making, bureaucracy 
system" plays a major role, highly 
recommended is the Corps of 
Engineers publication, CHESAPEAKE 
BAY FUTURE CONDITIONS REPORTS, 
1977-78. This is 12 vols. (a 
different facet of study for each 
volume) projecting uses of the Bay 
until the year 2020. 
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St. Mary's - The Mother Country of 
Maryland and the Crossroads 
Mr. Burton K. Kummerow, Historian, St. Mary's City Commission, St. Mary's City, 
Maryland 
"Where's St. Mary's County?" 
You unfold a Maryland road map and 
patiently point to the spot southeast 
of Washington, D.C. "Isn't St. 
Mary's on the Eastern Shore?" "No, 
it's on the Western Shore which is 
really quite different." The 
northern tip of the county is just an 
hour's drive from the Washington 
Beltway and yet it's a world apart. 
How ignorant most people are of 
Chesapeake Bay geography? 
The Bay, of course, has an 
endless series of nooks and crannies. 
But, once you've located the slender 
peninsula that is the Mother County 
of Maryland, it becomes an obvious 
feature on the map. All of Maryland 
flows into Point Lookout at the 
confluence of the Potomac River and 
the widest part of the Chesapeake. 
That tiny fingertip of land points 
straight to the mouth of the Bay and 
the Atlantic Ocean beyond. 
St. Mary's County is the embodi-
ment of the Chesapeake Tidewater. 
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Two major highways are backbones that 
cut through the center of the 
peninsula. All the rest of the roads 
radiate out to hundreds of miles of 
waterfront. It's not unusual to see 
a destination that's a quarter of a 
mile away by water and 20 miles by 
land? St. Mary's and Calvert 
counties have shared a boundary at 
the mouth of the Patuxent River for 
over 300 years. The first bridge 
between the two arrived in 1978~ 
The Thomas Johnson Bridge 
demonstrates how recently Southern 
Maryland has turned its face from the 
Bay and begun to look back over its 
shoulder. Today, St. Mary's County 
struggles with the State Highway 
Administration to get its share of 
bypasses and dual highways. Auto-
mobiles are essential to commute to 
and from county services. Just a 
decade ago, however, there were only 
a handfull of stop lights throughout 
the whole area and the nearest fast 
food was 2 hours up the road. The 
modern world is winn i ng the battle as 
St. Mary's is being dragged kicking 
and screaming into the 20th century. 
No matte r where you are in St. 
Mary's, navigable wa t er i s only a few 
minutes away. Water continues to 
pe rvade the life of the county . 
Every issue of the weekly newspaper 
is filled with watermen's reports, 
pictures of the week's biggest fish 
catches, ecological issues and 
romantic pictures of the serene 
Tidewater landscape. And St. Mary's 
still puts its best face to the 
water. Try a drive through the 
monotonous and ramshackle environment 
of Route 235 . Then cruise into the 
mouth of the Potomac, past Point 
Lookout and up into the St. Mary's 
River. The landscape has certainly 
changed, but it's hard to imagine 
that Governor Leonard Calvert, the 
leader of the 1634 expedition that 
founded Maryland, would be upset by 
what he saw. 
The image of Gove rnor Calvert 
and his 140 settlers s a iling up to 
the first Maryland settlement is an 
important ingredient in county life. 
The 350th anniversary of that event 
is only a few years away . The 
continuity of 3 1/2 centuries of 
largely undisturbed rural life is a 
unique commodity in American life. 
St. Mary's is proud of these ties to 
the past. Banks, libraries, 
restaurants and even bars display 
images of Lord Baltimore's ships, the 
"ARK" and the "DOVE". The county 
phone book is filled with family 
names. Fenwick, Briscoe, Cheseldyne, 
Blackstone, Coombs and Gardiner all 
go right back to the 1630's tax 
lists. Two of the annual county 
festivals celebrate the achievements 
of those first settlers. One 
celebration , "Maryland Day", is a 
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holiday recognized throughout 
Maryland. 
This county pride in its 
centuries old heritage has spanned 
the usual set of history museums and 
historic houses. One of these 
efforts, supported by the State of 
Maryland, is researching and 
developing the site of Maryland's 
first capital at St. Mary's City. A 
quality research program has 
accumulated some startling new 
information about the 17th century 
Chesapeake frontier. One of the St. 
Mary's exhibits, a reconstructed 17th 
century ship called the "MARYLAND 
DOVE", is already plying the waters 
of the Chesapeake. 
The 350 year St. Mary's love 
affair with the Bay waters began with 
the world trade of the British 
empire . The finger of land at Point 
Lookout pointed to the hub of that 
trade in London. As one of the 
spokes on the imperial wheel, the St. 
Mary's frontier existed for the 
annual visit of the high-sterned and 
square rigged British merchant ships. 
In exchange for the "stinking 
sotweed" that was the rage among 
European smokers, the ships brought 
manufactured goods from all parts of 
a growing empire. St. Mary's City 
archaeologists have excavated pieces 
of British, Dutch, German, Spanish, 
Portuguese, Chinese and even Turkish 
pottery brought into Maryland between 
1634 and 1750. Lord Baltimore's 
colony was on the edge of a vast and 
cosmopolitan economic network. 
The focus changed after the 
American Revolution. Tobacco 
planters still built homes along the 
water's edge and continued to trade 
with passing ships and boats. But 
the markets now centered on the Bay 
and its tributaries. Baltimore 
replaced London as the prime market 
place, and the Chesapeake watermen 
developed distinctive sailing vessels 
that survived until welt into the 
20th century. At the time of the 
Civil War, sail was complemented by 
the advent of the steamboat, Many 
St, Mary's County residents still 
remember the daily visits of side-
and stern-wheelers that rivalled the 
best of the flat-bottomed carriers on 
Mark Twain's Mississippi, The luxury 
and convenience of steamboat travel 
marked the golden age of Chesapeake 
Bay transportation. 
Railroads and automobiles 
eventually eclipsed and then shut 
down the steamboat lines, St, Mary's 
County was still facing the water 
when the last steamers came through 
in the 1920's. There was no adequate 
replacement when the network on the 
Bay ceased to exist, The railroads 
never found a lucrative reason to 
extend into the county, During the 
great depression, St, Mary's turned 
into a backwater that was almost 
forgotten except for a short surge of 
interest when the Mother County 
celebrated its 300th birthday. The 
St, Mary's peninsula saw a window to 
the world shrink to a regional market 
that was in turn almost completely 
cut off in the 1930's. Through it 
all, countians remained married to 
the tobacco and seafood that had 
sustained their way of life for over 
300 years. 
It's interesting to speculate 
how isolated southern Maryland would 
have continued to be without the 
Second World War. The automobile 
made inroads in the 1930's, but St, 
Mary's became a picture post card 
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anachronism for the rest of the 
nation, National Geographic 
photographers chronicled decaying 
colonial mansions and teams of oxen 
pulling tobacco hogsheads. The U.S. 
Navy, however, had always seen the 
value of Tidewater real estate so 
close to Washington, D,C, The first 
good map of the area was a product of 
the federal government's search for a 
deep water naval base after the War 
of 1812, There was continued 
interest during the Civil War, and, 
120 years after the earliest 
investigations, the Navy finally 
found a home in the county, not for 
its ships, but for its growing fleet 
of aircraft. 
The Patuxent Naval Air Station 
has been the single most important 
force in bringing St, Mary's into the 
20th century. As one of the Navy's 
largest test facilities, it is the 
county's greatest employer. The air 
base has exerted immense influence 
for almost 40 years. It has brought 
electricity and sewers, created 
Lexington Park, the most populous 
county community, and has generated 
the roads that now link St, Mary's 
with the rest of Maryland's western 
shore. The county population had 
hardly changed for the hundred years 
before 1940, and then tripled in just 
three decades, Today it is hard to 
imagine St, Mary's without "Pax 
River" sprawling over thousands of 
acres at Cedar Point, 
Other pressures are now 
encroaching on the rolling farmland 
and waterfront, The area has always 
been an enticing spot for the sailor 
and sport fishermen, and as many as 
300,000 visitors a year fish, crab, 
sunbathe and camp at Point Lookout 
State Park. St, Mary's County has 
been called "Maryland's best kept 
secret," but the wor d is spreading. 
Southern Maryland might be a 
major resort area were it not for a 
couple of serious "flaws." There is 
nothing quite so oppressive as a hot 
and muggy August day. Many vacation 
spots are hot in the summer, but few 
have the frustrating combination of 
heat and nettles - the stinging 
nettles, million of jelly fish that 
drift into every inlet after July 
4th. These "flaws" have prevented 
overdevelopment for the sake of fun 
in the sun. Attempts at resort 
development have sputtered, but 
residential improvements are 
accelerating. The area is increas-
ing l y popular as a retirement 
community, especially for military 
who have discovered Southern 
Maryland's charms while stationed at 
the Pax River Air Station. The ever 
expanding Washington suburbs are 
beginning to march into the north end 
of St. Mary's County. 
Sixty thousand people reside in 
St. Mary's County. At the end of 
World War II, the total population 
was less than 15,000. There are 
several sizeable subdivisions, dual 
highways and at least a dozen fast 
food restaurants in Lexington Park. 
It's the typical pattern--a rural 
area falling prey to suburban sprawl 
and the pressures of over-population. 
There is the added attraction of 
waterfront property which gives the 
development a strange twist. While 
the rest of the county is promoting 
the usual improvements close to the 
highways and roads, the waterfront 
attracts upper middle class 
residents. These newcomers are 
willing to pay inflated prices to 
gain access to the Tidewater. 
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They've escaped the suburban blight 
and want no part of change to the 
landscape after they've arrived. 
Their recreational use of the water 
has all but outstripped the present 
commercial uses. 
St. Mary's County has a 
fascinating blend of old and new. 
The transient military and civilians 
who work for the federal government 
swell the county population but are 
hardly a part of it. They are the 
veneer that comes and goes with 
government contracts. They are the 
source of the haphazard strip 
development called Lexington Park and 
have little interest in or commitment 
to the future of the county. 
Then there are the retirees and 
lovers of the Tidewater who have 
chosen the area because of its rural 
charm. They are generally comfort-
able, articulate and conservative 
about change. They have tasted the 
pressures of modern American life and 
have fled to the country. The 
recreational use of the Bay and its 
inlets often consumes much of their 
lives. They are logical recruits for 
"Save the Bay" causes. 
And then there are the "old" 
residents of St. Mary's, the "locals" 
who have watched the modern world 
march into the county in the last few 
decades. Many of these families have 
lived and worked in Southern Maryland 
since the great influx of English 
immigrants in the 1600's. The truth 
is the population hardly grew between 
1700 and 1940. So, poor or wealthy, 
the families are aware of a 
continuity that has only recently 
been altered. 
Witness two men who now reside 
in St. Mary's County . The first is 
John Mitchell Morgan, a burly 
barnwright with well over a dozen 
children. He builds tobac~o barns 
and still uses the t raditional skills 
he learned from his grandfather: 
Early in the 1920's ••• , the boy , 
John Mitchell Morgan, entered a 
household that was more isolated than 
most households today from any cities 
or large centers of trade, and also 
was more sufficient to its own daily 
needs; for, like many small farmers 
for centuries before them, Morgan' s 
grandparents could do a great deal 
besides grow corn and tobacco. They 
drew most of their own fo od from the 
farm itself: vegetable garden, 
livestock, and fruit trees - apple, 
pear, cherry, walnut. They also 
fished, hunted and trapped in the 
woods nearby . 
Morgan's grandfather, George 
Washington Burch, was an expert 
woodworker as well as a farmer. 
"Anything of wood," says the 
grandson, "well, he could make it": 
tables, chairs, ax handles, cart and 
buggy wheels, shingles, tobacco 
sticks, fence palings, split baskets, 
ox bows, harrows, watering troughs, 
barns and outbuildings. He. hewed out 
a very large log and built his own 
tobacco prize - screw jack, pins, and 
all. He supplemented the family's 
cash income in the winter, or 
whenever the crops were not being 
worked, by making and selling 
furniture, farm tools, and hoops for 
the hogsheads that carried tobacco 
out of nearby ports to market. 
Working and living were not 
separate for the Burches. Everyone 
worked, even the dogs - they were to 
help the hunters, for there was no 
such thing as a dog kept simply as a 
"pet" - and there was work even for a 
child such as Morgan was. As the 
smallest member of the family, he did 
the chores most suited to him: 
climbed a nearby tree to put up two 
turkey roosts for his grandmother's 
birds; milked the cows and herded 
them from the swamp to the cow pen 
and back; squeezed himself somewhat 
reluctantly into the tight space 
under the porch to find eggs laid by 
the hens there. He also watched his 
grandparents and gradually learned 
how they kept the house livable, 
gathered food, and readied the crops 
for shipment.* 
Another county resident is close 
to his ninetieth birthday. He may be 
Maryland's oldest working waterman. 
Clearence Biscoe still tongs for 
oysters and is the acknowledged 
patriarch of the St. Mary's River 
oyster fleet. He and his wife have 
lived as long as anyone can remember 
on a picturesque farm near the mouth 
of Carthagena Creek (called Cathy 
Gene by the residents). He has led a 
robust, outdoor life, and has missed 
Sunday services at St. George's 
Church only 2 or 3 times in the last 
40 years . He often talks of the days 
that he hauled freight up and down 
the Chesapeake Bay with large 
schooners . Visitors drop in 
frequently to share his vast 
experience, and follow him around the 
*Excerpted from The House at Queen Tree, by Jane Perkinson, 1978. 
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yard as he attends to his never-
ending chores. When pressed about 
the changes in Bay waters, Mr. Biscoe 
squints his eyes. "We had everything 
we needed right here in this creek 
and it was a good life, now days ya 
gotta search hard for it." 
The St. Mary's community honors 
its citizens who lived and worked in 
the county when the old ways 
prevailed. A county physician, 
recently retiring after a 64 year 
practice, was featured on several 
occasions in local newspapers. A 
veteran waterman and tobacco 
auctioneer are serving as county 
commissioners. Change has yet to 
erase continuity. 
This continuity has its negative 
side. Southern Maryland has become a 
laughable anachronism to Washington 
newspapers. One article pointed to 
the Judge Roy Bean type of justice 
that is prevalent in St. Mary's and 
Charles counties. Another referred 
to the 7th voting district of St. 
Mary's as Maryland's "Barbary Coast." 
The 7th district is, to be sure, an 
unusual place. Residents in that 
very rural area along the Potomac 
still talk seriously about oyster 
wars. A couple of barns have 
mysteriously burned within the last 
year. Local farmers and watermen are 
sporting brand new caps emblazoned 
with the words "Barbary Coast." 
Quaint or backward, St. Mary's 
has a 350 year old relationship with 
the Chesapeake Bay, and a large stake 
in its future. There are both good 
and bad signs of what may happen in 
the years ahead. In spite of the 
obvious influence of development and 
population growth, St. Mary's County 
is trying to cope intelligently with 
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this change. The sad fact is that so 
much of the reaction to change has to 
be negative. 
The county is way ahead of its 
neighbors in Southern Maryland in 
planning its future on paper. The 
planning documents produced in the 
1970's could be adequate guidelines 
for the 1980's and 90's. These 
documents call for careful control of 
the large population centers and 
preservation of county wetlands and 
waterfront with residential zoning 
and public ownership. But the 
execution of this planning is putting 
the county's future in jeopardy. 
Attractive real estate 
opportunities have created a perfect 
climate for developers. Strip 
development continues at a fast rate 
both in population centers and along 
the major county roads. The county 
government, still glued to the old 
family political structure, seems 
unable to cope with the power of the 
market place. This same structure is 
suspicious of using big government 
funds to implement preservation and 
other public works programs. 
Recently, the County Commission told 
the Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources that it wanted no part of 
state acquisition of county wetlands. 
But, in the midst of this 
deteriorating situation, there is an 
element that is fighting wholesale 
change. True, the reaction to change 
is essentially negative. County 
residents are fiercely anti-industry. 
While nearby counties were welcoming 
nuclear plants and natural gas 
depots, St. Mary's fought and 
defeated the development of an oil 
refinery. Local people created the 
Potomac River Association and stymied 
a lobby with influential support even 
in the face of obvious economic 
benefits for the county. The only 
industry welcomed in recent years has 
been a Japanese eel processing plant 
at Piney Point. Woe be it to the 
company that takes on the anti-
industry lobby in the county! 
St. Mary's countians enjoy 
arguing about changes in their 
traditional life style. Letters to 
the editor are read avidly in the 
weekly newspapers. Public meetings 
are always well attended. Everything 
from new sewers, to public land 
acquisition, to new restaurants and 
marinas are all debated with 
enthusiasm. Some say that there 
isn't much else to do in St, Mary's. 
True or not, the fact remains that 
public issues draw crowds and 
opinions in Southern Maryland. 
A Chesapeake Bay ethic needs an 
audience to accept or reject it, St. 
Mary's County has such an audience 
with a strong sense of tradition and 
a strong commitment to the quality of 
its life close to the water, This 
commitment is often wrongheaded and 
woefully ignorant, It is also 
dangerously fragile as the county 
embraces the "good life" that is 
being imported from the Baltimore-
Washington metropolitan areas, But 
it has already had its share of 
successes in preventing industrial 
inroads and demanding attention to 
ecological problems. The combination 
of local newspapers and watermen drew 
attention to the woes of the Patuxent 
River. This alliance brought enough 
publicity to the problem to mobilize 
the Governor and, in turn, the 
Department of Natural Resources, For 
the first time in its history, the 
Patuxent may receive concern rather 
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than neglect from public agencies. 
St, Mary's County is as confused 
about the future as everyone else, 
The environmental movement, however, 
has a local audience that will listen 
and debate a well thought-out program 
of action, The Mother County of 
Maryland, like other communities next 
to the water, lives with the Bay and 
its problems on a daily basis. It 
represents the grass roots foundation 
that can listen, reflect and assist 
in securing the future survival of 
the Chesapeake, 
APPENDIX 
A CHESAPEAKE BAY QUESTIONNAIRE 
(This ques tionnaire will be sent to 200 St. Mary's 
Count y res i den t s to sample their present thinking 
about the Bay and its problems . It would be useful 
to compare this sample with others collected in 
urban or suburban areas.) 
1 . How closely do you follow Bay problems? 
2, What condit i on is the Bay i n? 
3. Wha t are the Bay's major problems? 
4. What sources of informati on do you trust? 
5. Who should be in charge of: a, Monitoring problems 
b, Developing solutions 
c . Implementing changes 
6. What is the Bay used for today which you consider an improper use? 
7, Do you see the Bay's future to be beyond your influence? 
The general public's influence? 
8. Do you feel well enough informed about the Bay to participate in 
the shaping of public policy? 
9 . Should the Bay be managed for the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people? Is there any merit in preserving the Bay in 
ways which do not appear to benefit humans? 
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Nature as Symbol: The Chesapeake Bay 
Dr. Mary Kleinhans Blair, Academic Consultant, Maryland Committee for the Humanities, 
Baltimore, Maryland 
r. 
A human tendency, even need, is 
to see nature not as mere rocks, 
water and trees, but to see beyond 
them, through them, to whatever it is 
that they stand for. We regard that 
particular collection of things as 
indicating something larger than 
themselves. They resonate in us as 
if they were more than intricate 
groups of cells. We think that 
nature means. It stands as symbol 
for something beyond itself, and it 
is that symbolic use we make of 
nature that is the subject of this 
paper. I want first to examine how 
we see and use nature as symbol, 
particularly in the American 
tradition, and then to examine one 
major and specific piece of nature, 
the Chesapeake Bay, to understand how 
those who work on, live near, own or 
visit the Bay come to prize it as 
symbol, as something beyond an 
estuary, a complex marine environ-
ment, a shipping lane, a place to 
sail, a shoreline for development, a 
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source of food. 
The desire to see nature as an 
embodiment of something beyond it 
springs from an ancient need to 
control the world and must have 
occurred very early in human history. 
Primitive man's hold on the world 
depended on much more than his small 
skills, on accident, weather, 
vegetation, geography and game, and 
so he began to cultivate the powers 
behind these things. I quote from 
John Stewart Collis' book, "The 
Triumph of the Tree: 
"Having become aware of objects 
and begun to name them, this earliest 
man became aware of something else. 
It is a remarkable fact that no 
sooner had he looked closely at the 
phenomena of Nature than he began to 
concern himself with, not the visible 
object in front of him which he could 
clearly see, but with an invisible 
object which he could not see at all. 
He looked at the trees, the rocks, 
the rivers, and animals, and having 
looked at them he at once began to 
talk about somethi ng in them which he 
had never seen and nev~heard of. 
The thing inside the objective 
appearance was called a god. No one 
forced man at this time to think 
about gods, there was no tradition 
imposing it upon him--and yet his 
first thoughts seem to have turned 
towards a Thing behind the thing, a 
Force behind or within the 
appearance. Thus worship .... " 
Of cour se, we cannot know the 
exact shape of that early religious 
impulse, but Collis cannot be far 
wrong. Primitive man needed to know 
what power made i t rain, what made 
game appear, and the need created 
worship. If gods lived inside the 
clouds and plants, then nature must 
be approached with caution and 
respect. The Thing inside could be 
courted, propitiated, bargained with, 
and thus the instability of the 
natural world would be brought 
somewhat under human control. Those 
forces were so fully embodied in the 
object that man grasped the spirit of 
the thing through the physical 
reality of the thing. The god is 
absolutely identified with the thing 
itself, and there is no separation 
between matter and spirit. The whole 
world, every object, is fully and 
equally alive. 
Although such an animistic view 
of the world now survives only among 
primitive societies, in cultures like 
our own the willingness to interpret 
nature, to see parts of it in anthro-
pomorphic terms, is still very much 
with us. The form that willingness 
takes is more often artistic and 
literary than religious; it is not a 
god in the river or eagle we see, but 
a human quality we project into such 
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objects. They become direct visual 
symbols of particular character-
istics, or we yoke them to certain 
attributes through language. For 
most Americans, a picture of an eagle 
gives immediate suggestions of the 
spirit of national freedom. When the 
poet William Butler Yeats speaks of 
"the ravens of unceasing thought," he 
links the black ominous birds to a 
restless and brooding mind, and in 
the process does something with words 
that a picture can never do. Few of 
us are such careful poets as Yeats, 
but confronted with the power, 
expanse or beauty of nature, all of 
us are given to reading meaning into 
it, either through language or 
through visual associations. 
We make those interpretive acts 
for many reasons, though three seem 
most important. We read into nature 
because we have a genuine emotional 
response to nature and we want to 
give expression to it. We read into 
nature because, by attributing 
anthrophmorphic characteristics to 
it, we make it less alien. There is 
clearly a wildness in nature that 
both attracts and disquiets us. Its 
silence and strangeness are hard to 
bear, so we tame that wildness by 
giving it human qualities. At 
furthest extreme, we trivialize it by 
reducing animals and landscapes to 
cartoons and advertising displays.1 
Finally we read into nature because 
in so doing nature becomes a channel 
of self-discovery. When we choose 
words or symbols to indicate what 
nature might stand for, we reveal 
ourselves, values, ideas and 
ignorance. Nature becomes a mirror 
for us, at times an instructive 
mirror, and at times our reflection 
so absorbs us that we fail to see the 
substantive reality of nature itself. 
When we treat the natural world 
as symbol, we are in a fundamental 
and subtle way using nature to serve 
us. Yeats' phrase tells us more 
about human obsession than. about 
ravens. The presidential seal gives 
little information about real eagles. 
We are not using nature in the 
physical sense of exploitation or 
manufacture or cultivation, but we 
are bending it to some very human 
ends. This is a use not commonly 
considered, certainly not one subject 
to regulation or management. The 
task given to the ten scholars 
writing papers on the Chesapeake Bay 
is to explore a "use ethic" for this 
one natural region. Most of the 
other scholars deal with a balance 
between pragmatic uses: shipping, 
shellfish harvest, recreation. But 
in regard to the use of nature as a 
source of symbols, something we all 
do, it is difficult to say what 
constitutes an ethical interpretation 
and what does not. Far easier to 
judge symbols on esthetic grounds, A 
poor sort of interpretation, an 
"unethical symbol" if you will, is 
one that cultivates in us a 
sentimental attitude about nature 
or panders to a sense of self-
congratulation, Our only defense is 
to be aware of the effect symbols 
have on us, To be "ethical," we must 
know when and how we are using nature 
to stand for something else, If we 
are conscious of that use, then we 
may learn something about ourselves; 
if we struggle to go beyond our 
interpretations to the workings of 
nature itself, then we may learn 
something about it; when we are 
unconscious about projecting human 
meanings into nature, then we court 
our own ignorance, 
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II 
Different cultures interpret 
nature according to their history and 
to the terrain and vegetation of 
their land,2 Since our primary 
interest is in the various 
associations attached to the 
Chesapeake Bay, a look at how two key 
American thinkers interpreted nature 
will establish an American cultural 
context for us. Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Herman Melville are significant 
because, among 19th century figures, 
they were supremely conscious about 
attempting to discover what nature 
meant, In contrast to Europe, 
America had such a vastness of space 
and such an abundance of uncultivated 
wilderness; both men were certain 
that this na~ure had a distinct 
spiritual dimension, that it was a 
channel for discovering a kind of 
universal significance, This effort 
to unearth the symbolic meaning of 
natural objects is far less prevalent 
among 20th century writers, largely 
because they do not share the 
conviction that nature stands for a 
spiritual entity beyond itself, But 
because contemporary writers borrow 
natural objects as a source for their 
symbols, they have inherited some of 
the presumptions and terms of Emerson 
and Melville, If we want to know how 
nature evokes ideas for us, it is 
best to begin with two men who 
devoted a major portion of their 
intellectual lives to this problem. 
Emerson was the first American 
able to look at particular parts of 
nature--one field, one pond, one 
pebble--and see the metaphorical and 
moral possibilities offered by the 
natural world immediately around him, 
He proposed to define exactly how 
these objects work on us and how our 
minds bring ideas to nature; he 
detailed that process so that we 
might cultivate it in ourselves. 
Emerson was not a naturalist, but a 
cleric, moralist, philosopher, 
believer. In 1829 he was ordained a 
Unitarian minister. Religion among 
the Unitarians was orderly, based on 
logic and reason . Emerson was 
increasing ly restless with such 
theology because it did not confront 
the believer with an immediate and 
compelling sense of God's power. It 
presented him with words, books, 
received doctrine, the ideas of 
others, histor y, tradition, in short, 
with Europe, but he wanted to 
apprehend directly both ideas and 
things. He wanted not to receive the 
wisdom of others, but to have that 
wisdom immediately revealed to him, 
to enjoy "an original relation to the 
universe." Only his experience with 
nature made him feel so confronted. 
In "Nature," his most important 
essay, published in 1836, he speaks 
of walking on Concord Common, seeing 
the trees at winter twilight "without 
having in my thoughts any occurrence 
of special good fortune, I have 
enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am 
glad to the brink of fear." This 
sense of transport has come to him 
through his eyes, through vision 
alone, come immediately, without 
logic or contemplation. He intuits 
something from the objects themselves 
which so move him that he speaks of 
becoming "a transparent eyeball; I am 
nothing; I see all; the currents of 
the Universal Being circulate through 
me; I am par t or parcel of God." 
What passes through him is the 
connecting link between things--
trees, sky , snow--and God. He is but 
a transparent medium for that 
exchange. He has gone through the 
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thing to whatever it is that is 
behind the thing, to a union with the 
Universal Being. 
Such experiences made Emerson 
sure that he was connected to 
something larger than himself, and he 
wanted to reach it not just by 
fortuitous accident, but by ardent 
and disciplined cultivation, Hence 
he values sight, intuition, reve-
lation, the power of the unaided 
individual mind to grasp not just the 
scene before him, but the spirit 
which must lie behind such beauty. 
He never doubts that behind such 
natural objects there is indeed a 
spiritual reality, something to go 
through the object to. No external 
combination of form and color alone 
could make us feel so possessed. We 
can then use those objects, that 
beauty to transcend the world around 
us into that purer realm of spirit 
which is only indicated by the 
external world, 
In Emerson's terminology, the 
world is composed of matter and 
spirit, those things we can touch and 
those things known by the mind alone. 
What interested him was the 
connection between the two distinct 
realms and the expansion of the world 
of the spirit by the observation of 
the natural world. It was perfectly 
obvious to him that our ideas were 
enriched and amplified by things, 
matter, the natural world, We 
understand so much more clearly the 
idea of cunning by observing the fox. 
Without the fox, the idea of cunning 
is abstract, immature, thin, Rocks 
help convey to us the idea of 
firmness; small white wood flowers 
suggest to us the idea of innocence 
which we might not grasp without the 
presence of the flowers, The 
correspondence between matter--foxes, 
rocks , flowers--and spirit--cunning, 
firmness, innocence--seems slightly 
mechanical, but both obvious and true 
once pointed out. Emersofrwas fully 
sure that all natural objects and 
events--"natural facts" he called 
them-- would correspond to ideas or 
"spiritual facts" if we could but 
discipline our eyes to see s uch 
objects correctly. Nature wastes 
nothing ; all is there for a purpose. 
What exactly he would have made of a 
bonito tuna or a toucan is a little 
obscure, but he seems certain they 
too would yield a meaning. We ascend 
to the world of ideas, of spirit by 
analogy, by correspondences, by 
metaphor. 
It is easily seen that 
there is nothing lucky or capricious 
in these analogies, but that they are 
constant, and pervade nature. These 
are not the dreams of a few poets, 
here and there, but man is an 
analogist, and studies relation in 
all objects, He is placed in the 
centre of beings, and a ray of 
relation passes from every other 
being to him. And neither can man be 
understood without these objects, nor 
these objects without man, All the 
facts in natural history taken by 
themselves, have no value, but are 
barren, like a single sex. But marry 
it to human history, and it is full 
of life. ("Nature"] 
Man is the analogist, the person 
who sees, who intuits the "ray of 
relation" between things and ideas , 
matter and spirit . Without the 
connection of spirit, without 
standing for something, things of 
nature alone are useless, barren; 
this idea lacks respect for the 
self-contained integrity of natural 
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objects or cycles, though it is part 
of Emerson's central truth, The 
primary function of nature is to 
serve man's intellectual life. We 
use it, and to use it ethically means 
~discover the precise idea behind 
each object, 
I suspect finally that Emerson 
didn't really care much f or the woods 
at all, but only for the idea of 
woods. Everything had to mean, and 
if as disciplined observer he could 
see through all of nature, the 
wholeness of the natural world, then 
its ultimate order, and the ultimate 
order of ideas would be fully present 
to him, The whole world would stand 
forth as spirit, he would see it all, 
and then be in the mind of God, back 
on Concord Common at twilight, 
egoless, transparent, It is all 
there, waiting behind the worl d of 
things to be discovered by the man 
with the love of truth who can see 
with the clear eye of the child, The 
relationship between things and ideas 
is not arbitrary, "not fancied by 
some poet, but stands in t he will of 
God, and so is free to be known by 
all men." Needless to say, Emerson 
did not succeed in comprehending the 
world of spirit by intuit ing the 
whole of nature. But he is unique in 
American cultural life because, in 
contrast to everyone who came before, 
he asks us to contemplate directly 
the immediate world around us. 
Herman Melville took Emerson's 
proposition about grasping meaning 
through the observation of phenomena 
with utmost seriousness. Unlike 
Emerson he was not content with the 
single equation of one thing to one 
idea, a collection of things/ideas 
equalling the whole, and he was 
filled with skepticism about the 
possibilities of perfection. To test 
Emerson's idea, he chose the most 
complex and compelling natural object 
he could imagine: a white whale, the 
largest mammal, a genetic mutant. He 
chose something that he knew we could 
not resist speculating about in terms 
of meaning. Once the white whale is 
before us, we are certain it stands 
for something, though we do not know 
what it is. With the whale, Melville 
owns us fully on the level of feeling 
and instinct: we never doubt it 
means. Then he sets out to discover 
exactly what it does mean. He is in 
pursuit of the root of our emotion, 
the essential why of the natural 
world. 
His thoroughness accounts for 
much of the tedium a novice feels in 
reading Moby Dick. We expect a good 
chase, a mad captain, an inter-
national crew, an innocent but 
thoughtful young man, and the 
vengeful triumph of the whale. 
That's all there, but we seem to have 
to wade through endless chapters 
which probe every part of the whale: 
the head, the eye, the flukes, the 
spout, its sex life, its ability to 
stay underwater for long periods of 
time, the varieties of the species. 
Then we read about every aspect of 
whaling: the whaleboat, the harpoon, 
the crow's nest, the dismemberment of 
the whale, the rendering of the 
blubber. All that sifting through 
facts of whaling and whales, through 
every myth and story associated with 
whaling, is Melville in pursuit of 
the truth behind the objective whale. 
What can we finally know about this 
beast that will allow us to go 
through him to whatever it is he 
stands for? Where is the proof of 
Emerson's assertion that "the 
relationships between things and 
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ideas are not arbitrary?" Is there a 
fixed and discoverable meaning behind 
the natural object? Does the world 
reflect a true and perfect order 
which is accessible to man? 
Melville would like to find the 
certainty of such knowledge but he is 
far too honest to lie to us. Only 
once does he flirt with the notion 
that the external world might not 
have any spiritual reality behind 
it.3 For the most part his respect 
for our instinctual response to the 
puzzle of the natural world assures 
him that it does indeed mean, but he 
cannot discover the exact nature of 
that meaning. Ahab is certain that 
he knows exactly what lies behind 
the white whale: total malice, 
unmitigated evil. But Ahab is 
crazed. By the end of the book his 
perceptions are "unethical" because 
he is clearly misreading obvious 
natural signs to shore up his 
certainty about the whale's identity. 
In a symbolic way, he abuses nature. 
Melville envies his certainty but 
knows its danger: in the hands of a 
powerful man, it causes the death of 
the entire crew. 
Only Ishmael alone escapes to 
tell something different, and it is 
in that knowledge that the American 
relationship to nature is permanently 
altered. What Ishmael learns, to his 
sadness and wonder, is that despite 
the need to ascribe meaning to 
nature, there is no way to fix that 
meaning, no way with certainty to 
ascend through the material world 
into a permanent pantheon of ideas. 
Emerson said that we see meaning; it 
is all lying there before us, the 
world of things corresponding to the 
world of ideas, requiring only 
discovery by the intuitive eye. 
Creation is perfect; the order of 
ideas is perfect; the Universal Being 
is perfect; we can be perfect if we 
can only see it all properly. 
Melville closes that eye. We can no 
longer see the connection waiting 
before us. We must make it. Since 
we cannot be certain of what the 
whale finally means and since such a 
creature will continually tap our 
capacity for wonder and our need to 
ascribe meaning, we will make our own 
interpretations. Symbol is man's 
creation, his link between things, 
his ability to shape a complexity of 
meanings in the world.4 
It is true that Melville's 
conclusion has set us somewhat adrift 
spiritually. Since he cannot find 
his way into that world of permanence 
as Emerson did, he, and we, are cut 
off from the certainty of truth, 
Nature cannot take us toward God. 
Man is not the disciple of seeing, 
but rather the creator of his own 
world of meaning. The power of a 
symbol, the complexity it bestows 
upon the world is now all fully ours. 
We endow the world with meaning; we 
allow it to stand for us, This is 
not a cynical statement, implying we 
should cease that activity because 
there is no external meaning in 
nature, only meaning inside our 
heads. Seeing nature symbolically is 
a necessary human activity, as 
necessary as eating or sex. It is 
what we do--both Emerson and Melville 
knew that. Their willingness to 
explore as fully as they did this 
ineradicable capacity of our minds is 
what gives them importance for us. 
There are, of course, those in the 
20th century like Stephen Crane, who, 
in his conviction that nature is but 
an indifferent set of forces, 
forswears any exploration into 
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meanings we might ascribe to it. 
There will be others, like Ernest 
Hemingway, whose distrust of the 
inner significance of things leads 
him only to describe externals, even 
though the sense that those externals 
stand for something larger is never 
omitted. There will be those, like 
William Gass, who is so suffused with 
the understanding that we make every 
connection of meaning in the world 
that he seems persuaded that nothing 
external has any real validity. We 
have only the insides of our heads to 
haunt us, the ultimate individualism. 
I do not want to explore the 
particular erosion of meaning that 
such later writers represent because 
it seems to me that they blur the 
truth of what we are in pursuit of 
here, that we do use nature in 
various symbolic ways. Emerson and 
Melville are our best guides to 
uncovering the symbolic uses we make 
of nature, even if we no longer think 
as they did. Most of us do not 
believe with Emerson that nature is 
the certain channel to a knowable 
spirit or God, but his perception of 
how our ideas are affected by the 
natural world is still a sound one. 
Melville accepted that basic 
perception but made us see that 
although meaning is not inherent in 
the object, but created by our own 
associations, it is no less valid as 
a source of self-knowledge. Melville 
also freed us from Emerson's dictum 
that natural objects have no inherent 
worth unless yoked to human ideas, 
and allowed us to value nature on her 
terms, not just ours. Both men had 
great moral seriousness about the 
natural world, and it is perhaps that 
seriousness that fuels the American 
conservationist's certainty that the 
preservation of nature, in and of 
itself, is necessary to our national 
well-being. 
III 
Melville has made us aware of a 
conflict between our need to use the 
natural world to stand for something 
larger than itself and the possi-
bilities of misinterpretation and 
self-deception that accompany that 
need. Ishmael's rather temperate 
solution to this problem is to 
develop what Melville calls an "equal 
eye. That means he doubts the 
meanings we ascribe to natural things 
because he knows ·that such meanings 
lie not within the things themselves 
but are in the beholder. At the 
same time he does not abandon the 
possibility that the meanings we give 
to things may illuminate our per-
ceptions and alter our behavior. 
They may prove to be "true" after 
all. With that kind of skeptical 
balance before us, we need to turn 
directly to the Chesapeake Bay to see 
what kind of collective meanings we 
share about it, particularly those 
associations that come from language 
about the Bay and from visual 
perceptions of it. The Chesapeake is 
not the white whale; it does not stir 
us with immediate speculation about 
mystery and power in the natural 
world. By examining simple words and 
visual impressions of it, we want to 
see what kind of symbolic connections 
it does have for us and how strong 
they are. 
Emerson says that language is 
the symbol of thing, or "natural 
fact" as he calls it, so I want to 
begin with the names we give this 
body of water. My premise is that 
language, in addition to its powers 
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of definition, is always at work 
through the subtle associations words 
carry. The connotations of words are 
not arbitrary, but are shaped as 
definitions are by a history of 
common usage among English speakers. 
That usage tugs at the more 
suggestive parts of our minds, at the 
links between things and the names we 
give them and the way we think about 
those things. "Chesapeake" is not 
originally an English word and has 
little connotative power for English 
speakers though it may carry strong 
past associations for those who live 
near the Bay. Primarily it stands as 
a place name. Someone from 
Washington State would not have 
special connections with "Chesapeake" 
except as it locates a place on a 
map, just as a Marylander would have 
no particular connections with 
"Puget." 
"Bay" is a different matter, for 
it has a history in English. "Bay" 
comes from the Old French baer, 
meaning to stand open, to gape, and 
the Oxford English Dictionary says 
that it means "an indentation of the 
sea into the land with a wide 
opening." When the dictionary speaks 
of an "indentation" it suggests to me 
something more regular than the 
Chesapeake Bay, something more like 
Massachusetts Bay or even that huge 
bulbous mass which most of us only 
know from school maps, Hudson Bay. 
We may asso ciate the simplicity of 
"bay" with simplicity of shape; 
surely, the word itself suggests 
something far less complex than the 
maze of creeks, coves and rivers that 
make up the Chesapeake Bay. A bay 
should have a neat curving shoreline, 
an indentation like a "dent," rounded 
and regular. The Chesapeake Bay in 
reality does not fit the simple 
connotation of the word "bay." It 
is, of course, in the literal sense, 
an indentation, and it has a wide 
mouth, though not proportionately 
when compared to its length, but the 
suggestions that accompany ."bay" do 
not prepare us to see the physical 
reality of the Bay. 
Another connotation of "bay" is 
something secure, and enclosed, a 
place of harbor, a limited space of 
water with defined shores. Most of 
these suggestions are associated with 
human activity; safe means safe for 
us, for our ships, for protection 
from storms. We are not loose on the 
sea at the mercy of the waves . 
Frequently in a bay, the horizon is a 
marked shoreline, a fringe of trees, 
not the distant blur of sea and sky. 
That shoreline makes it a smaller, 
more defined, less alien, less wild 
and less powerful place than the 
ocean. It fits around us. 
In large part, the Chesapeake 
conforms to most of these sug-
gestions. It is clearly not the 
ocean; it has no shoreline like the 
ocean, no sandy place to watch big 
waves roll in. It is enclosed, safer 
than the ocean, but large enough to 
create its own weather and to be 
dangerous in a storm. It is too 
large for shelter, though it provides 
numerous places of safety in its 
rivers. On a map the sense of 
enclosure is particularly strong for 
so much water/ space seems to be 
contained behind its mouth. That 
feeling of enclosure belies the Bay's 
ability to produce a real storm. A 
defined horizon, a line of trees that 
marks the meeting of water and sky, 
is characteristic of much of the Bay. 
The other important suggestion 
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of "bay" has to do with water and 
what it stands for in human 
experience. Water is the unfamiliar 
medium, not terra firma, but 
insubstantial, a realm that only 
those with special knowledge or 
equipment can venture upon. Since 
water is trackless, there are no 
fixed routes when traveling on it, 
The sailor is free to go where he 
will, so water often suggests 
adventure or freedom, unrestricted 
movement, a place without 
regulations, hence a place of 
self-expression or self-discovery. 
On land, one follows the road or 
trail but on water one follows his 
desire and the wind. These somewhat 
romantic adventurous suggestions may 
still apply to the recreational 
sailor who sees the Bay as a personal 
playground, but they certainly do not 
apply to the freighters that must 
negotiate the Bay channels to and 
from Baltimore. 
In contrast to land, water is 
often thought of as female. In 
mythic terms it is fluid, uncertain, 
changeable, reflective. Water has a 
certain "behavior" that land does 
not; it has moods that we give human 
names to--calm, tempestuous, 
angry--and because it changes, humans 
have a certain pleasure in trying to 
predict its behavior, and hence 
develop affection for it. A body of 
water can transform itself, can be 
different at different times and have 
different events occurring in the 
same place but at different depths, 
and so seems to possess a responsive 
power that land does not. Water is 
also the primordial element, the soup 
out of which we came, and in that 
sense it is female too: the spawning 
place, the mother place, the fluid of 
gestation . 
In any given landscape, water 
draws the human e ye . It is a strong 
component of what we find esthet-
ically pleasing about na t ure. A 
river, a lake, a shoreline is always 
more attractive to us than a 
continuim of woods or lawn, perhaps 
because we can look out over water. 
Water opens up a scene for us, the 
view becomes expansive, and whatever 
is in us that responds to vistas is 
pleased. We can imagine Emerson 
meditating on how water expands our 
vision ; the more we can see, the more 
ideas we receive. A horizontal vista 
over water is more placid, more 
comforting, less stirring than, say, 
the Rocky Mountains or the Grand 
Canyon. 
These connotations seem to be 
the major ones carried by the English 
word "bay." Some of them would 
vanish if it were the "Chesapeake 
Estuary" rather than the Bay. 
"Estuary" is more descriptively 
accurate, but if that were the name, 
we would think more direc tly about 
the area of transition between 
freshwater rivers and the ocean, 
about tidal systems, marshes, 
nutrient production and seafood, and 
less about an enclosed safe place for 
human use and habitation, a place to 
look out over and a place that can 
be described in terms of human 
temperament. "Estuary" is more 
scientific sounding; "bay" a little 
more inviting. "Estuary" is not as 
"watery" sounding as "bay" so the 
suggestions of adventure and freedom, 
femaleness and placid expansiveness 
would not come to us so readily. 
"Estuary" would connote more the 
physical reality of the Bay whereas 
"bay" itself is misleading about 
actual conditions there. 
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The most important difference 
between "bay" and "estuary" is that 
"bay" is distinctly more humanly 
oriented . It is a place for man--to 
feel safe upon, to be taken care of, 
mothered, provided for both in terms 
of pleasant surroundings and food, a 
place that inspires human respon-
siveness in terms of its open space, 
a place that has human moods and so 
can be understood as having a 
temperament and thought of as a "she" 
rather than an "it." Nature serves 
man here in a whole variety of ways 
and serves him rather open-handedly. 
Nature is tamed, but does demand the 
labor of cultivation. It provides 
for man without man in turn having to 
provide for it. I am not speaking 
here of the reality of contemporary 
efforts to manage intelligently the 
various aspects of the Bay, but about 
the more popular and generally 
diffused associations that are 
carried by the language we use. 
"Bay" demands little from us; it does 
not help us see what is really out 
there, and it allows almost all our 
responses to be in terms of human 
needs and desires. It is language 
that makes things simpler for us than 
things really are, and so as a source 
of symbolic weight, the name of the 
place is not faithful to the 
complexity of the place. Instead i t 
encourages us to see it as a place 
designed to feed and please humans, 
rather than a place which also needs 
caretaking from us. 
Another source of symbolism 
about the Bay is how it looks on a 
map. That is how Americans first 
know it, as that space that cuts up 
into the East Coast somewhere in the 
middle of the country. The most 
common map is a state road map, so if 
you look at one, you will not see the 
Bay as a single entity. On a 
Virginia map your eyes are likely to 
stop at the coast, so you may never 
see the Bay at all, unless you 
remember that the long neck of Cape 
Charles is part of the state. To a 
Marylander, the Bay is that area 
without roads that cuts the state in 
two, it is primarily something to be 
gotten around. On paper, the Bay 
exists more or less as negative 
space. 
That sense of negative space is 
also true on a larger map which shows 
the whole Bay in relation to all the 
surrounding states. Its size carries 
an impact, but it is still primarily 
an obstacle. Although it is a major 
geographical feature, it lacks the 
immediately recognizable outline of 
Florida, Long Island, or even the 
state of Maine, whose actual borders 
are not nearly so well delineated as 
the Bay's. The land mass of the 
Eastern Shore is fairly identifiable, 
if seen in isolation. It is the long 
bony left hand of a witch, the thumb 
curled into the palm and the skinny 
accusing index finger pointed at 
Virginia Beach. The Bay is vaguely 
the reverse of that, as if the same 
left hand were laid flat and viewed 
from the side, the slightly arching 
fingers aimed toward Philadelphia. 
The hand shape is not nearly so 
satisfactory when applied to the Bay 
as to the Eastern Shore, for it omits 
all the large Virginia rivers, which 
would, I suppose, rise like snakes 
out of the back of the hand, thus 
badly mixing this image. We do not 
see the Bay easily. If the Bay were 
presented without any identifiable 
surrounding land mass or sense of 
scale, most East Coast residents 
probably could not identify it, 
though they could identify Lake 
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Superior or Lake Michigan . It is the 
very complexity of the Bay's 
geography that works against easy 
recognition. 
The Chesapeake Bay does not 
exist as a strongly defined entity in 
language or on paper. A mental image 
of it is not sharp; people who do not 
live on or near it do not identify 
strongly with it because they lack a 
clear idea of where it is, how it 
behaves and where they are in 
relation to it. The same fuzziness 
is present if you set out to see it 
for yourself. Most people don't. 
They would rather go to the ocean 
where they can watch the waves come 
in, scan a long beach and a longer 
horizon of water and sky. Visually, 
the ocean is much simpler. It is 
also more conducive to inexpensive 
recreation, adolescent pleasures and 
the healthy feel of salt air. It is 
much harder to see the Bay. Starting 
from Annapolis, you have one chance 
at a panorama as you cross the Bay 
Bridge. Assuming the bridge's rail 
is not precisely at your eye level, 
you grasp some of the Bay's size and 
attractiveness. But the shoreline is 
low and indistinct so your sense of 
how the water and the land meet is 
unclear, nothing like the simplicity 
of waves rolling up a beach. 
Try to see that shoreline 
closely and you will be lucky if you 
know where you are in relation to the 
main body of the Bay. You will cross 
inlets and backwaters, and if you 
reach more open water, you will find 
that over 95% of the shoreline is 
privately owned and hence inac-
cessible to exploration. If you get 
to a spot where you can look out over 
water, you will probably be on a 
small cove of an interior river and 
you will see a tranquil and pleasing 
scene: a stretch of silent water 
with a not particularly distant shore 
of woods or lawn sloping to the 
river's edge. It is very hard to 
associate this with the expanse of 
water you saw from the Bridge, and 
without a map, you may not even know 
which arm of the river to take to get 
to the open Bay. You probably cannot 
walk far on this land you have found, 
even if it were unfenced, for the 
edge of the water is honeycombed with 
marshes, bogs, inlets and small 
bluffs. There is hardly anywhere on 
the Bay where you might walk a mile 
on its shores. 
As you explore the edges of the 
Bay you will find many charming 
corners: a 17th century mansion, 
workboats aligned at a dock, a marsh 
at twilight. As the photographs of 
Aubrey Bodine testify, the life 
around the Bay is very picturesque, 
although the isolating power of his 
camera exaggerates the romantic 
appeal of life on the water. Seen 
firsthand, you find that the pristine 
quality Bodine captures in a white 
boat with white sails is mixed with 
the ordinary details of the place: 
mobile homes, junked cars, the usual 
disarray that folks live with. The 
leather-necked watermen, so 
intriguing in the photographs, are 
not open and friendly to your 
conversation. The natives let you 
know you are an outsider. You are 
left, like any tourist, with only 
your eyes, with anesthetic 
evaluation of the place.5 
Unless we grow up in a place, 
all of us must begin with appear-
ances, with visual impressions, and 
for most visitors the visual aspect 
of the Bay, however charming, is a 
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fragmented one. Like the taciturn 
watermen, its totality is not readily 
accessible. We cannot follow 
Emerson's instructions and intuit 
significance just by looking at this 
body of water. Without a strong 
unified visual image, the Bay does 
not carry symbolic power for those 
who do not live on or near it. They 
do not see it, and more importantly, 
because it is not readily apparent, 
they do not see that their actions, 
taken at some distance from the Bay, 
might affect its health. Most 
pollution of the Bay does not come 
from the Bay itself, but from the 
surrounding watershed which feeds 
into the Bay. A clearer visual image 
of the Bay would help outsiders 
develop a better sense of the 
consequences of their actions because 
they would know what is being 
affected. Much of the Bay is hidden, 
recessed, even disorienting, so it is 
hard for this large low amorphous 
body of water to begin to resonate in 
the mind. It needs to have that 
resonance so those beyond its 
immediate users become aware of its 
importance. 
Despite the lack of visual unity 
to the Bay, there are clearly those 
for whom the Bay has great symbolic 
power. The difference between such 
groups and the uninitiated is that 
they engage with the Bay in some mode 
that is more than visual. They work 
on it, fish it, sail on it, own or 
sell property on it, study it and 
write about it. They invest 
themselves, either through activity 
or money, and that investment 
heightens the symbolic power of the 
Bay in their lives. The Bay is a 
place one becomes inordinately 
attached to, but that attachment 
occurs almost exclusively through 
activity, in contrast to, for 
example, the Grand Canyon. Many 
Americans who have never seen the 
Canyon value it deeply. 
To watermen, the Bay is a 
work-site for more than eight hours 
a day. It is an area of self-
definition for such men, and it is 
not visual attractiveness that has 
the strongest hold on them, but the 
connections of memory, family 
history, economic struggle, human 
sharing, pride in their work, and 
knowledge of the water that feed into 
symbolic overtones about the Bay . 
The recreational sailor, who may not 
be native to the Bay, shares in its 
significance because he buys a boat 
and spends a portion of his free time 
maintaining and sailing it. A sense 
of unrestricted movement, the 
possibility of adventure, the 
technical prowess of sailing, and 
escape from the routine of life are 
particularly stimulating to him. The 
Bay is free space, a field for his 
pleasure. The sailor will not have 
the same sense of reciprocal 
dependency on the Bay as the watermen 
do, so his attachment to it may be 
narrower, more romantic and circum-
scribed by his own recreational 
needs. The owner of waterfront 
property has made a larger investment 
than the recreational sailor and will 
have a correspondingly stronger 
attachment to the Bay. Having 
purchased a piece of it, his desire 
that it and the surrounding 
properties be visually rewarding 
joins with his pride of ownership 
about all that watery space off the 
end of his dock. 
Scientists, ecologists and 
engineers seek to understand and 
analyze the biological and geological 
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systems of the Bay. They work to 
purge from their language any 
suggestion of symbol about the Bay, 
for their interest is in precise and 
literal description. More than any 
other group they attempt to encompass 
the Bay as a total entity worthy of 
study, preservation and intelligent 
use but their information rarely 
contributes to a common visual symbol 
of the Bay. Environmentally active 
groups obtain most of their 
information from scientists, but 
their value structures are frequently 
a combination of intense personal 
affection for place and a moral 
conviction about the complexity of 
the Bay and the necessity of 
preserving it as a natural system. 
The Bay has a great deal of symbolic 
weight for this last group; it is a 
significant piece of threatened 
environment that must be protected 
before its beauty and integrity are 
further eroded. The Bay becomes a 
symbol of natural well-being. 
This review of verbal and visual 
images associated with the Bay 
suggests that the symbolic power of 
the Bay is not universally acces-
sible, but hinges on involvement, 
occupation and ownership. Among 
those who have attachments to the 
Bay, there are insiders and 
outsiders, those who live, work and 
play on the Bay and those who just 
visit or read of it. Because the Bay 
does not have a strong visual image, 
it has fewer compelling aspects for 
the outsider, in contrast to the 
wider public affection for the Maine 
coast or California redwoods. 
Melville chose his central symbol 
because he knew we could not resist 
its power. In contrast, the 
Chesapeake Bay seems to have far less 
symbolic potential and hence it is 
not always easy to stir the public to 
act in its behalf. 
IV 
The immediate experience of 
verbal and visual associations is not 
the only source of symbolic power for 
natural objects. A writer, partic-
ularly a novelist, can create meaning 
within a fictional setting and hence 
transform landscape into symbol. 
There is a good deal of poetry and 
fiction written about the Bay, much 
of it by natives and much of it about 
the Eastern Shore and life on the 
water there. The isolation of the 
Eastern Shore seems to have produced 
a regional kind of literature 
characterized by sentimentality, 
uncritical affection and attachment 
to a region that seems as near 
perfection as any earthly spot. Such 
works give the general impression 
that life on the Eastern Shore is 
rural, uncomplicated, stable, 
untouched by progress in the negative 
sense of the term, and filled with 
natural goodness. In the face of 
unbroken bucolic happiness, 
disruptions like war, depression, 
slavery and racial antagonism seem 
inconsequential. The real dangers 
are outsiders moving in, tourists, 
traffic, real estate development, and 
popularity, all of which threaten an 
established way of life. 
The most important book to 
create a symbolic sense of the Bay, 
James Michener's Chesapeake [1978], 
is not by a native, though Michener 
lived on the Shore while writing it. 
The other volumes about life on the 
Bay will never have the wide appeal 
of Michener's novel, and hence have 
far less power to create public ideas 
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about the Bay. Michener is not a 
particularly skillful writer. His 
sense of character development and 
motivation is annoyingly weak and his 
grasp of history flawed. His 
literary strength lies in his ability 
to steep himself in a particular 
geographic region and endow that 
region with a public significance it 
did not previously have. What 
interests us then about Chesapeake is 
not l i terary merit, but the cultural 
assumptions Michener makes about the 
Bay and the terms he uses to describe 
this landscape and its hold over the 
generations who live upon it. 
One of the common themes in the 
regional literature is that the Bay 
is Eden. Michener's novel relies 
heavily upon this image, though his 
use of it, while sentimental, is more 
complex than other writers. In the 
opening pages, the indian Pentaquod 
escapes his own tribe on the 
Susquehanna and wanders down the Bay. 
At the Choptank he comes upon an 
"island, rich in signs and promises," 
"a land of the most inviting nature," 
"the impression of opulence and 
quietness and gentle living," "The 
most congenial place he had ever 
seen." He finds fish, quail, deer, 
maize, pumpkins, turkeys and no 
people. "This must be the right 
place." This island, which is 
described in similar terms throughout 
the book, becomes the home of the 
first and ultimately most successful 
family of the region. An island as 
the beginning of civilization is more 
a situation of imagination than 
reality. While it may provide 
protection, which is not a reason for 
its attraction in the novel, it does 
not offer the abundance and variety 
of the mainland. Initial settlements 
are usually on shore. But myth-
ically, islands are places of 
origins, their specialness signified 
by their separation from the 
mainland. Often they are places of 
primordial innocence, cut off by 
water from the ills of society.6 It 
is paradise, the place apart, the 
delectable garden islands, and 
Michener seems to be trading on all 
these associations in making it his 
most important geographic feature. 
The paradise theme recurs over 
and over in the novel. The land at 
the mouth of the Choptank is nature 
perfected to man's uses. However 
perfect a place it was, and is, the 
novel's characters succeed in 
undermining paradise. Eden is 
incompatible with crowds. Edmund 
Steed, the first white settler, wants 
more land for tobacco, so he begins 
to burn and clear Indian lands, thus 
initiating quarrels with them. Evil 
enters the garden. Most of the 
characters have respect for the land, 
and yet, because they want something 
that does not belong to them--tools, 
seed, food, women--they bring 
themselves into contention with 
others, slavery being the largest 
source of contention. Ownership in 
paradise is the problem; nature 
herself provides sustenance for free, 
but men want more. 
Despite the difficulties 
characters create for themselves, 
paradise always remains for them as 
possibility, but it is a paradise of 
beauty more than one of innocence and 
goodness. Often when characters are 
in turmoil, when they have been 
spurned in love or are choking with 
indignation over slavery or have 
felt the pressure of being socially 
inferior, they turn to nature--
marshes, woods, open water--for 
consolation. It puts them in touch 
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with something larger and more 
enduring than they are. For a 
moment, the solitary person is in 
paradise again. Michener usually 
waxes poetic at these moments, 
describing the flight of geese or 
twilight spreading over the water. 
His characters react to the physical 
beauty; his language is oriented 
toward visual experience, not toward 
ties of memory and shared experience 
which also lie in landscapes. The 
Quaker Edward Paxmore quarrels with 
his wife over slavery and in 
exasperation walks unto his porch to 
contemplate 
"the serenity of his river; it 
provided a calm greater than any he 
had ever known before ; whenever he 
saw the marsh and the quiet trees he 
forgot his quarreling. On this night 
a dying moon rose in the east, 
throwing a silvery light over that 
placid stretch of water from the 
Cliff to Devon, making it a peaceful 
lake of incredible beauty." 
The reader sees what Edward sees 
and enters into his thought only 
enough to know he is calmed by the 
scene. The ·character reacts only to 
physical beauty. In giving nature 
only visually esthetic power, 
Michener places his character in the 
sam~ position as the Bay visitor. 
Both Edward and the visitor are 
calmed and restored by contact with 
the natural world, but neither of 
them make a connection with human 
history or with the biological or 
geographical reality of the place. 
The visitor is probably ignorant of 
those connections, but Michener's 
characters should be full of them 
because the novel purports to tell a 
history. Michener makes familiar 
nature a place without human ties. 
It is always waiting for troubled 
man, always good and generous. 
Nature is perfect; man has fallen and 
in the process spoiled paradise. 
This treatment seems a particularly 
romantic one because it says that 
nature is only beneficent and that 
all of her qualities can be grasped 
simply by appreciating her beauty. 
This is not to say that natural 
esthetics lack power over us; on the 
contrary, as Fredrick Law Olmstead 
knew, they are an endless resource of 
beneficent influences. Such beauty 
is also subject to human creation and 
design; witness Olmstead's creation 
of major parks.7 But nature is not 
perfect and beauty is not nature's 
only hold on us. We value place as 
much for the meanings we ascribe to 
it and our knowledge of its history 
and significance. In Michener's 
world humans must bear the guilt of 
tampering with the perfection and 
beauty of nature, when in fact the 
only real choice is to be intelligent 
partners with it. 
Devon Island, which has slowly 
been eroding over the 350 years of 
the novel, slides fully under water 
on the book's last page. Paradise is 
gone, or so the mythic themes imply. 
But one of the characters argues that 
there is still "a whole paradise here 
that's unsullied," and he takes his 
ecologist son off to see the large 
old estates on the Tred Avon River, 
where the sense of serenity and order 
that once was part of the natural 
scenery is now shored up by the 
personal fortunes of the owners of 
the handsome estates. Paradise is 
still viable, not in wild nature, but 
in the realm of property owners, and 
it has now been transformed into "the 
land of pleasant living," a name that 
almost wholly suggests human comfort, 
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only a little of natural beauty and 
nothing of moral goodness. 
In Michener's hands, the 
paradise theme seems to me to be an 
"unethical" symbol because it 
cultivates in us the idea that nature 
is perfect, that its perfection 
embodied only in its visual beauty, 
and that man's evil ways will lead 
him to spoil or lose that beauty. It 
is not a symbol which helps us 
respond to the Bay in realistic 
terms, for in the novel man can atone 
for his guilt only by preserving 
beauty, not by understanding the 
complex natural processes that make 
up the Bay. In the novel, such 
preservation requires wealth and a 
low population density. Paradise is 
only possible if just a few people 
are admitted into it, while the rest 
of us are to be cast into outer 
darkness. Population density is of 
course the major problem in the Bay 
area, and I do not mean to disparage 
the importance of the issue. But we 
should be extraordinarily cautious 
about using paradise symbolism to 
illuminate the Bay's problems, 
because it speaks more to the 
pleasures of those who already occupy 
"the land of pleasant living" and 
less to the real needs of the Bay. 
The assumption that the bounty of 
paradise is made ready for the 
inhabitants keeps us from seeing any 
real historical interaction between 
land, water and human fate, and it 
keeps us from squarely facing 
competing desires for access to and 
use of the Bay. The paradise myth 
would indicate that the inhabitants 
are the elect, that natures caters to 
their use and pleasure, and since it 
provides for them so readily, they 
owe it little in return. It does not 
halp man become the responsible 
decision-maker about the landscape. 
V 
Not all of the literatur e 
written about the Chesapeake relies 
upon the kind of self-congratulatory 
values that figure prominently in 
Michener's novel and in other 
regional literary works. John Smith , 
in 1624, one of the first to wr i te 
about the Bay, initially trumpeted it 
as a "fruitful and delightsome l and ," 
but he was bent on luring settlers 
with such descriptions. A little 
experience among the indians made him 
complain that in Virginia one could 
not live by pillage as did the 
Romans; "all you expect from thence 
must be by labor." In 1705 Rober t 
Beverly chided the colonists for no t 
working hard enough and improving the 
possibilities that nature placed 
before them. 
The best volume about life on 
the Bay is William Warner's Beautiful . 
Swimmers [1976], and it underscores 
the fact that those who actually wo rk 
on the Bay (as did Smith and Beverly) 
are the least prone to indulge 
themselves in seeing the Bay as Eden. 
Warner's book is primarily about blue 
crabs and the independent watermen 
who go in search of them and other 
shellfish. Warner is full of fact s 
about the life cycle of the crab, the 
natural history of the Bay, the 
details of tonging and dredging, but 
with none of these does he follow 
Emerson's lead and let them expand 
into symbol. Because the independent 
watermen own neither Bay or bottom, 
they are in fact harvesting nature's 
bounty in their catch, but the work 
itself is too demanding of long hours 
and hard labor for them to imagine 
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they are taking something for free. 
Warner's refusal to use his 
description of the watermen to create 
symbolic meaning seems justly 
circumspect, for the major literary 
symbol we do have about the Bay, t hat 
of paradise, has not served us well 
in fostering a sense of responsi-
bility towards it, It has made man 
into a recipient, not a caretaker who 
must make wise choices about a 
natural system. In the public mind, 
the Bay is often negative space, i s 
geographically fuzzy, because i t 
lacks the visual unity to become 
symbolically powerful. In terms of 
transforming nature into meaning, the 
Chesapeake does not yet have what i t 
needs ; it does not yet stand f or 
something beyond itself which he lps 
us see it and our role more clearly. 
To be as honest and thorough as 
Emerson and Melville about our 
reactions to nature, we can ask wha t 
ideas the Bay brings once we have 
begun to grasp something of its 
totality. What connections does our 
mind make that we truly value? If we 
know that, then we should act to 
preserve those aspects of the Bay 
that cultivate valued ideas in us , 
The Bay is of course beautiful, 
tranquil, intimate in many places , 
unobtrusive . Those notions about 
natural beauty will always be 
important; however, the Bay must lead 
to more than external appreciation, 
The most important idea to be 
gathered from the Bay is, I think , 
that of diversity, The Bay itself is 
geographically complex; we can never 
see it all , It is biologically 
complex, so much so that we have yet 
to grasp its full workings. That 
awareness should make us cautious i n 
our tamperings, It is complex in 
terms of human use and human activity 
in and around it. As much as 
possible that diversity of uses 
should be preserved; no one use 
should come to dominate the others. 
And finally, the Bay is symbolically 
complex for in it more than one thing 
can happen at the same place and no 
one notion encompasses what it 
offers. It deserves neither a single 
image, such as a lighthouse, gull or 
crab, nor a slogan, nor a single 
layer of sentiment about its joys. 
Perhaps it should have a mandala, a 
Chinese screen, a painting with the 
intricacy (but not the subject 
matter) of Hieronymus Bosch, an 
ambiguous poem, a novel with 
contrapuntal actions whose aim is not 
celebration,9 It should be something 
as complicated as that feeling when 
V-18 
you get off the boat at the Smith 
Island dock for the first time: a 
feeling that combines the sense of 
having been lost in the marsh and 
this town emerging from it, the sense 
of a wholly unique place, whose 
visible self will reveal a pattern 
and culture unlike our own, the sense 
of history and continuum, and the 
sense of a great fragility of place 
whose uniqueness demands from us wise 
action, not to keep it a preserved 
museum piece and not to let it 
dissolve into a place like other 
uniform places in American culture. 
Whatever this symbol is, let it 
suggest to us that not all will be 
easily revealed in the first glance 
and that we are not only recipients 
but caretakers of this place. 
NOTES 
1. The most stimulating recent 
essay about t he essential 
wildness of nature and the human 
reluctance to recognize its 
power is John Fowles ' The Tree 
(1980) . Josephine Jacobsen's 
recent column on the editorial 
page of the Baltimore Morning 
Sun, "Where the Wild Went About " 
(June 12, 1980) explor es briefly 
much the same these: "We try to 
feed our egos by fo rcing the 
wild to become the t ame ." 
2. The most useful study of how 
different peoples and di fferent 
cultures seen nature is Yi-Fu 
Tuan's Topophilia: A Study of 
Environmental Percept i ons , 
Attitudes and Values ( 1974) . 
The volume is extremely useful 
in sifting through the 
sentimental reasons we value 
landscape and in providing some 
ordered reasoning for what we 
simply might think of a s 
personal preference . 
3. Melville's only f l ir t a t i on with 
atheism occurs at the end of 
chapter 42, "The Whiteness of 
the Whale." If ther e i s no 
spirit behind nature, i f vis i ble 
objects do not stand f or 
invisible powers, even if we 
cannot discover the ir exact 
natures, then "all deif i ed 
Nature absolutely paints like 
the harlot, whose allurements 
cover nothing but the charnel-
house within . " 
4. Melville is explici t about the 
transfer from seeing meaning to 
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making meaning in chapter 85, 
"The Fountain." Logic, hist ory, 
science, and myth yield him no 
clear understanding about the 
nature and significance of t he 
whale's spout. "Still we can 
hypothesize, even if we canno t 
prove and establish." The 
hypothesis becomes his created, 
invented meaning. 
5, In Topophilia , Tuan argues t hat 
we cannot enjoy a pure esthe t ic 
sensation for much longer than 
two minutes, Anesthetic 
appreciation of scenery, 
however, intense, "is flee ting 
unless one's eyes are kept to it 
for some other reason, either 
the recall of historical events 
that hallowed the scene or the 
recall of its underlying reality 
in geology and structure" 
(93-5). 
6, Tuan discusses the mythic 
importance of island 
environments in Topophilia 
( 118-20). 
7. Olmstead's theory of how 
ordinary, unexotic nature works 
on us still seems the bes t 
explanation of its beneficient 
·influence. Charles Beveridge 
explains Olmstead in Nineteenth 
Century (Spring, 1980 ): 
"Scenery, he decided, worked by 
an unconscious process to 
produce a relaxing and 
'unbending' of faculties made 
tense by the strain, noise and 
artificial surroundings of urban 
life . The necessary condi t i on 
for such an experience was t he 
absence of distractions and 
demands on the conscious mind , 
The effect came not as a r esult 
of exami nat i on , anal ysis or 
comparison, nor of ap preciation 
of particular parts of the 
scene; r ather, it came in s uch a 
way that the viewer was unaware 
of i ts workings." Olmstead's 
designs now seem so organic to 
us that we must work to remember 
that they are consciously shaped 
creations and not unaided nature 
at wo r k. 
8. A most illuminating discussio n 
of John Smith's essentially 
mili t ary attitude to the New 
World is chapter 3 "Captain 
Courageous: Captain John Smith, 
Father of Us All" in John 
Seelye's Prophetic Waters 
(1977). 
9. A most elegant theorist about 
how writers use real places and 
real objects for fictional 
purposes is John Barth. See his 
"Historical Fiction, Fictitious 
History, and the Chesapeake Bay 
Blue Crabs, or, About About," 
The Washington Post Magazine, 
July 15, 1979. 
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The Just Allocation of Common Resources 
Dr. Alan E. Fuchs, Chairman and Professor of Philosophy, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
A specter is haunting the 
Chesapeake Bay--the specter of the 
"tragedy of the commons ." Since 
Garrit Hardin popularized this 
parable in the early seventies, l the 
"tragedy of the commons" has served 
as an effective metaphor for the 
ecological and utilization problems 
facing the Chesapeake region . Rich 
Collins, for example, vividly 
employed it to demonstrate that some 
form of democratically established 
but mutuallr coercive governmental 
policy is necessary if we are to 
avert the tragedy to which our 
unregulated individual action is 
inextricably leading.2 But Collins 
failed to fully exorcise our specter. 
Though he effectively demonstrated 
the defects of libertarian and 
simplistically utilitarian policies, 
he leaves us without a workable 
alternative. Though he articulately 
urges that we "develop a concept ion 
of the public interest which 
incorporates common concerns as 
something different from the calcu-
lation of our immediate individual 
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preferences,"3 his only explication 
of that conception is a brief 
quotation from Walter Lippmann: "The 
public interest may be presumed to be 
what men would choose if they saw 
clearly, thought rationally, acted 
disinterestedly and benevolently. "4 
In this brief essay I would like to 
sketch a proposal for that con-
ce ption . Freely using John Rawls' 
reformulation of traditional social 
contract theory,5 I hope to outline a 
procedure that public officials might 
use to help us all avert the mutual 
tragedy forecasted so clearly by 
Hardin, Collins, and others. But 
first let us reformula te the problem 
and then briefly evaluate the most 
obvious solutions to it. 
Collins' account is clear and 
concise: 
There is 
to all. Each 
cattle and can 
many cattle 
commons. This 
a pasture that is open 
herdsman owns his own 
be expected to keep as 
as possible on the 
arrangement has worked 
successfully in this community for 
centuries. But now, because of 
increased human population and 
because some of the wars and diseases 
that used to limit cattle production 
have been removed by technology, the 
basic carrying capacity of the 
commons is threatened. At this 
point, the inherent logic of 
centuries of behavior becomes 
remorselessly tragic. 
As each individual considers his 
own well-being and attempts to maxi-
mize his own gain, he asks himself, 
like any good sophomore who has 
earned an A in Economics 101, "What 
is the utilHy to me of adding one 
animal t o my herd?" 
The positive utility is one more 
cow and i ts value to him; the per-
sonal cost is his share of the 
community's loss which is only a 
fraction of the value to him 
personally of the additional animal. 
Rational behavior calls for the 
herdsman to increase. his grazing 
animals. As Hardin notes: 
" ••• this is the conclusion reached by 
each and every rational herdsman 
sharing a commons. Therein is the 
tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase 
his herd without limit--in a world 
that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes 
in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all. "6 
But clearly isn't the 
Chesapeake, even with its extraor-
dinary diversity of users, 
essentially a commons in this sense? 
Electric utilities, given their 
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interest in minimizing costs, 
rationally ought to build large 
power-plants cooled by the Bay's 
waters. Farmers along or near the 
Bay's shores will get better crops by 
heavy use of chemical fertilizers. 
Individual wate rmen rationally should 
catch as many crabs as they can, and 
oil companies can supply their 
countless customers less expensively 
with refineries built close to their 
markets. Likewise, of course, for 
landowners bulkheading their precious 
shore-front property, cities 
economically disposing of their 
wastes, and so on. 
Lest we miss the point of the 
parable, Collins highlights the 
lesson, as well as its immediate 
implication for public policy. The 
collective tragedy results from each 
individual or group rationally 
pursuing its own best interest. The 
only way for each user of the commons 
to avoid harmful consequences is to 
establish a mutually coercive agency 
that ironically limits his pursuit of 
rational self-interest. That public 
governmental authority hopefully 
substitutes some conception of the 
"common good" for individual 
preferences as the object of ·its 
regulations, though, again, each 
individual is still better off than 
he would have been had the common 
resource upon which he depends been 
depleted or otherwise destroyed. 
Moreover, though Collins does not 
stress this point, coercion is 
necessary. Since the tragedy results 
from each agent pursuing rational 
self-interest, mere exhortation to 
observe the public interest is sure 
to fail. For it would be, by 
definition, irrational for anyone to 
comply. Assuming a high degree of 
prudential self-interest in 
individual agents, the only way to 
elicit cooperative behavior is to 
make it in everyone's own interest to 
cooperate. Public principles of 
cooperation, backed by effective 
sanctions do just that, 
Even this cursory formulation . of 
the problem should amply demonstrate 
the fundamental defect of one of the 
most popular policies for the 
regulation of collector resources, 
namely, laissez-faire. Long the 
darling of economic conservatives, 
libertarian social policies have once 
again become intellectually respect-
able to a wide variety of political 
points of view, Frustrated with the 
seeming inability of governments to 
plan rationally for the effective use 
of public resources, many have come 
to believe in the myth that the 
public interest will be miraculously 
enhanced by benign neglect. In its 
classic version, the story has it 
that individuals pursuing their own 
self-interest will be inadvertently 
forced by the necessities of the 
market to bring about the long-run 
interests of all, In its more modern 
formulation, the competition between 
interest-groups or other political 
forces automatically brings about the 
enhancement of the public good. But 
as Collins dramatically points out, 
the theory of laissez-faire is 
nothing but the metaphor of the 
commons. Since the individual 
pursuit of rational self-interest is 
the essence of our problem, how can 
it claim to be its solution? Once 
again the need for a coercive public 
policy that restricts the unbridled 
pursuit of self-interest is clearly 
seen. 
One might have hoped that 
utilitarianism could have provided 
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t he type of social policy that we 
seek , What theory of public choice 
could be more rational than the 
maximization of the interests of the 
various parties that belong to the 
group? Since it is rational for one 
individual to maximize his or her 
satisfaction over an entire lifetime, 
why isn't it analogously rational for 
a society to seek the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number? 
According to t his plausible view, 
alternative social policies would be 
ranked by a theoretically simple 
procedure. The consequences of each 
alternative for all relevantly 
affected individuals or groups would 
be determined. These consequences 
would be quantitatively ranked by 
means of some common index, such as 
happiness, satisfaction, or more 
plausibly, individual preferences. 
Older formulations of the view tended 
to speak of the former notions, while 
more modern views, such as welfare 
economics, have stressed the idea of 
preferences. Some theories even 
measure these preferences in terms of 
the amount of money that an agent 
would be willing to expend to bring 
about or maintain a desired state of 
affairs. 
Although theoretically elegant, 
and a major improvement over the myth 
of a benevolent invisible hand 
leading a free market toward the 
common good, all forms of utilitari-
anism suffer from some fundamental 
flaws, The most frequently noted one 
is briefly cited in Collins' paper. 
How is a benevolent public official 
seeking to maximize the collective 
good to weigh the diverse preferences 
of the many citizens in his juris-
diction? How is the value of a 
scenic vista t o be weighed against 
the economic importance of deeper 
harbors? How can an oil refinery's 
toxic effects on oysters and crabs be 
measured against the value of lower 
gasoline prices for thousands of 
consumers? Some find this incom-
mensurability of individual interests 
a fatal flaw in the very idea of a 
utilitarian public policy. Others 
like Collins, quoting Christopher 
Stone, remind us that courts and 
other agencies do often attribute a 
common monetary value to seemingly 
incommensurable interests such as 
pain and suffering, attachment to 
treasured heirlooms, and even the 
value of personal reputations. Why 
not extend this approach, they ask, 
to the preference for a clean 
environment or the desire for a 
succulent oyster? But even if the 
problem of the incommensurability of 
the great diversity of values at 
stake could be resolved by means of 
some common economic measure or by 
means of some more sophisticated 
index for ranking preferences, a 
fundamental problem for utilitar-
ianism remains. Suppose, for 
example, that a policy favoring 
maximum industrial use of the Bay 
would result in moderate benefit to 
millions of individuals (particularly 
those who do not live in the 
immediate vicinity of the water) by 
providing them with desired goods at 
cheaper prices. Unfortunately, this 
program would cause great harm to 
many of the denizens of the region by 
destroying their livelihood or by 
despoiling their treasured waterside 
property. Imagine that this harm, 
however, given the limited number of 
individuals involved, is somewhat 
less (according to the utilitarian 
calculation) than the aggregate of 
benefits accrued by the distant 
consumers. Though utilitarianism 
seems to require it, should we really . 
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sacrifice the interests of the few to 
those of the many? Is such a 
utilitarian policy obviously the 
correct one? Is its arithmetic 
summation of individual preferences 
really what we mean by the "common 
good" or the "public interest"? Or 
do we think that people may have 
rights to certain uses of a common 
resource that cannot be abrogated by 
mere utilitarian expediency? Mustn' t 
we recognize the justice of certain 
claims to the use of a resource that 
are not dependent solely upon the 
collective benefits that would result 
from their recognition? 
Utility-bas~d theories, I 
concede (provided they could overcome 
their internal conceptual diffi-
culties), do provide the basis for a 
solution to the problem of the -
commons. As Hobbes pointed out, any 
sufficiently effective coercive 
authority is better than anarchy. 
But if we seek a just social policy, 
one that recognizes the possible 
rights of each individual, we must 
search further. 
How then should we determine and 
justify a coercive governmental 
policy for the allocation and 
utilization of common resources? Is 
there a procedure that conscientious 
public officials can use which is 
also reasonably practical and likely 
to elicit support from conscientious 
citizens? I think there is, and I 
would like to sketch it briefly here. 
I shall call the procedure "justice 
as fairness," borrowing this name, as 
well as much of the following, from 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice. 
The suggested procedure builds 
upon the classical notion of a social 
contract. Just governmental power, 
according to this tradition, derives 
from the consent of the governed, No 
use of social authority, no matter 
how benevolent or productive of 
social value, is ever legitimate 
unless those subject to its control 
voluntarily place themselves under 
its sway. Unfortunately, traditional 
social contract theory floundered on 
the rocks of the problem of consent, 
for it is unrealistic to imagine any 
moderate-sized social group giving 
its unanimous consent to all acts of 
its ruling body or even to imagine a 
unanimous initial agreement to follow 
majority rule, perhaps as part of a 
constitutionally regulated govern-
mental system, But if such unanimous 
consent is not forthcoming, what 
authority or legitimacy can a govern-
ment have over its nonconsenting (or 
worse, its dissenting) citizens? 
Moreover, what is the moral force 
of a mere contract? If a rich 
manufacturer and a desperate consumer 
agree to a transaction out of the 
latter's necessity for the former's 
product, or if a sexist domineering 
male and an indoctrinated subservient 
female consent to a social arrange-
ment out of uncritical conformity to 
their society's sexual role patterns, 
is either agreement necessarily just? 
Something else ts apparently needed 
before mutual consent can become the 
criterion of normative legitimacy. 
Justice as fairness answers 
these two major problems by enriching 
and clarifying the theoretical model 
that lies at the base of the 
classical contract theory, The 
traditional theorists, Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, referred to this 
condition as the "State of Nature," 
In their accounts the covenant that 
established and justified a societal 
structure or body politic was entered 
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into from a pre-governmental or even 
non-social "state of nature," Though 
this evocative phrase suggests a 
world of primitive pre-historical 
savages (though strangely capable of 
rather elaborate game-theoretic 
reasoning), I like to think that the 
"state-of-nature" was always 
envisioned as an hypothetical 
analytical model or theoretical 
construct designed to explain and 
justify the idea of legitimate 
authority, and not to factually 
describe its historical derivation, 
Whatever the accuracy of this 
interpretation of the traditional 
formulations of the theory, justice 
as fairness explicitly specifies that 
the imagined contract is merely 
hypothetical, It is a part of an 
analytical theory of social justice, 
instructing us to consider the 
principles that would have been 
agreed to by every rational person in 
a suitably defined situation, each 
element of which is designed to model 
theoretically some aspect of the role 
and function of principles of social 
justice in actual societies, The 
most important of the qualifications 
of this "original position" is the 
so-called "veil-of-ignorance" which 
the theory places on each of the 
contracting parties, Designed to 
capture our moral intuition that 
principles of justice should be 
impartial and should not arbitrarily 
reflect the contingent accidents of 
birth, such as race or sex,7 the 
veil-of-ignorance deprives the 
contractors of the knowledge of who, 
in particular, they are, They know 
that they are members of a society 
and that they must live together 
under the principles to which they 
now agree, They know the general 
laws of physical and social science, 
and they are rationally capable of 
using such knowledge to calculate the 
consequences of alternative policies. 
But deprived of the knowledge of 
their own place in society or of any 
specific fact about themselves, such 
as their sex, race, socio-economic 
level, occupation, natural abilities, 
etc., they cannot determine how 
different proposed social principles 
would personally affect themselves, 
Even if imagined as merely self-
interested rational agents, they are 
still forced to choose the best 
policy for all of the members of 
their society, for they do not know 
what place in that society they 
actually will hold. The parties 
would not agree to any racist policy, 
for example, since not knowing their 
own race they could not foresee 
whether they would be benefited or 
harmed by any such discriminatory 
principle. Similarly, sexist 
injustices could not win agreement 
from self-interested contractors who 
were ignorant of their own sex. 
It should now be apparent how 
justice as fairness rectifies our two 
concerns with the traditional 
contract view. First of all, there 
~ a sense in which everyone can be 
said to have consented to a just 
social arrangement. Since just 
principles are by definition those 
policies that would have been agreed 
to by all rational persons in the 
original position, unanimous consent 
by all of the parties is assured. 
Since the contractors are forced to 
choose qua rational and equal 
citizens, and not as particular 
individuals with particular 
interests, there are few, if any, 
grounds for disagreement. Secondly, 
and more significantly, the fact that 
the agreement stems from a situation 
that is fundamentally fair to all 
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parties (for they all share a 
position of total equality) gives 
moral validity to their agreements. 
While it is implausible to suggest 
that all contracts or even all 
voluntary contracts are legitimate 
(the major error of libertarian 
theorists such as Milton Freedman and 
Robert Nozick), it is useful to 
consider the results of fair 
agreements reached from fundamentally 
fair initial conditions as legiti-
mate. Arriving at just results thus 
becomes a question of validating the 
procedures for establishing social 
principles, rather than conforming to 
a predetermined pattern (such as 
"equality") in the distribution of 
social goods. 
We are now prepared to venture 
back to the shores of the 
Chesapeake! Our problem was to 
select a governmental policy that 
would justly impose constraints on 
the behaviour of individual users of 
a common resource such as the Bay, so 
that all would avert the disastrous 
"tragedy of the commons," and would, 
instead, fairly partake of their 
legitimate shares of the common good 
or public interest, The procedure 
for the determination of such a 
policy proposed by justice as 
fairness is simple, though perhaps 
deceptively so. Those responsible 
for determining the policies for the 
region must first of all acquire 
sufficient general knowledge about 
the problems facing the Bay, so that 
they can reasonably calculate the 
consequences to each of the affected 
parties of imposing alternative 
regulations or programs. They must 
understand and appreciate the manner 
in which advancing one interest (say, 
dredging the shipping channels to 
permit large coal-ships to use the 
Norfolk and Baltimore harbors) may 
adversely affect another (e.g., by 
destroying the natural habitat of 
commercially important species of 
fish or crabs), and they must also 
identify and hopefully sympa-
thetically appreciate the extremely 
wide range of such affected 
interests. Fortunately, many 
concerned groups have already made 
prodigious efforts to document the 
condition of our common resource and 
the way in which the Bay's various 
users affect one another. Others 
have begun to catalogue the sur-
prising diversity of persons and 
groups whose lives depend in some way 
on use of the Bay (e.g., the Japanese 
worker whose factory is fueled by 
coal shipped out of Hampton Roads, or 
even the American who drives an 
eaonomical car produced in that 
Japanese factory!). Unfortunately, 
of course, no actual human policy-
makers, even those who are willing to 
put personal interest aside and seek 
truly just decisions, could ever hope 
to achieve the necessary extensive 
knowledge. This first requirement 
specifies an ideal state, and like 
all such ideals, it can only be 
approximated in actual practice. But 
it can and should suggest a goal 
towards which our decision makers 
should aspire. 
Secondly, our ideal policy-
makers would attempt to view their 
choices from behind the veil-of-
ignorance. They would somehow try to 
forget that they were fishermen, 
shippers, recreational land-owners, 
citizens of distant inland regions, 
or whatever, and try to make their 
proposals in temporary ignorance of 
their personal situations and 
individual interests.8 One such 
leader's temporary enthusiasm for an 
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extensive dredging proposal, say, 
might be diminished as he sympathet-
ically took up the points-of-view of 
the commercial fisherman, the 
consumers of his catch, or the lovers 
of endangered species of wildlife, 
thus forgetting his actual economic 
interest in a shipping firm or his 
concern over price increases in 
automobiles partially caused by the 
unavailability of inexpensive steel, 
which was in turn partially attribu-
table to congestion in the Hampton 
Roads harbor. 
Although the decision procedure 
of "justice as fairness" appears 
excessively abstract for use in 
practical contexts, that is not, I 
believe, the case. Indeed, the basic 
idea that justice is achieved by 
deciding from a disinterested 
perspective largely explains the 
moral force behind our present 
conflict-of-interest requirements for 
law-makers and judges, and it seems 
to account for the rhetorical impact 
of the familiar cry of moral 
indignation, "How would you like it 
if I did it to you?" Moreover, even 
if such truly impartial choice is a 
moral ideal unattainable by our all 
too fallible and all too corruptible 
public officials, our earlier 
comments on epistemic fallibility 
apply here as well. Justice as 
fairness is a theory of normatively 
sound decision-making. If actual 
persons cannot achieve perfection 
according to its requirements, they 
may nevertheless use it as a 
sought-after goal, a standard for 
testing their own consciences and a 
benchmark for evaluating the conduct 
of others. An ethical theory can do 
no more. 
NOTES 
1. Garret Hardin, "The Tragedy of the 
Commons," in Exploring New Ethics 
for Survival (New York, Penguin 
Books, 1973) . 
2. Rich Collins, "Individual 
Decisions and Public Outcomes (Why 
People Do What They Do), in Me and 
You and Bay Ab(Use), Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting of the 
Citizens Program for the 
Chesapeake Bay, Inc., Sea Grant 
Extension Division, VPI & SU, 
Blacksburg, VA, 1979. 
3. Ibld. p. 25. 
4 . Loe. Cit. 
5. John Rawls , A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971). 
6. Collins, p. 18. 
7. This suggests only part of the 
theoretical force of the "veil-of-
ignorance." It also purportedly 
VI-8 
models the categorical or 
universal character of moral 
principles, a feature that is 
central to almost every 
philosophical account of the 
nature of morality, from the 
Bible's "golden-rule," by way of 
Kant's "categorical imperative," 
to the modern meta-ethical 
theories of Baier, Hare, Singer 
and others. See my "Fairness to 
Justice as Fairness," forthcoming 
in H. Miller and w. Williams, 
eds., Limits of Utilitarianism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minn. 
Press, 1981). 
8. Representatives elected to a 
legislative body and executive 
administrators responsible for a 
general region introduce some 
complexity, since they may not 
directly seek their own interest, 
but rather that of their constit-
uents. The veil-of-ignorance 
would then have to be interpreted 
to exclude knowledge of the 
identities and interests of the 
constituents as well as those of 
the policy-makers. 
Efficiency, Equality and the Environonment 
Dr. Mark Sagoff, Research Associate, Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, 
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 
"To assert that there is a 
pollution problem or an environmental 
problem," a well-known commentator 
has written, "is to assert, at least 
implicitly, that one or more 
resources is not being used so as to 
maximize human satisfactions. In 
this respect at least environmental 
problems are economics problems, and 
better insight can be gained by 
application of economic analysis."1 
This commonplace view regards 
environmental problems as problems in 
the distribution of resources. They 
arise because markets in some way 
have failed.2 To resolve these 
problems it is necessary to price 
externalities or otherwise to correct 
market deficiencies.3 One should 
distribute property-rights -- or 
rights to the use of resources -- in 
ways that are efficient and fair.4 
But there is a problem with this 
answer. The problem is that we have 
an ideal, albeit vague, about what a 
decent, self-respecting environmental 
VII-1 
policy would be like, Such a policy, 
for example, would not convert a 
magnificent bay like the Chesapeake 
into a chemical dump. It would 
preserve wetlands, or at least a few 
of them, even when they might be 
profitably filled in, to make a race 
track, a tank farm, or an outdoor 
cinema. Our ideal includes something 
about preserving habitats, protecting 
complex biological communities, 
restoring landmarks, and generally 
keeping faith with our natural and 
historical heritage.S I do not mean 
to be saying anything at all 
controversial. I only suggest that 
something would be terribly wrong if 
urban sprawl conquered all, 
Something would be wrong if all of 
America got to look like Route One, 
outside of Washington, 
Environmental policy, some 
people say, ought to be based on 
economic grounds: it ought to 
maximize "satisfaction," 
"efficiency," or something like 
that.6 This is not the only goal 
public policy migh t ser ve: justice 
and equal ity a r e also i mpor tant . 
Therefore, economists recognize a 
"trade-off" be t ween e ff i ciency and 
equal i ty . ? This a pproach, I believe, 
is still problematic for the 
following reason . I have said that 
we have an envi ronmental ideal which 
tells us it would be wr ong to turn 
all our natural beaut y to blight. I 
want to ask whether this 
environmental i deal is compatible 
with the goal s of efficiency and 
qual i ty in public policy. I believe 
it is not. I do not see how we can 
have a self-respecting or decent 
environmental policy if it is based 
on a "trade-off" between efficiency 
and justice. 
I 
Wha t I believe is that the goal 
of efficiency, at least as it is 
usually unde rstood, conflicts with 
many of the object i ves dear to 
environmentalists . A distribution of 
resources is efficient, l et us say, 
if it allots commodities to those who 
value them most . 8 Those who value 
them most, at least on one view, are 
those who are willing to pay the most 
for them.9 The individuals or, more 
plausibly, the corpor ations who pay 
the most for land do so to get a 
large return on the i r investment. 
They may be real estate developers. 
They subdivide . They replace 
comparatively unprofitable farms, 
swamps, and woodlands with 
money-making gas stations, quick-eat 
places, furniture outlets, shopping 
centers, and condominiums, 
Is an efficient di s tribution of 
resources a good one? The citizens 
of Anne Arundel County, Mar yland , may 
not think so . Anne Arundel County 
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has maintained much of its rural 
character in spite of the fac t that 
it lies wi t hin commuting distance of 
the District of Columbia , Its 
c i tizens prize the quietness and 
beauty of their environment. Their 
conception of the good life and of 
what gives value to life requires 
them to protect the pastoral and 
agrarian tradition they love. They 
feel threatened every time 
Presidential Realty or the Grace 
Corporation buys a farm and puts up a 
big billboard which says, "Coming 
Soon 
An acre of land in Anne Arundel 
County, if it is planted in corn, may 
be sold for about $2,000. It may 
bring as much as $100,000, however, 
if it can be planted in garden 
apartments. This includes a 
set-aside for sauna, tennis courts, 
swimming pool, and garage. (There is 
no problem of the commons when you 
are dealing with New Age Realty. 
They put your apartment number on 
your deckchair, locker, and parking 
space.) 
The people of Anne Arundel 
County moved there, or many of them 
did, in order to flee the burbs. Now 
more people, seeking a little peace 
from advertising and from 
automobiles, want to join them. They 
saw the ads and drove out. They 
bring the suburbs with them . That is 
what developers build; that is what 
people pay for. That must be what 
they want. After a few years there 
may be nothing to choose between Anne 
Arundel County and Prince George's. 
This is the triumph of the consumer 
will. 
What should the citizens of Anne 
Arundel County do? Must they sit 
idly by while commercial ventures 
destroy the things they believe in, 
the things that give value to their 
lives? Yes. The only measure of 
value that makes sense to many 
policy-makers is willingess-to-pay. 
The citizens of Anne Arundel County 
might as well forget their moral, 
aesthetic, and ideological 
convictions. These are hard to 
convert into money. 
The residents of Anne Arundel 
County may look for ways to outbid 
the corporations in order to preserve 
the environment they cherish. They 
could pay $1,000 per bushel for corn 
to make that crop as profitable as 
garden apartments. Butter and sugar 
corn is good, however, it is not that 
good. The citizens may also try~ 
buy the farms to preserve them. That 
would be expensive. When the County 
buys development rights to one acre 
the next acre becomes even more 
attractive to developers. (Is it the 
open space nearby, perhaps, that 
makes a subdivision sell? Are the 
developers really selling the open 
space, then, without paying for it?) 
The cost of the development rights 
may run in the millions. The whole 
State of Maryland may not be able to 
foot the bill. 
The citizens of the County have 
one more strategy to try. They might 
zone for agricultural use the land 
they wish to save. This would throw 
the problem to the courts, Judges 
would then have to decide whether the 
proposed zoning -- which fails to pay 
the affected landowners -- is a 
legitimate exercise of the police 
power or an illegitimate, because 
uncompensated, exercise of eminent 
domain,10 
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Let us suppose that the judges 
who decide this matter have been 
illuminated by the philosophy of the 
Chicago School of Law and Economics. 
They would think it significant that 
land within commuting distance of 
Dupont Circle is good as gold if it 
is developed for modern commercial 
and residential use. Land that may 
only be farmed, however, commands a 
much lower price . These judges, 
moreover, may be suspicious of the 
power of voting majorities to impose 
their conception of the good life on 
recalcitrant minorities. They may 
conclude, then, that the proposed 
zoning ordinance is an unjust 
"taking" of the property-rights 
farmers might otherwise sell, for 
huge amounts, to subdividers. They 
might decide that a free market, not 
a zoning board or an elected 
assembly, is the legitimate indicator 
of the popular will. 
And what would be the result of 
this decision? Mondo Condo. High 
Rise Heaven. Bungalow bonanza. Gala 
opening. Move fast. • • "cause they 
won't last. Wet bar . Adult game 
room. Class action. Luxury package. 
The blitz is on. 
II 
Efficiency is not the only goal 
of a liberal society. Surely we are 
concerned with justice and equality 
as well. By "justice," I do not mean 
giving suspects a fair trial. Nor do 
I refer to poetic justice -- the kind 
that rewards virtue or punishes vice. 
I refer, rather, to justice in the 
distribution of welfare, resources, 
and opportunities . I think we may 
agree that a socie ty in which a few 
people a r e very rich while everyone 
else starves is pr ima facie not a 
just society. A nation in which 
goods and offices are distributed 
more or less equally, however, comes 
closer to our intuition of what 
justice demands. I do not need to 
consider here contemporary theories 
of justice .11 It suffices to say 
that a just society shows concern and 
respect for the interests of its 
least well off members . It 
structures its institutions to 
provide for the least well-off before 
advancing the interests of the more 
fortunate .12 
Justice, as characterized in 
contemporary political theory, is 
wonderful, but would not help, so far 
as I can see, the citizens of Anne 
Arundel County . Their farms are not 
threatened because too few people can 
afford to eat chicken. The farms are 
threatened , rather, because too many 
people can afford to buy 
condominiums. I suppos e about a 
million individuals in the Washington 
area can make a down payment on a 
ticky- t acky second home near the 
beach. How can it help the 
environment to add a second or a 
third million to that number? How 
can it help the environment to make 
the least well-off better off -- and 
so able to consume more? Justice and 
equality require that every citizen 
be sure of a decent income insofar as 
that can be done, but the actual 
results f or society depend largely on 
what people spend their money on. 
The money may go straight into 
automobiles, fast food shops, 
motorboats, dirt bikes, and other 
consumer goods which are advertised 
on television. What good is social 
justice if it simply sells 
Chevrolets? What good is equality if 
it is the equality of a parking lot? 
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The people of Anne Arundel 
County are privileged. They have 
clean water, clean air, and open 
space. They want to preserve these 
advantages. But this seems to be 
incompatible with the goal of 
equality . The people who want to 
move there -- from the ghettos of 
Hyattsville and the gulags of 
Anacostia -- are not nearly so well-
off. What would serve their 
interests? What would meet their 
demands? The answer: shopping 
centers, subdivisions, and highways 
all the way to the beach. The old, 
unjust way of dealing with the poor 
was to pile them on top of each other 
in dismal urban projects. What 
equality demands, I imagine, is that 
the poor be middle class and live in 
Anne Arundel County. But then we 
could not distinguish Edgewater from 
Route One. 
III 
A social policy based on the 
pursuit of equality has much in 
common with a policy which emphasizes 
efficiency instead. Both policies 
distribute resources according to the 
income of the recipients. A policy 
that seeks to achieve equality, I 
imagine, favors the interests of 
those who can pay the least to 
satisfy them; it may do this, for 
example, by transferring goods and 
services to the poor. A policy that 
seeks to achieve efficiency, on the 
other hand, appears to favor the 
interests of the rich. Both 
policies, however, make 
distributional considerations the 
principal basis of allocation. The 
question is always whose interests 
are served; we rarely ask what those 
interests are. The question is 
always who gets to use things; it is 
seldom how they use them.13 
The consequences of effic i ency 
for the environment , seen in this 
light, may be expected to be roughl y 
the same a s t he consequences of 
equa lity . Thi s would seem to ~ollow, 
anyway, if the interes ts of the poor 
and the i nterests of the rich are 
a l ike , As l ong a s environmental 
policy serves consumer pr eference , i n 
other words , we shall have the same 
policy, regardless of who the 
consumers are. I know tha t i f peopl e 
are real l y s tarv i ng t hey wi ll not be 
out i n s nowmobi les ; but the welfare 
s t a t e might be able to provide 
ever yone with some extra cash. And 
that is l ikely to go r ight into 
gasoline . 14 Ther e is no reason to 
think that the interests of the poor 
will be any less trivial, r idiculous , 
or petty tha n the inter es t s of the 
rich , A motorboat i s a motorboat; 
what dif fer ence does i t make to the 
environment who is in it? An 
environmental policy can be no better 
than the i nterests it serves . 
This should no t surprise us. 
The least advantaged in our society, 
like the most advantaged , want single 
family homes, They also, like the 
rich, think about their cars alot. 
Having your own wheels is what people 
really get off on . 
Four-on- the- floo r , electronic 
fuel inject i on, wide traction, big 
action, mags , and stripes. Have a 
Camaro . A Luv pick- up , A little 
redistribution could move t hose 
babies, fast. 
The social goal of equality and 
the social goal of ef f ic i ency both 
stimulate demand, And thus each can 
be justified in the context of a 
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Keynesian economics, What should we 
make of this? Someone might draw the 
conclusion that academic political 
philosophy is a form of apologetics. 
In the old days, when capital ism 
required the concentration of wea l th , 
academics argued in favor of 
individualism and natural rights , 
Now that capitalism requires mo re 
widely based markets, however, 
philosophers theorize on the val ue of 
equality. I do no t need to conside r 
this sor t of cri t icism here . I 
believe it is only cynical. No one 
would seriously suggest that "the 
interest of t he least well off" be 
taken as a code word or as a 
euphemism f or "Heavy Chevy." 
Nevertheless, social just i ce, 
which transfers weal th from t he most 
to t he least advantaged, may be 
something that General Motors needs 
in this difficult model year. Thi s 
is because the preferences of 
consumers, rich or poor, can be 
manipulated and to some extent 
controlled by the corporations 
t hrough advertising. Thus weal th 
transferred to consumers may r e turn 
to the control of corpora t e 
executives. They can then bu y more 
advertising and sell more cars . And 
people will see the ads and move out 
to Anne Arundel County. They want to 
get away from automobiles a nd 
advertising. But how can anyone 
actually accomplis h this? How can we 
stop building shopping centers ? I 
find nothing in the litera t ure on 
efficiency nor in the lite r a t ure on 
social justice t hat answers thi s 
question. The choice of one of these 
principles instead of the other, 
then, will not ease the traf f i c 
situation on Fridays and Sundays at 
the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. The 
difference between efficiency a nd 
equality, for practical purposes, may 
be only in the names of the people 
waiting to get through the light. 
IV 
One of the bes t books about 
environmental eth i cs I have r ead is a 
study of the Delaware Estuary, The 
Uncertain Search for Environmental 
Quality, by Bruce Ackerman, with 
other authors.15 Ackerman et al. 
represent the Delaware as a~ommons. 
The problem posed by the Delaware and 
other estuaries, however, is 
different from the clas s ic problem of 
the commons,16 In the classic 
situation, two or more individuals 
compete for the same use of a given 
resource. Two ranchers graze cattle 
on a pasture; two oil companies take 
oil from the same field. In these 
situat i ons, as is well known, the 
strategy by which each individual 
seeks to maximize his own profit can 
lead to an unwanted outcome for 
a11.17 
The problem which arises for an 
estuarine system is different. It 
arises because individuals or 
corporations want to use a natural 
resource in different ways . Imagine, 
as an analogy, that the people who 
compete for the use of a pasture are 
not two ranchers but a rancher and a 
farmer. The rancher wants to graze 
animals there; the farmer wants to 
plow it and plant crops. We might 
imagine a third party, a developer, 
who wants to pave over the meadow and 
build a shopping center. Now, the 
problem is not that these users need 
to work together; there is nothing to 
coordinate. They cannot s hare. They 
have to decide how to use the land. 
About a dozen cities and a 
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hundred major industries use the 
Delaware estuary as a sewer into 
which to dump their waste. The 
cities include Trenton, Burlington, 
Philadelphia, Camden, Chester, and 
Wilmington. I suppose between 12 and 
15 million people have toilets 
connected to the Delaware and that is 
pa r t of the problem. Paper, steel, 
petroleum, food and chemical 
processing plants line the river and 
dump huge quantities of effluent into 
it. Nobody catches fish between 
Philadelphia and Wilmington; shad are 
long gone. They say that if you put 
your hand in the river it will come 
out bones. 
The Delaware also serves as a 
shipping channel into the major ports 
all along it, notably, Wilmington, 
Marcus Hook, Philadelphia, and 
Trenton. Billions of dollars worth 
of goods go in and out. Freighters 
do not dissolve in the excrement 
which floats in the river; the 
tankers run right through it. The 
use of the estuary as a sewer is 
fully compatible with its use as a 
liquid highway. 
The question arises whether it 
would be efficient or just or wise to 
use the Delaware in any other way. 
To "clean up" the estuary, to bring 
it back to a semblance of its 
"natural" condition, would cost 
billions and billions of dollars. 
Much of this burden would fall on the 
taxpayers of Philadelphia and other 
industrial cities. What improvement 
could be worth this cost? 
The residents of Society Hill in 
Philadelphia would surely like to use 
the Delaware for swimming, boating, 
fishing, and other forms of 
recreation. True, a tributary of the 
Delaware, the Schuylkill River, runs 
through the poorer sectiori of town, 
as well as through the largest urban 
park in America, might be cleaned up 
much more cheaply. But the affluent 
residents of Society Hill might still 
avoid the Schuylkill, since it is 
near the black ghetto. Were the 
Schuylkill clean, they would cut to 
visit Martha's Vineyard, the 
Hamptons, or the Jersey shore. 
Who else would benefit from a 
"clean" Delaware? Commercial fishing 
would be possible; but enormous 
quantities of seafood are available 
now in the fishing grounds off New 
Jersey. You can buy bluefish in 
Philadelphia for fifty cents a pound. 
Oysters could be grown near the mouth 
of the estuary. The polluted river, 
however, provides an environment 
which supports a richer abundance of 
benthic worms, which are harvested 
and sold for pet food and fertilizer. 
It is not easy to see how life 
in the Delaware can be resurrected. 
The following problem is an example 
of many others. Fish need a certain 
amount of oxygen in the water at all 
times. When raw sewage enters the 
estuary, it depletes that oxygen. To 
protect the fish, cities must treat 
sewage, so that it may enter the 
river without making an oxygen 
demand. On a rainy day, however, 
billions of gallons of water, the 
run-off from the streets of 
Philadelphia and other cities rush 
into the sewers and combine with 
human waste. No reservoir can be 
built large enough to hold the waste 
and the rainwater together. As a 
result, untreated sewage must be 
passed directly into the estuary, 
where it absorbs whatever oxygen it 
finds. Even if fish could survive on 
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ordinary days, therefore, they would 
all die after a big rain. 
The only solution to this 
problem, other than to give up the 
Delaware as dead, would be for 
Philadelphia and other cities to 
build separate sewer systems for 
waste and for run-off. It would cost 
billions. The citizens of 
Philadelphia , who are among the 
poorest and most heavily taxed people 
in the nation, could never pay for 
it. And the shad which might enjoy 
the river as a result could not be 
eaten because of the remaining 
concentration of heavy metals. 
The authors of the Uncertain 
Search for Environmental Quality use 
this argument to show, beyond a 
doubt, that the economically sane and 
socially necessary thing to do with 
the Delaware is use it as both a 
liquid highway and a sewer. We 
cannot afford to do anything else. 
We should have to pay incredible 
costs for a cleaner, more "natural" 
estuary; few benefits -- from the 
point of view of efficiency or 
equality would be gained. 
Now, I believe that Ackerman et 
al. have identified the solution t~ 
the "problem of the commons" that 
both social justice and social 
efficiency demand. It is, as I 
expected it to be, precisely opposed 
to the objectives and values of 
environmentalists. The Delaware, 
moreover, is the neighbor of the 
Chesapeake; the problem of the 
commons, i n the two estuaries, is 
much the same. The economy of the 
Chesapeake region may already depend 
more on shipping -- particularly the 
shippi. ng of oil and coal -- than upon 
the taki ng of fish. The solution to 
the problem of the commons which 
equality and efficiency demand in the 
example of the Delaware is plain and 
is thoroughly supported in Ackerman's 
admirable study. Will equality and 
efficiency demand the pollution and 
the destruction of the Chesapeake as 
well? 
V 
Those who write in favor of 
efficiency or equality as goals for 
our society are aware that these 
objectives conflict, or are likely to 
conflict, with the preservationist 
policies put forward by 
environmentali sts. Among these 
wr.iters, I believe , Ronald Dworkin 
handles this conflict in a subtle and 
suggestive way . Dworkin recognizes 
that many of us (for example: the 
residents of Anne Arundel County) 
wish to preserve a way of life apart 
from a cornucopian consumer economy. 
Dworkin concedes that there is 
"a powerful sentiment that a 
simpler way of life is better, in 
itself, than the life of consumption 
most Americans have recently 
preferred; this simpler life requires 
living in harmony with nature, and is 
therefore disturbed when, for 
example, a beautiful mountainside is 
spoiled by strip-mining for the coal 
that lies within it, Should the 
mountainside be saved, in order to 
protect a way of life that depends 
upon it, either by regulation that 
prohibits mining, or by acquisition 
with the taxpayer's money for a 
national park? May a liberal support 
such policies, consistently with his 
constitutive political morality? "18 
Dworkin answers this question 
consistently with his general view. 
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He argues that if a market is fair we 
should accept its result even if we 
are disgusted by it. An official may 
interfere in the market only if he or 
she believes it has not been fair. 
Dworkin writes: 
"If he believes that government 
intervention is necessary to achieve 
a fair distribution of resources, on 
the ground that the market does not 
fairly reflect the preferences of 
those who want the park against those 
who want what the coal will produce, 
then he has a standard egalitarian 
reason for supporting 
intervention."19 
But what if he does not? What 
if Mr. Liberal is simply appalled as 
a citizen at what fair, egalitarian, 
and efficient markets are doing to 
exploit the environment to service 
what seem to him to be idiotic 
consumer demands? What if he wishes, 
on principle, to preserve a 
wilderness area from winnebagos or, 
as a matter of ideology, he wishes to 
keep a wonderful pond from being 
converted into a parking lot or a gas 
station? Suppose he simply feels 
that a good or virtuous society would 
not let urban sprawl spread from the 
city to the sea? These are familiar 
problems. To be consistent -- keep 
the state from endorsing any 
conception of the virtuous society or 
of the good life -- Mr. Liberal has 
to keep his values to himself. He 
should buy what he can and leave the 
rest to the consumer preferences of 
others. 
Dworkin worries about this. 
Personal or private preferences, 
after all, are not all caused in the 
same way. Some represent a person's 
values; others may merely result from 
various forms of seduction or subtle 
coercion. Should preferences caused 
in these different ways, for example, 
preferences obviously inspired by 
advertising, be treated with equal 
respect and concern? This is a 
question about which the old 
Utilitarians also worried. They 
compared Socrates and a pig; they 
compared poetry and pushkin. Dworkin 
touches on this question, in relation 
to the use of the environment, in the 
following passage. 
"Suppose, 
liberal 
however, that the 
believes that the 
conquest of unspoiled terrain by the 
consumer economy is self-fueling and 
irreversible, and that this process 
will make a way of life that has been 
desired and found satisfying in the 
past unavailable to future 
generations, and indeed to the future 
of those who now seem unaware of its 
appeal. He fears that this way of 
life will become unknown, so that the 
process is not neutral amongst 
competing ideas of the good life, but 
in fact in destructive of the very 
possibility of some of these. In 
that case the liberal has reasons for 
a program of conservation which are 
not only consistent with his 
constitutive morality, but in fact 
sponsored by it. "20 
What Dworkin says here is true. 
The resources and opportunities that 
are available to us determine, in 
large part, the goals we seek and the 
preferences we express. We can say, 
then, that while our preferences 
change our environment, so, too, our 
environment changes or controls our 
preferences. This may be a powerful 
argument for preserving natural 
environments. We want to insure that 
certain choices or options or values 
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are available in the future even if 
few consumers take them seriously 
today . 
Everything, or almost 
everything, however , has or may have 
a meaning; almost any environment or 
any product may be favored or 
protected for the sake of the way of 
life it symbolizes or for the values 
it may later reinspire.21 Consider, 
for example , the great gas guzzling 
behemoth automobiles, the production 
of which, I believe, is now 
effectively outlawed. Perhaps we 
should insist upon their production 
instead. After all, a life of 
profligacy, wastefulness, and 
conspicuous consumption which has 
been desired and found satisfying in 
the past may otherwise become 
unavailable to future generations, 
and indeed to the future of those who 
now seem unaware of its appeal. 
Consider, moreover, the sexist 
sitcoms that everyone used to watch 
on television. If these no longer 
appeal to us and go off the air, a 
way of life may become unknown. The 
market process then would not be 
neutral among competing ideas of the 
good life, but in fact would be 
destructive of some of these. Shall 
we rerun "I Love Lucy," then? They 
liked it once. What shall we save 
for our children, to give them a 
basis on which to form their values, 
and what shall we let fade 
ingloriously into the past? Who 
shall answer this question? The 
ideological preference for certain 
values, which the liberal tosses out 
the front door, enters by the back. 
VI 
I cannot discuss here the 
strategy by which liberals bring into 
policy debate the values that they 
are supposed to leave outside.22 
Briefly, the problem is this. 
Dworkin has said, correctly, that 
liberalism "supposes that political 
decisions must be, so far as 
possible, independent of any 
particular conception of the good 
life, or what gives value to life."23 
Liberal political theory, in other 
words, refuses, in principle, to 
allow other-regarding, ideological, 
or what Dworkin calls "external" 
preferences to i nfluence public 
policy.24 These "external" 
preferences, in general, consist in 
the values people would speak up for, 
a rgue for, work for, and lobby for as 
citizens, when they take the point of 
view of the community, and not just 
their individual interests, into 
account.25 The essence of liberal 
political theory, as Dworkin 
correctly points out, is to exclude 
these contending conceptions of "the 
good life in commo n" from 
conside rat ion; it is to allow 
individuals to choose for no one but 
themselves.26 Thus a liberal policy 
would reject the things people may 
vote for in favor of the things they 
wait in line to buy. Liberal theory 
denies ideology for the sake of 
interest . It rests public policy 
squarely on a platform of analytical 
sophistication in the service of 
consumer demand. 
Liberals like Dworkin are 
appalled, however, at what 
self-fuelling and irreversible 
markets have done and are doing to 
the natural environment. They 
disapprove of the urban cowboy who 
gets on his snowmobile at night to 
ride out into the boonies to take pot 
shots at the wild animals. They feel 
dismay when they hear that a 
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magnificent species -- certain 
whales, for example -- are becoming 
extinct; this dismay, moreover, is 
moral, and has nothing to do with 
maximizing a sustained yield of 
blubber. The liberal may worry when 
he or she sees the Eastern Shore of 
Maryland on its way to becoming a 
profitable sceptic puddle surrounded 
by an even more profitable cement 
wasteland. He or she has second 
thoughts on hearing proposals that 
would turn our national parks into 
swingless cities. The question 
arises, then, how the liberal can 
maintain his or her commitment to 
consumer preference when what 
cons umers want is so loathsome. Why 
must we treat all interests with 
equal respect and concern rather than 
with the indifference and contempt 
some of them so palpably deserve? 
Economists in universities 
across the nation are writing 
articles and reading papers aimed at 
answering this question.27 Their 
problem -- although they might not 
put in this way -- is to show that 
policies that are efficient are also 
generally consistent with our 
ideological or "external" 
preferences. The key here is to 
assign a price to these values, to 
show, in other words, that the moral 
anguish we feel at certain events is 
a cost that has to be taken into 
account. How much are you willing to 
pay for the mere knowledge that the 
furbish lousewort enjoys its habitat 
undisturbed? How much would you pay 
to know that the Chesapeake will not 
go to the dogs? If your heart bleeds 
at the extinction of a species or the 
destruction of an estuary, then, in a 
way, their protection is a benefit to 
you. You may not be able to reveal 
this kind of preference in a market; 
free rider problems, or something, 
make that difficult. That is where 
economists come in: they can analyze 
and compensate for this market 
failure. They can treat your 
"external" preferences as if they 
were personal interests. Ana then 
they can give the "benefits" or 
preservation a surrogate or "shadow" 
price.28 
You can see immediately what is 
going on here. Do these analysts ask 
surrealists how much they are willing 
to pay to see everything melt? Of 
course not, What they are supposed 
to do is to transform the "external" 
preferences of which good liberals 
approve into personal preferences 
that deserve a surrogate "price." 
They do this by not noticing that 
they are "external" or ideological or 
ethical in origin; they call them 
"fragile," "soft," or "intangible" 
variables instead. Then they can 
identify them as "spillover" effects 
and give them a "shadow" price.29 It 
is the damnedest thing you ever saw. 
But we have to save both liberal 
political theory and the natural 
environment. Pricing certain 
ideological values as if they were 
market externalities is one way that 
this can be done. 
In the passages I quoted, Ronald 
Dworkin is concerned about the 
"spillover" effects of present market 
transactions on the moral 
opportunities of future generations. 
In speaking for future generations 
who cannot speak for themselves --
and by setting out a conception of 
the moral opportunities that are 
worth pricing, Dworkin reveals, as I 
think, a fundamental tension in 
liberal political theory. The 
liberal, on the one hand, wants 
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public policy to serve private or 
"subjective" interests. The liberal 
recognizes, on the other hand, that 
these preferences -- sometimes in 
contrast to the "external" or 
"objective" values the same people 
have30 -- are often abominable, The 
very people who have these 
preferences may wish to be rid of 
them, (The addiction of smokers is 
an example.) This is the problem of 
Socrates and the pig; it is the 
problem of preferring pinball to 
Pushkin. The classical utilitarians, 
to solve this problem, trusted to 
education, experience, or to the 
perfectability of man, I do not know 
what liberals trust in today. 
VII 
The problem Dworkin identifies 
with respect to future generations is 
discussed in the literature of 
economics as the problem of 
"irreversibilities. "31 From a 
logical point of view, nothing, once 
destroyed, can come back into being; 
time goes in but one direction, 
everything is irreversible in that 
sense. The "irreversibili ties" of 
concern to economists, however, 
consist in special or unique 
commodities for which no adequate 
substitute is likely ever to be 
found. An example might be a redwood 
forest, so old, magnificent, and rare 
that nothing can replace it. Yet 
economists, as a rule, are adept at 
showing how virtually anything can be 
considered fungible: 
all you have to do is set up some 
indifference curves and see where 
they cross. Why then is a redwood 
forest irreplaceable if, perhaps a 
little advertising, more people would 
prefer to visit a Las Vegas type 
Shangri-La there i nstead? 
In a paper on "Environmental 
Preservation, Uncertainty , and 
Irreversibility," Kenneth Ar r ow and 
Anthony Fisher review economic 
studies concerning the Hells Canyon 
reach of the Snake River, a 
magnificent landscape wh i ch may 
become the site of a hyd r oelectric 
dam. These studies, according to 
Arrow and Fisher, show "that even the 
most profitable of current 
development projects there can be 
expected at this time to yield a 
smaller return than the 
preservation-recreation 
alternative."32 Thes e authors then 
ask how analysis of this kind might 
apply, f or example, to the choice 
"between preserving (pa r t of) a 
virgin redwood forest for wilderness 
recreation, on the one hand, or 
opening (part of) it up to clear-cut 
logging, on the other . "33 
It is significant that, in this 
study, Arrow and Fisher consider only 
the recreational benefits which 
follow from the preservation of the 
redwood forest. They fail to mention 
the greater recreational use of an 
area once it is clear- cut. Observers 
confronted with a similar situation 
in the Appalachian Mountains, for 
example, found that: 
"When you talk about economic 
value, snowmobiling is unsurpassed. 
It's an expensive sport and spreads a 
lot of money around. The hikers 
bring their own food and stay in an 
Appalachian Mountain hut . 
Snowmobilers stay in local motels, 
eat at the restaurant, patronize gas 
stations. "34 
You can snowmobile in winter in 
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a clear-cut forest (a few trees might 
be left for slaloming); you can dirt 
bike there in the summer. Off-road 
vehicle races held on public lands 
now attract thousands of participants 
and thousands of spectators.35 Yet 
public lands are being closed to 
these vehicles; imagine, then, the 
opportunity a clear-cut forest 
presents. And you can be sure that 
interest in dirt-bikes will always be 
keen, as long as they are advertised 
like this: 
"Just put your gang on Suzuki's 
DS trail bikes. And head for the 
boonies • Peaks or valleys, it's 
all the same to those rugged off-road 
machines. Trac to ring up a hillside 
or going flat-out on a dry lake is no 
sweat. "36 
Now, that's recreation. Any 
developer will tell you that for each 
hiker that backpacks into the 
wilderness you can bring in a hundred 
tourists if you provide a disco, 
massage parlor, bar, and casino 
gambling, instead of a lot of trees. 
You never heard of the mob muscling 
into the pemmican business. That is 
because backpacking is not where the 
big recreation dollar is. 
I want to ask why economists, 
concerned with the question of 
wilderness preservation as opposed, 
say, to clear-cutting and 
tree-farming, consider the 
recreational interests only of the 
wilderness users, rather than the 
preferences of the dirt-bikers, 
golf-players, bumper-car enthusiasts, 
skiers, hang-gliders, and others 
likely to use the area after it is 
clear-cut. The hikers already have 
more wilderness to hike in than the 
dirt-bikers have clear-cut areas to 
raise hell in. And everyone knows 
how long you have a stand in line for 
the chair lift. Why are economists 
so concerned about the recreational 
interests of people who hike? Why 
don't they favor the interests of the 
motorcycle gangs instead? 
The reason is this. Most 
Americans are convinced on moral 
grounds that we ought not to destroy 
a thousand year old wilderness even 
(or perhaps especially) to achieve 
economic ends. They believe, in 
other words, that environmental 
policy, at least in this instance, 
ought not to be based on economic 
arguments. How can economists take 
this strongly held preference -- or 
conviction -- into account? How can 
they make economic analysis a 
credible basis for environmental 
policy with respect to the 
wilderness? How can they come up 
with results that are acceptable on 
ethical, cultural, and political 
grounds? 
They do this in two ways. One I 
have mentioned. It is to "shadow" 
price political factors as market 
externalities. The other is to put a 
high "price" on aesthetic and other 
"benefits" of outdoor wilderness 
recreation. Aaron Wildavsky, over 
ten years ago, identified these 
"benefits" as "finagle" factors that 
distinguish the new cost-benefit 
approach from the old free-market 
economics.37 "Outdoor recreation," 
he observes, "may be alleged to have 
great psychic benefits, though 
demonstrating its dimensions or 
comparing it with television or 
people-watching on crowded streets is 
another matter."38 Wildavsky 
correctly concludes: 
"If the old economics will not 
let you have what you know is right, 
it follows that a new economics is 
evidently needed . The term new 
economics of natural resources is 
used to designate an emerging trend 
and permits economists to avoid 
direct confrontation with political 
problems by bringing in aesthe tic 
factors to make economic analys is 
come out "right.""39 
I think that we should preserve 
the ancient redwood forests because 
this is the ethical, decent, and 
self-respecting thing to do. It is 
also what almost all Americans agree 
is the right thing to do.40 But what 
is right, ethical, decent, and 
self-respecting is not always and 
perhaps is not even usually what is 
efficient. These concepts are not 
the same. But that is not a problem 
for us; that is a problem for 
economists of the liberal tradition . 
Nor is the decent and self-respecting 
environmental policy necessarily the 
one that contributes to equality, 
either. It has more to do, 
fundamentally, with how we are to 
relate to each other and to the pas t 
and to the future as sharers or a 
common natural and national heritage. 
Why must we see this only as a matter 
of distributive justice or 
distributive efficiency? The point 
of an environmental ethic is to base 
the difference between right and 
wrong on other more political, 
more aesthetic -- grounds. 
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Ronald Dworkin is right in his 
commitment to preserve for future 
generations the magnificent 
environments that l]lany of us work to 
preserve not for recreation or for 
any other use but for the meaning 
they have for us and for the values 
they express. In order to protect 
these environments, however, and in 
order to preserve them as 
opportunities for the moral education 
of future generations, we must 
recognize our commitment for what it 
is. It is not an interest of the 
sort consumers reveal in free and 
fair markets. It is a value, an 
ideal, a.n ethic we subscribe to 
collectively and demand to accomplish 
and to pay for as a nation. 
If we are to understand our 
environmental problems, we need not 
better cost-benefit analysis but a 
better idea of what our values are: 
not our interests as individual 
consumers -- we already know what 
those are --· but the ideals we stand 
for collectively and are willing to 
sacrifice for as a nation. To limit 
the role of the chooser to that of 
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the consumer is to slight ourselves 
and ,blight our environment. To say 
this, however, is to speak as with a 
voice from a wilderness. Dworkin is 
right: wilderness, rivers, 
estuaries, bays, forests, and 
farmland have voices: they express 
our shared values and transmit them. 
They speak to us and for us. And 
when the wilderness disappears, 
voices from it disappear as well. 
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Amuck on Spacesh1p Earth: Beyond a Land-Use Ethic 
Mr. Morris Yarowsky, Associate Professor of Art, Virginia Commonwealth University, 
Richmond, Virginia 
"Once upon a time the wild 
animals, the big ones, used to roar ; 
today they are stuffed." Paul 
Gauguin, Intimate Journals 
"Man lacks the capacity to 
foresee and forestall; he will end by 
destroying the earth." Albert 
Schweitzer 
r. 
The serious art of our time is 
not very often involved with imagery 
that is derived from Nature. 
Landscape painting exists, but in a 
minor way; contemporary sculptors 
fabricate works on outdoor sites, but 
without commenting on general 
environmental issues. Ideologies in 
art are formed within broad, changing 
sensibilities. Lines of thought are 
continuously generated, and a special 
history of ideas more or less 
determines what imagery, structure, 
and meaning are of interest in any 
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given time. 
Painting and sculpture are mute 
systems when compared to writing and 
talking. If one wanted to comment on 
a subject as complex as the current 
ecological crisis, why would one 
expect silent art to be more 
effective than a straightforward 
explication of the problem? Yet, 
images can be forceful. The most 
salient contemporary image, perhaps, 
has not come from art, but from the 
camera on a rocket headed toward the 
moon. For the first time, earth was 
actually seen as a small, isolated 
rocky sphere - only a finite system 
sustaining the life on it. The 
graphic quality of Earth from afar 
underlined the importance and, even, 
the poignancy of Buckminster Fuller's 
instructive metaphor, "spaceship 
earth." As man accelerates his 
rampage of destruction of the 
planet's environment, the image of a 
small, habitable rock - with a 
delicate and vulnerable life support 
structure - becomes an increasingly 
important part of the imagery of the 
crisis. 
The "Earthworks" movement in 
sculpture of the 1960's used the 
environment as site and material. 
This movement signified a move away 
from the pristine context of the 
white walls of the traditional 
gallery space, and - in part - tried 
to distance art from the traditional 
support systems of gallery, museum, 
col lector . A long series of 
innovative, original and, often, 
awesomely monumental work appeared. 
Probably the most famous work of this 
period is Smithson's "Spiral Jetty," 
a grandiose structure of rocks built 
by bulldozer and other earth moving 
machinery and extended in a huge 
spiral coil into the remoteness of 
Utah's Great Salt Lake. 
The site of this piece suggests 
with metaphors of the inexplicable 
mysteries of the Earth, legends of 
the sources of this vast salty body 
of water. Smithson attempted to make 
his enormous (1500 feet long) rock 
spiral an integral part of the 
world's natural structure. Aware of 
the ubiquitous occurrence of spiral 
growth forms in crystalline 
structures, he tried to establish a 
parallel with this monumental work. 
Built in the 1960's, the piece is now 
submerged and invisible. Smithson 
wanted a human-time image of physical 
entropy, which he understood as a 
movement of all things in the 
Universe toward ultimate sameness and 
timeless disorder. His work was 
caught up, in human-time, in a type 
of cosmological loss of its identity. 
The heroic vision of an artist 
devising structures that operated 
within vast spans of geologic time is 
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inspiring and instructive; it renews 
a perspective of ourselves as a form 
of life bracketed between the archaic 
mammoths of prehistory and the 
entropic end of time. But this is a 
poetic, if real, truism, and doesn't 
articulate solutions or even problems 
related to the here and now of our 
crisis. 
The indifference of contemporary 
Western art to Nature imagery stands 
in stark contrast to American 
painting of the 19th Century, which 
was often dominated, ideologically, 
by the pantheistic religious and 
philosophical sensibility of the 
time. Nature was viewed not only as 
God's creation, but as the actual 
embodiment and presence of God in the 
world. Painting reflected this 
religious pantheism with precision, 
embodying Emerson's belief that "the 
noblest ministry of nature is to 
stand as the apparition of God."1 An 
attitude that is apparent in much of 
the popular landscape painting of the 
period. Albert Bierstadt's work, one 
mountain top more glowing than the 
next, streaming "holy" rays of light, 
attempted in an unrestrained manner 
to depict the sublime in Nature. 
Major artists of the time, such as 
Durand and Cole, followed suit in 
attempting to fit their work into the 
prevailing quasi-religious world 
view. The imagery was orthodoxy. As 
an art historian, Barbara Novack, 
explains: 
Any irresponsibility on his part 
(the artist's) might result in a kind 
of excommunication. The nineteenth 
century rings with exhortations to 
the artist on the high moral duties 
of his exceptional calling - entirely 
proper for landscape painters, those 
priests of the natural church.2 
The sense of sublime vocation 
was so deeply felt that artists 
tended to incorporate nature theology 
into the conduct of their lives, The 
painter Innes, for example, whose 
work reflected the view that the 
visual world was a direct example of 
God's imminence, reflected this 
preoccupation in his dying words, As 
his son recalled, while viewing a 
sunset, 
"Just 
down below 
threw his 
exclaimed, 
beautiful!' 
ground, .. 3 
as the big red ball went 
the horizon,,,[Innes] 
hands into the air and 
'My God! oh, how 
and fell stricken to the 
The coincidence of the strong 
and caring concern of art and artists 
in the 19th Century with the 
widespread destruction of the 
American wilderness at the time tells 
us that painting, even with its 
declaration of the apotheon's of 
Nature, was ineffective as a tool for 
conservation. 
II. 
Baywide failure of oyster 
reproduction: Reproduction is 
a highly sensitive and essential 
process, and general failure of a 
species which has been widespread, 
abundant and extremely well adapted 
to this estuarine system is a grave 
indication of fundamental trouble,4 
The inability of oysters to 
survive in the Chesapeake Bay is a 
highly dramatic and even metaphorical 
signal that its ecosystem has been 
the victim of traumatic abuse, Since 
the oysters of the Bay had been a 
significant part of its estuarine 
life, the suddenness of the 
destruction of an ancient habitat is 
chilling, 
Oysters are not art, but their 
disappearance from the Bay seems 
depressingly reminiscent of the 
inability of ancient artifacts 
throughout the world to withstand the 
onslaught of modern population 
pressures and pollution. The sudden 
los s of much of the world's art to an 
increasingly spoiled atmosphere is at 
least a sign that things on earth are 
quite different than they have been 
during the past two or three thousand 
years, Exemplifying this destruction 
is the threatened loss of the great 
and indecipherable ground drawings on 
the arid desert surface of the Nazca 
region in Peru. These drawings are 
so vast, of ,uch a large scale, 
covering a narrow, 40-mile strip of 
the Peruvian coast, that they were 
thought to be remnants of ancient 
irrigation ditches until aerial 
inspection in the 1930s showed that 
they were giant dr awings of animals, 
geometric design and markings, 
Recent research has uncovered that 
some of the lines were probably 
astronomical measurement devices,5 
One system of lines in particular 
points to the contact point of the 
sun at the horizon at the date of the 
winter solstice, and calculations 
based on this data date the drawings 
from between the first and sixth 
century, B.C. The drawings are very 
fragile; they were made by brushing 
away the shallow, pebbly top surface 
to expose a lighter colored sandy 
soil underneath , However, in spite 
of the relatively impermanent nature 
of the drawings, they have survived 
well over a probable period of 
several thousand years. 
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Flamboyant s pecula tion about the 
origin of t he drawings, fo cuss i ng on 
fantasies about visi t ors fr om "outer 
space," in particular , have attracted 
large numbers of people to the s ite . 
As a resul t, t he ground- ma rkings are 
now in danger of being des t r oyed by 
foot traffic and automobile t ire 
tracks . Historically, t he Nazca 
region has been one of the driest 
areas of the wor l d; the arid climate 
also acted as a conservator for the 
drawings . Now indust r ial i zation in 
nearby regions has changed t his , 
causing periodical r ain which 
serious l y threatens t he sur vival of 
the remaining markings. 
But probably mo re unnerving than 
the destruction of the Nazca lines is 
the destruction of Athenian 
Acropolis . The caryatids , those 
maidens that support the en tablature 
of the structure, recen tly have been 
removed to protect them from further 
devastation by the heavi l y polluted 
atmosphere . A 1975 UNESCO report on 
the condition of these monuments 
stated that the Ac r opoli s had been 
damaged more from atmospheric 
pollution during the last forty years 
than in the previous fo ur centuri es!6 
There is something especially 
sad - if not absolutely alarming -
about the destruction of these works, 
suddenly unable to survive in t he 
newly industrialized world. Of 
course, preventive , s t opgap measures 
can be taken; art can be put i nto 
hermetic environments and saved for a 
time, although the necessity of 
having to do this is not very 
reassuring. Does t he removal of the 
Greek caryatids from an unsuitable 
environment have some connection with 
the death of oysters in the Bay? Is 
the plight of those antique ma i dens 
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also a "grave indication of 
fundamental trouble?" 
There is a very large body of 
liter ature which examines the 
problems contributing to the growing 
environmental and ecological crisis. 
We are aware, simply from reading the 
newspapers, that specific, seemingly 
discrete environmental disasters 
occur with almost daily frequency. 
Acid rain , produced by coal-burning 
plants in the mid-West, is already 
responsible for destroying almost all 
life in 170 lakes in the Adirondack 
Mountains, and in a very large number 
of Canadian lakes, as well.7 There 
i s serious specutation that the 
"greenhouse effect" - an increase in 
the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
- will cause a significant rise in 
the earth's temperature, melt the ice 
caps; and thereby raise the sea by 
hundreds of feet and inundate a good 
deal of civilization. Another issue: 
the reprocessing of uranium in 
existing reactors produces extremely 
hazardous isotopes (strontium 90 and 
cessium 137) which should be stored 
for at least 1 , 000 years. The 
storage tanks holding these isotopes 
are already leaking.8 Further 
chemical contamination of the 
environment has been dramatized 
recently by the problems at Love 
Canal; that location is now 
acknowledged to be uninhabitable, and 
some of its former residents have 
very possibly incurred genetic damage 
and other physical maladies, 
The likelihood of discovering 
many other chemical dump sites 
exuding toxic materials is very 
strong. The destruction of fresh 
water resources thrQugh industrial 
dumping, sewage, oil and chemicals is 
ubiquitous. Hydrofluorocarbons have 
been released into the ionosphere in 
enormous quantities through the use 
of spray cans, thereby depleting the 
ozone layer and subjecting the 
world's population to increasingly 
dangerous amounts of solar radiation. 
On a far simpler level, res_piratory 
and cardiac ailments are exacerbated 
by the polluted atmosphere in heavily 
populated areas; we are used to daily 
news/reports on air quality, and 
already accept these regular 
measurements of the poisoned 
atmosphere in our cities as normal. 
The summary of existing and 
potential environmental disasters can 
be a very long one. It would be 
possible to discuss the release of 
toxic pollutants through train 
derailments, the chemical poisoning 
as a result of pesticide spraying, 
the damage caused by the widespread 
use of such chemicals as Agent 
Orange, the massive pollution of 
rivers due to run-off of industrial 
wastes, or the poisoning of a river 
due to pesticide dumping (Kepone). 
However, it is not only the 
by-products of a runaway technology 
that tend to destroy the environment. 
The rapidly increasing populations in 
constant need of new habitation tend 
to destroy massive areas of arable 
land through housing, highways and 
general support-systems associated 
with urban sprawl. National parks, 
which are - in a sense - Museums of 
Nature (and that is an alarming 
notion), are being damaged irrevers-
ibly by poaching, pollution, over-
crowding and the invasion of wildlife 
into the parks due to urban growth.9 
All of these problems are 
well-known; the environment is 
everywhere threatened and the 
literature which describes the 
situation is vast, dealing with the 
population explosion, the rapacious 
exploitation of nonrenewable 
resources, the dangers of blind 
economic and technological growth and 
the future availability of food for 
the world's increasing population. 
Is it useful, then, to review the 
evidence once more, to compile long 
lists of serious environmental 
problems? 
If the various environmental 
problems were discrete, that is -
separate, independent, more or less 
autonomous issues - then 
comprehensive overviews wouldn't be 
necessary. Agencies, citizens 
groups, and individuals could treat 
separate problems and emerge with 
"clean" solutions. Small brush fires 
can be put out, limited solutions can 
be found. However, if the current 
evidence on the environment adds up 
to a "doomsday" conclusion, 
strategies for dealing with the 
crisis will have to be much more 
intense and different in nature than 
those already being developed. We 
have to know if the life system or 
earth is large enough and resilient 
enough to withstand the enormous 
battering that it is receiving. And, 
more importantly, is our species' 
intelligence and capacity for caring 
great enough to reverse the awesome 
slide into an environmental crisis of 
emergency proportions? Some 
environmentalists have already 
suggested that things are too far 
gone, that the probability of 
humankind's survival is not high. 
Lamont Cole, in a well-known essay, 
"Can the World be Saved?"lO (his 
conclusions are negative) muses that 
the piece might well have been 
titled, "Is There Intelligent Life on 
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Earth?" 
s. R. Eyre , an English 
geographer, holds that all of these 
factors are veering toward an almost 
unstoppable catastrophic 
collision.li Eyre points out that a 
world population of one billion was 
achieved for the first time around 
1810 (A,D.) . It took another century 
or so to add another billion (1920), 
but the next billion came in only 
forty years. Eyre projects the 
recent growth rate to indicate that, 
by the end of the century, the 
world's population will total about 
seven and one-half billion ,12 This 
rate of population increase 
represents what biologists would 
diagnos e as a "swarming stage," in 
which a species experiences 
unrestrained growth due to the 
absence of environmental controls, 
Under labora to ry conditions, when a 
culture of bac teria increases its 
population so that it inhabits the 
entire medium, it necessarily dies 
from being poisoned by its own waste 
products and the i nevitable shortage 
of food. Eyre notes: 
"Because of his mobility and 
other aspects of his technology, man 
will be the first species to achieve 
the swarming stage simultaneously 
over the whole earth: from the point 
of view of all the other organisms in 
all the earth's ecosystems, man is 
becoming a 'pest' everywhere at the 
same time. Furthermore, as a 
technological animal, he is more of a 
pest than other organi sms that reach 
the swarming stage because he uses up 
nonrenewable resources and produces 
inorganic by-products, whereas a 
non-technological species consumes 
mainly renewable resources and 
produces only organic waste."13 
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It is difficult to understand 
why there is no world-consciousness 
of the crisis facing us, both in 
terms of the critically endangered 
environment and a population 
growth-rate that is - by far -
outrunning its potential food 
resources. 
In the 19th century, it was 
fashionable for nature viewers to 
observe "scenes" through amber-tinted 
Claude glasses. The Claude glass was 
mounted on a handle and its effect 
was to clean up the raw edges of the 
natural vista, obscure distracting 
details and present a roseate and 
glowing picture. Is our anesthetized 
indifference to the crisis a modern 
version of the amber glass? 
III. 
"A society that fears it has no 
future is not likely to give much 
attention to the needs of the next 
generation." Christopher Lasch, The 
Culture of Narcissism 
Note: The following excerpts 
are from a lecture delivered at 
Harvard University in the year 2080, 
by James Watson #3 on the occasion of 
his retirement from the Chair of 
Social Eco-history. Professor Watson 
#3 is the Genetic Recurrance (GR) of 
James Watson #1, the 20th century 
co-discoverer of DNA, and author of 
the Principle of Genetic Return 
(1985). This Principle established 
empirically that human beings are 
reconstituted, genetically, and are 
reborn in mathematically determinable 
sequences in an endless series, It 
was the discovery of this phenomenon 
that is generally acknowledged to 
have raised civilization's 
environmental consciousness and ended 
the widespread destruction of the 
Earth's ecosystem in the 20th 
century. Watson #l's research was 
responsible for focusing world-wide 
attention on preserving and enhancing 
the environment. Mankind became 
determined to have a habitable place 
avai lable for its future. 
"How Mankind Managed to Survive into 
the 21st century Against the Odds!" 
Students and colleagues, 
greet ings! Many of us here today 
have possibly met before, although, 
of course, we can't remember the 
occasion( s). It is certainly 
difficul t to understand, in looking 
back on the late 20th century how -
in spite of all of the information 
that was available the Earth's 
environment was consciously brought 
to the point of almost total and 
irreversible ruin. Social historians 
who are trying to understand that 
benighted century point to several 
explanations: mass and psychological 
depression brought on by the inabil-
ity to control the technology of the 
time and the sudden and explosive 
growth of mass communications, along 
with its mismanagement, which T11ay 
have lead to widespread confusion 
about man 's relationship to the 
world. 
Permit me to offer a few 
examples: during the late 1980s and 
1990s, there was a tremendous panic 
in the western world brought about by 
the rising prices not the rapid 
depletion of fossil fuels, and 
especially oil. The general response 
to this crisis was an almost unregu-
lated proliferation of nuclear 
generating plants. Now, the radio-
active waste - both controlled and 
uncontrolled - that was generated was 
considerable and dangerous. Even 
though the technology of that time 
had no solution for its storage and 
disposal, western societies continued 
to produce an enormous amount of 
undisposable radioactive by-pr oducts 
and spillage. These waste products 
were dumped thoughtlessly, in 
containers that could not even last 
for a single generation, and in 
out-of-the-way, hidden places. The 
same situation existed in the case of 
toxic chemical wastes. For instance, 
a poor West African country, Sierra 
Leone, became a dump site for 
millions of tons of toxic waste from 
the United States after its leader 
agreed to a paltry bribe .14 And as 
many of you know, parts of the rural 
Southeastern United States were for 
years clanqestinely used as dump 
sites for both radioactive and 
chemical waste. 
As long as one hundred years 
ago, the seriousness of the problem 
was recognized. In 1980, as many as 
700 chemical dump sites were known to 
exist in New York State alone! The 
situation worsened as "injection" 
wells became a popular method of 
disposing of chemical waste. Again, 
in 1980, well over a half-million 
wells of this type existed in the 
United States, pumping chemicals and 
sewage into the ground, contaminating 
underground water sources that 
supplied about half of the country's 
drinking water.15 You are aware that 
this accounts for the reason that, 
even today, large areas of our 
country are still without safe water, 
and consequently, are uninhabitable. 
And we have still not found a good 
solution to the problem of cleansing 
the heavily contaminated underground 
VIII-7 
water sources. 
Furthermore, a century ago, the 
automobile culture had become all 
pervasive, world-wide . In America, 
the landscape was transf igured 
grotesquely by millions of miles of 
concrete and asphalt roadways, the 
configuration of cities was altered 
to conform to the use of autos, and 
the atmosphere was heavily polluted 
with waste products from the com-
bustion of fuel. Towns and cities 
lost their geographical identities as 
arterial roadways obscured differ-
ences of plac,~ and attitude. The 
massive impulse to travel in cars 
produced a homogeneity of landscape 
along the roadways t hat had seriously 
harmful effects on the national 
social structure. Now that all of 
this concrete has been removed and 
vegetation and restful villages have 
replaced what were called "super-
highways," it's difficult to imagine 
why people of the last century felt 
such an overwhelming need for the 
ruinous automobile culture. I might 
add that our miniaturized and 
efficient public transport system is 
almost accident-free, and does not 
kill over 50,000 individuals a year, 
as did the autos of the 1980s. 
In retrospect, the automobile 
culture of the last century seems to 
us today not only ecologically 
senseless, but a metaphor of the 
generally destructive tendencies of 
that time toward the environment. It 
would be inconceivable for us to want 
to devise a machine, weighing around 
3,000 pounds and using non-renewable 
fossil fuels merely to transport a 
load of 150 pounds, say, from place 
to place. The illogic of the concept 
is mind-boggling! I will remind the 
historians in the audience of the 
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social traumas associated with the 
year 1986, shortly after the 
Principle of Eternal Return was 
discovered, at which time almost all 
of the automobiles in North America 
were destroyed by vigilante groups of 
conservationists. 
Man before that date behaved 
indifferently toward his natural 
environment because he was losing a 
tangible grasp of what the natural 
environment actually was. Coastlines 
had been transformed by a frenzy of 
building and alteration. Nature had 
become something that people took 
trips to see. The oceans of the 
world were moribund. Oil slicks, 
chemical disposal, waste products 
from engine fuel and waste of boats, 
massive over-harvesting of food from 
the sea, and industrial run-off and 
sewage from coastal areas had almost 
fatally damaged the oceanic eco-
system. In North America, the rivers 
had already been hopelessly polluted 
by industrial chemical and sewage 
infusions, and most of the major 
fresh water lakes had died as a 
result of actual dumping or acid 
rain. The grander natural vistas, 
the Natural Parks, were on the verge 
of being destroyed by the huge press 
of tourists in automobiles and larger 
vehicles called "campers." People 
were anxious to see Nature, even 
though it was perceived as some sort 
of "theme park." 
Just as Nature was beginning to 
be seen, in the late 20th century, as 
a "preserve," much of the large 
animal life on Earth, rapidly 
disappearing, could exist only as 
rare oddities in zoos. So many 
animal species were on the verge of 
being made extinct by man's 
insatiable and mindless sprawl that 
zoos around the world were changing 
the ir funct ion. From exhibiting 
ins t itutions they became sanctuaries 
fo r t he a la rmingly large number of 
e ndangered species. Historians of 
1979 e s t i ma t ed that zoos we.re then 
attempting t o preserve no fewer than 
215 enda ngered species.16 It's 
thanks to those efforts of the 
enligh t e ned few that such extra-
ordinary animals as the oryx and 
Siberian tiger have survived. 
Bu t the deadly and uncontrolled 
invasion of man into wild habitats 
had already destroyed millions of 
plant and animal spec i es. Population 
sprawl world-wide was estimated to 
have des troyed between a half-million 
a nd two mill i on species during the 
years 1980 and 2000.1 7 We will never 
know wha t benefit s and beauty migh t 
have been available t o us in that 
huge inventory of destr oyed life 
forms! 
Since General Return became a 
Fi r st Pr i nciple , we have disciplined 
ourselves t o procreate only so much 
as is consi s tent with our habitat. 
After all , none of us wants to return 
to find ove r crowding and massive 
starvation . Above all, we don't wan t 
to experience again the ravages o f 
malnutrition suffered by billions of 
humans in the late 1900s. Our his-
torians have not been able t o 
understand why that benighted 
civilization did nothing to inhibit 
an exponent ially exploding popu-
lation . It was known one hundred 
years ago tha t t he world' s population 
would rise from about f our billion 
people to over six b i llion within 
twenty- five years. The results were 
predictable . 
Wel l , what have we learned from 
VIII-9 
history and from the calamitous and 
ecologically suicidal behavior of the 
20th century societies? Our lesson 
must result in a code of behavior , an 
ethical code, toward the environment: 
1. Environmental decisions must 
never be based on antiquated notions 
of laissez-faire ent repreneurship. 
Where there is a situation in which 
an act will produce a profit, but 
harm the environment, it must be 
prohibited. This is now so generally 
understood in our society that there 
is 1i ttle disagreement about the 
enactment of this principle. Of 
course, it means that our manner of 
living is very simple when compared 
to the a l most baroquely gadget-filled 
lifestyle of the 20th century. But 
we have clean air, water, and the 
land now is alinost free of ancient 
residual biocides. In addition, we 
are not massively wasting the Earth's 
resources to produce trivial 
manufactured items. 
2 . Walking, wheeling and public 
transport must never give way to 
individually owned automobiles again. 
The use of dung for fuel and solar 
batteries makes efficient, if 
somewhat sl ow, transportation for 
those who need it. On water, sails 
with dung-powered auxil l iary engines 
are used on all boats except fo r 
those belonging to heads of state -
which are permitted to use small 
alcohol engines. 
3. Dwellings and commercial 
buildings are to be conserved in all 
but the most extreme cases. New 
structures are built only after the 
most careful examinations of the site 
and t he impact on the biota . Old 
lumber is always restored for use in 
new construction. 
4. News pape rs, bureacratic memos, 
throw- away packaging a re banned as a 
means of saving millions of tons of 
timber from being des troyed. 
Informatio n is conveyed 
electronically . Our proverb, "If you 
can say it, don't write it" has saved 
enormous tracts of woodland . 
5. Chemical fertilizers are never 
used, even if a crop appears to be 
failing. Irrigation is prohibited 
where the salinity of arable land 
starts i.ncreasing. Local farms are 
the sour ce, i n almost every city and 
village, for food supply . 
6. We have, of cour se , done away 
with nuclear sources of energy since 
the risk of extremely long-term 
environmental contamination and 
genetic damage is too great. It goes 
without saying that nuclear weapons 
systems have long been dismantled, 
and the technology has been destroyed 
and forgotten. 
7. As we all know , human over-
population is the most serious threat 
to our planet and its finite 
resources. Some have called our 
stern regulatory measures against 
overpopulation repressive - and even 
draconian - but we are now aware that 
no solution to this problem based on 
consensus and individual vol i tion has 
ever worked in the past. 
8. In conclusion, I would like to 
say a few words about art, and the 
place it has in our lives. We now 
know that we are all art i sts, in the 
broadest sense; we apply a rigorous 
esthetic to the making of objects and 
the construction of structures for 
dwelling. We know that the "art" of 
our object-environment encourages us 
to perceive our surroundings with a 
car ing and joyous attitude. More 
importantly, the conservation of the 
natural environment is understood to 
be uniquely linked to esthetic 
strategies. That is, it is almost 
always true that efforts to conserve 
our environment result in visually 
pleasing and esthetically gratifying 
situations. 
It has not been easy to correct the 
incredible visual blight imposed upon 
the environment by our former selves 
over the past several centuries. We 
have had to remove, and ingeniously 
dis pose of, millions of tons of 
concrete and steel, restructure 
cities so that they could be viable 
without the formerly ubiquitous 
automobile, restore vegetation 
everywhere so that animal life and 
food resources became abundant. All 
of this can be seen as a new form of 
art, for which the environment is 
content. 
To be sure, we continue to have 
speci alist-artists. Those among us 
who are painters, sculptors and poets 
continue working along the lines of 
the long tradition of art-making. In 
the history of our civilization, it 
has probably been the artists who 
have created the least overt damage 
to the physical world. Paintings are 
still made with the most primitive 
means: a few pieces of wood for a 
stretcher, a few animal hairs on a 
stick for a brush, some pigments 
(non-toxic, of course), and a piece 
of cotton are the material 
requirements for making a painting. 
This is the sort of activity that 
stands as a model for the entire 
society; it is a non-wasteful, 
non-destructive, and generally 
non-utilitarian activity. The 
imaginative usage of simple resources 
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is, in fact the paradigmatic strategy 
of our present philosophy of 
conserving and enhancing our habitat. 
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The Chesapeake Bay: A Black Perspective 
Dr. William M. Harris, Sr., Dean, Afro-American Affairs and Associate Professor of 
City Planning, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 
INTRODUCTION 
The Chesapeake Bay geograph-
ically borders the upper South. In 
the case of Virginia, the Chesapeake 
Bay constitutes the Old South. 
Historically and culturally, the 
Chesapeake Bay has helped shape the 
lifestyles of people living along its 
water systems. 
In this statement, the primary 
effort is to argue the concept of an 
ethic as it applies to a selected 
Black community along the Chesapeake 
Bay. In 1978, the Piedmont 
Environmental Council in the Land Use 
Ethic Project defined ethic as a "set 
of prescriptions and proscriptions 
grounded in fundamental judgment 
about what constitutes a good 
society." Closely centered about 
value or desires, the ethic has 
practical orientation that lends 
itself to change and ·modification of 
habit. Thus, the ethic generates the 
challenge of responsibility as 
individuals respond to the changing 
environment. 
IX-1 
With the coming of large groups 
of cultural and racially different 
people, the popular view of the 
United States holds the notion of a 
"melting pot." The central theme to 
this view is that ethnic groups are 
different by religion, tradition, and 
social preferences; but that these 
differences essentially melt or 
dissolve to form something of the 
American. For the European groups, 
the idea has some validity. For 
those racially different peoples, 
Africans and Asians, the concept has 
been far from ideal operationally. 
An ethnic group as used here refers 
to these racially and culturally 
different people, (African-American), 
in the environment of the Chesapeake 
Bay. Although we do not present the 
value of preserving ethnic orien-
tation, it has received much 
attention in the recent past. 
Because it will impact the 
development of this statement, we 
find it useful to give precise 
definition to the Black community. 
The Black community is a highly 
diversified set of interrelated 
structures and aggregates of people 
who are held together by the forces 
of White oppression and racism. The 
key element noted in this definition 
is the constraint external forces 
place upon the Black community. 
This statement discusses a 
Chesapeake Bay ethic impact on the 
Black ethnic community. The 
community is narrowed in this paper 
to include only two historically 
Black colleges as they have been 
involved in the Chesapeake Bay 
environment. An analysis of the 
interviews with faculty members at 
Hampton Institute and the University 
of Maryland, Eastern Shore is built 
around how the conflict theory 
rela tes to the resolution of problems 
for choices. 
THE RIGHT OR GOOD 
The universal just exists. 
There is right. There is good. Such 
frame of reference is necessary to 
accommodate the concept of ethic. 
Formulating a value perspective 
necessitates working from some 
reference of right and good. Let us 
attempt to give meaning to this 
notion. 
Right is just. Right can only 
be abridged, and is generally felt a 
reasonable exercise to permit the 
stability of social systems. Right 
is natural and cannot be given, only 
denied or oppressed. Right is tested 
in the practical reality when social 
systems or societies are established 
to allow more than one or a few 
individuals to gather for a purpose. 
Right in a vacuum of human social 
interaction is probably void of 
utility. 
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Good is the best measure of 
right. Good is the valued approxi-
mation of right. Good, then, is used 
to provide advice and counsel and to 
evaluate one thing or another. 
Realizing that the practice of good 
could be complex, Rawls offered, "We 
can understand part of what it is 
meant by something good even though 
we do not know what are the desired 
features of the object being 
evaluated." It is in this context 
that Rawls draws the notion of 
justice. Relevant to this statement 
is Rawls' conclusion that the various 
conceptions of justice are the 
outgrowth of different notions of 
society against the background of 
opposing view of the natural 
necessities and opportunities of 
human life. Good is thus conditioned 
by cultural experiences. 
Since right exists universally, 
and good is the gauge for right, man 
(respecting the equivalence of woman) 
seeks rationale for this behavior. 
European peoples of the Judeo-
Christian persuasion may look to the 
Bible's Book of Genesis, Chapter 1, 
verse 28, where man is given mastery 
over all elements of the earth. 
Environmentally, this religion allows 
that man and nature are two separate 
things, but man dominates. In this 
configuration, not only ~re man and 
nature established as a dualism, but 
God's Will grants man's exploitation 
of nature for his proper ends. In 
fact Christianity permits man to 
exploit nature without feelings for 
natural objects. 
In the Western Hemisphere, 
excluding the original peoples, man 
(Europeans) had the additional 
motivation of exploitation of the 
environment by establishing an 
economic order, capitalism. In this 
system, profits at the expense of 
human and natural systems became the 
expected and measure of value. Land 
in this system is property. Property 
is a possession to be used for 
benefit of the owner. Leopold 
advises against land exploitation for 
economic benefit as a means to 
protect the health of the land, for 
health is the land's ability to 
renew, Decisions to use land may go 
beyond economic expediency and 
include what is ethically and 
esthetically right. 
An ethic relating to environ-
mental matters is determined both by 
cultural background and value of land 
as property. It is obvious that 
conflict is likely to surface where 
differences in cultural lifestyles 
and values among groups exist, It is 
pertinent to consider some of these 
differences affecting the formulation 
of an ethic among ethnically diverse 
groups, 
VIEWS OF NATURE 
More than a decade ago the 
Kerner Commission reported the 
obvious, the United States consists 
of two societies--one Black and one 
White. Interpretations of the 
significance of these separate 
societies occupying the same legal 
context have been criticized, This 
dualism in American society lends to 
issues of variance in values (good), 
implementation of principles 
(justice), and conflict, 
If these societies are related, 
and they are intimately so, then it 
is important to understand the 
reality. Modern science holds that 
no two things in nature are exactly 
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the same, At the same time modern 
science seeks to discover the common 
features that allow the formulation 
of predictive models that can be 
exploited to describe behavior, For 
example, while no two trains are 
exact in composition and construc-
tion, they obey the same laws of 
motion. With this common behavior, 
it is possible to calculate (model) 
with high precision their motion 
given characteristics of their 
behavior, Of course, societal 
behavior is both too complex and 
dynamic to predict behavior with the 
accuracy of simple moving objects. 
Still, the possibility of describing 
certain features of the complex 
dynamics exists when observation is 
sufficiently rigorous, The latter is 
the basis for social sciences, 
Not as well known and even less 
respected have been the analysis and 
description of the significance of 
these societies by Black scientists, 
The fact, not withstanding the 
reality of the duality of the 
societies, is evident by experiences 
of people from political, social, and 
economic perspectives . 
The most substantial difference 
in the two societies is color. In 
fact, the problem of race in America 
is the color line. In literature the 
issue of color is treated by American 
novelists. The great white whale is 
strong, engaging and revengeful, 
while the white devil horse is 
unbreakable and killing. Tradition 
is maintained in depicting the Black 
male as serving and dull of wit, as 
the dream is deferred in response to 
oppressive surroundings. In the 
political area, too, the dichotomy of 
race and color is ~xpressed . Toward 
the intent of violence for oppression 
and rectification of social change, 
has been the opposing voice of love 
for even the oppressor. In the area 
of education and learning the modern 
announcements of innate learning 
deficiencies counter the call for 
universal teaching for the purpose of 
freeing both races. As the 
recommendation for larger, more 
efficient jails is made, the history 
of injust ice as a tradition of 
controlling the Black community is 
cited. No evidence offers convincing 
support for the notion that race and 
color will soon leave the American 
psychic as a consideration for 
societal behavior. 
Wi t hout question, Blacks and 
Whites have some similarities of 
values, rights, and ideas of utility. 
Both appear to value the comforts 
afforded through energy and resource 
exploitation even when they come at 
the expense of other peoples. Both 
have an appreciation for rights as 
the guardian to civil liberties. The 
ethic expressed in the Constitution, 
with amendments, and the code of laws 
giving uniform protections demon-
strate the point. On the topic of 
utility , both groups support work as 
a viable scale for measuring 
commitment. This notion of work 
permeates the continuing spirit of 
nationalism in war and peace. 
While it is readily possible to 
document the sociological studies 
demonstrating differences in values 
held by Blacks and Whites, it is not 
possible to similarly show their 
views of nature. Perhaps the 
greates t need for thorough research 
related to human interaction with the 
Bay, is that of identifying and 
reporting the different perspectives 
held by various ethnic groups living 
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and working in the communities of the 
Bay. As it is possible to know how 
individuals or groups view the Bay, 
it is more efficient to draw policy 
conclusions that are equitable. 
Subsequent discussion of differences 
rely on those differences of values 
as opposed to conceptual variations 
of nature. 
The challenge to American ethics 
of environmental concerns is to 
sufficiently match the similarities 
and differences to achieve a workable 
entity. This becomes more the issue 
in the Chesapeake Bay community where 
American slavery was born. As the 
races view nature somewhat 
differently, the effort to extract an 
ethic becomes formidable. 
CONFLICT: TOWARD CONSENSUS 
Conflict is the tension created 
by competing points of view. Tension 
is the disruption in the stable 
conditions of a system . Both nature 
and man offer examples of excitation 
in the ordinarily constant state of 
affairs. For example, in nature, the 
eruption of a volcano may occur after 
many years of quiet. In the human 
sphere it may be manifested by 
contests of physical challenge, 
negotiations, or withdrawal. Since 
occurrences in nature are natural, 
that is, uncontrolled by known 
forces; it may well be the case that 
man's behavior is similarly natural. 
The obvious assumption in such a 
conclusion is that man is part of the 
natural order of things. 
Experience supports the idea 
that conflic t endures due to some 
form of catalyst. Conflict results 
when fo r ces interact to vary the 
normal pattern of a system. Floods 
of rivers occur when the addition of 
large volumes of water from rain, 
snow melts, or artificial blockages 
such as dams affects its normal 
carrying capacity. Human 
interpersonal challenges are 
responses to differences in values 
t ha t compete for resources, status, 
or control by one element over 
another. The behavior of these 
catalyti c influences which drive the 
pr ocess of conflict especially 
concern this statement. 
Conf lict produces a more dynamic 
system. This statement holds the 
posture that challenge or tension is 
positive to the health of the system . 
Clearly , authority sources do not 
commonly hol d this position. 
However, responding to the oppression 
of Black struggle for civil rights in 
the post Civil War period by the 
United States government, Frederick 
Douglass offered words supportive of 
t he pos i tion taken here. 
"If there is no struggle, there 
is no progress. Those who profess to 
favo r f reedom, and yet depreciate 
agita t i on , are men who want crops 
without plowing up the ground. They 
want r ain without thunder and 
lightni ng •••• This struggle may be a 
moral one; or it may be a physica l 
one; or it may be both moral and 
physica l; bu t there must be a 
struggl e ." 
Every society experiences at 
every moment social conflict: social 
conflict i s ubiquitous. Such 
challenge serves to bring into more 
even balance the disparities between 
groups . 
Increasingly man is forced to 
address the issues of being 
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confronted by the challenges of 
natural or environmental systems. To 
be brought into more even balance is 
the need and desire of man for 
shelter and comfort respecting the 
capacity of ecological systems to 
carry the burden. The conscience of 
man determines his response to the 
limiting ability of natural systems 
to produce quantities of resources in 
sufficient time to satisfy man. 
Nature may not be as passive as often 
presented. Nature's challenge may be 
to produce less as a means to limit 
the competition from man. That is , 
without adequate food supply fewer 
humans will survive to exploit 
nature. The natural system, · indeed, 
may persist against users who are 
unwise to the habits of the 
environment. 
This idea is appealing when 
considering very complex systems such 
as natural ecological environments. 
Man has the advantage of being able 
to modify his behaviors more readily 
through planned response than most 
forces in nature. Man's values as 
conditioned through his conscience 
sensitivity are determining in the 
protection of natural systems by both 
preservation and conservation. The 
continuing question is one of man's 
willingness or desire to meet this 
responsibility. 
REPORTED PERSPECTIVES 
To give balance and practical 
perspective t o the posture of this 
statement, two Black scholars were 
interviewed. Both are faculty 
members at historical Black 
institutions of higher learning. 
Neither college is entirely Black in 
enrollment nor faculty. One scholar 
has taught and conducted research for 
ten years in Maryland. The other has 
more than seventeen years service in 
a private institution in Virginia. 
Having substantial research investi-
gation experiences related to the 
Chesapeake Bay, the scholars are in 
the areas of marine toxicology and 
ecology and microbiology. Both have 
current research activities in the 
Chesapeake Bay. 
Both interviewees responded 
positively, one with some qualifi-
cation , t o the inqui r y i f they 
believed a uni versal ethic existed . 
Similarly they shared some response 
to the idea that Americans hold some 
ethics in common irrespective of 
race. They believe all Americans 
value freedom and respect human 
rights. Also they reported their 
belief that c i tizens of this na tion 
support t he idea of pursuit of 
happiness where security and "well 
being" are important regardless of 
class status. While one felt that 
Americans of all races supported in 
general the not ion of God as 
essential, the other felt Americans 
were committed to utility rather than 
theory as salient. 
Each scholar was asked to put 
the ideas expressed in terms of the 
universal ethic to consideration of 
the environment . Though the 
ecological environment was seen as 
vital in both cases, each respondent 
expressed need to balance nature with 
human demands . One repor ted a need 
to keep the environment "wholesome . " 
To achieve this end it is necessary 
to not destroy nature. I n fact, it 
was reported, man should replace all 
parts of the natural system used to 
satisfy man . The other responded 
with recognition that reaching the 
balance of natural exploitation by 
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man and the protection for the 
"future" brought about real challenge 
and often conflict. In this view it 
was suggested that the human element 
must be more willing to compromise 
with the ecological system. 
In considering what man's 
response to nature might be in 
managing or keeping the ecological 
system wholesome, the scholars were 
asked if they felt Blacks viewed 
nature differently than do Whites. 
To the extent the races have varied 
views of nature, both interviewees 
felt it was due to social and 
economic conditions. One report felt 
Whites had a more "monopolistic" view 
owing to their dominant role in 
society. Blacks on the other hand, 
the second scholar believed, were 
more given to compromise, especially 
if doing so was not merely preserving 
for preservation's sake. Both tied 
the social influences to the type and 
level of education experienced by the 
races. 
With some forcefulness the 
scholars reported that they held the 
differences in perspectives of nature 
resulting from social condition 
variances would generate positive 
effects when policy decisions are 
made relative to the environment. 
The conflict was seen as challenge 
around a position or behavior by 
differing parties. The solution was 
compromise after discussion. One 
scholar cited the need to employ 
transfer development right plans when 
developers contest the space of 
others . The other saw it desirable 
to more fully consider the local 
implications of national environ-
mental policies as they influence the 
local situation. Both emphasized the 
need to have conflict or challenge 
result in compromise of positions to 
l end greater satisfaction to all 
i nvolved . 
I n viewing conflict as having 
potential for positive decision-
making , each scholar commented -on the 
i mplications for fairness, happiness, 
and rationality . 
In t he one case it was reported 
tha t fairness is adjudicated at the 
legal level, such as courts, by 
par t ies involved. The responsibility 
f or fairness is given the courts to 
res ol ve the conflict. The view was 
also of fered in the other case that 
conflic t resolution in fairness 
cannot be realized if traditional 
Whi te cons ciences hold. For example, 
i t was pointed out, Blacks may fight 
to achieve f a irness in a conflict and 
be denied fairness simply out of 
t radition. Both respondents 
commented about the element of time 
being c ritical to fairness. If the 
energy and resource s required to win 
fairnes s in conflict resolution 
exceed the benefits, then it s t ill 
will be pe r ceived a loss. 
Neither college facult y member 
believed absolute happiness possible. 
In achieving resolution to conflict 
they believed it necessary to give up 
some of what wa s i deally desired. 
The compromise would destroy the 
oppor tunity for unt i nted happiness. 
Neither fel t this situation was 
especially harmful , especially if 
fairness prevailed in the final 
decision . 
Aga in the respondents held 
s imilar views when commenting about 
the use of rationality in decision-
maki ng . One , however, expressed 
concer n t hat the rational process of 
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arriving at a decision mi gh t be used 
against a group in conflic t r esolu-
tion. The example wa s gi ven where 
Blacks discovered an oys t er bed in 
the Chesapeake Bay and harvested the 
animals for good profi t . Spurred by 
White fishermen the state challenged 
that the area contained "bacteria 
pollution" in the oyster s . The state 
offered evidence and f ollowed a 
rat i onal, formal procedure f or its 
decision to halt t he fur t her harvest 
of the shellfish. However , when the 
waters were tested by other 
researchers no contamination was 
found. Thus the rational pr ocess was 
exploited to justify a dec i sion that 
was racially motivated, denying 
fairness and happiness to one group. 
Continuing to express views 
about the impacts to their insti-
tution as a resuit of variances in 
Black and White values, the two 
professors offered two experiences. 
One saw decisions by the governing 
board of the college system as 
reflecting the monopoliz i ng 
perspectives of a vastly majority 
White committee. The predominately 
Black college has been denied 
opportunity to expand offerings in 
courses and degrees in environmental 
sciences despite excellent location 
in the Chesapeake Bay. Similarly 
research support has not been 
allocated with equity to the 
disadvantage of the historically 
Black college. 
The other faculty member 
discussed the differences in terms of 
faculty characteristics. More White s 
have joined the faculty to teach and 
conduct research related to 
ecological s ystems. The tolerance 
and acceptance of Black f aculty 
members to the influx of Whites have 
made for less conflict. The 
newcomers have tended to support some 
of the issues beneficial to the Black 
college's interests. Time may 
produce a unified effort to address 
conflict reso l ution offering greater 
fairness and happiness to the 
traditionally disadvantaged. 
RESOLUTION FOR CHOICES 
The issues raised by the 
interviewees focus on three factors--
fairness, happiness, and rationality. 
Fairness is that behavior where 
all elements of a group or system are 
treated with equal status and 
opportunity for achievement. 
Fairness assumes no special advantage 
to any individual or group. In a 
system where disadvantages exist 
among individuals, fairness seeks to 
rectify the imbalance. Where such 
disadvantages are present and 
fairness operates, the goal is to 
achieve equity among the group. Only 
redistribution of the advantaged 
individuals' wealth to the 
disadvantaged individuals will assure 
fairness. Fairness is realized when 
equity, equal status in wealth, 
power, and opportunity, exist for all 
individuals in the system. 
Happiness is the condition or 
state of satisfaction a group has 
with status and opportunity for 
achievement. In reality, happiness 
exists as some degree of satisfaction 
with some state or condition. As 
individuals experience environmental 
forces that affect health, security, 
or need, the response attempts to 
maximize benefits to the individuals. 
Depending upon the energy expended to 
maximize benefits as measured against 
realized achievement, individuals 
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will feel some degree of satis-
faction. The ideal degree of 
satisfaction is happiness. 
Rationality is the process of 
logical procedures incorporating all, 
or as many as are known, environ-
mental conditions to reach a 
decision. Rationality is value-
conditioned. As a process moves 
through a logical set of steps toward 
decision-making, individuals exercise 
experiences relative to their views 
of nature. Ideally the process is 
objective and accounts for all 
environmental variables impacting the 
decision. Clearly, in practice, 
individuals cannot be other than 
subjective in the rational process of 
the logical steps of decision-making. 
The above applies to an 
ecological, environmental and ethical 
setting. Fairness dictates goals for 
ecological preservation and conser-
vation resulting in equal injury or 
benefit to all individuals in 
society. Happiness is contingent 
upon fairness. The ecological 
alternatives individuals respect as 
supportive of their interest and 
needs substantially condition the 
degree of satisfaction which they 
will realize. To work ideally, 
rationality hinges on fairness and 
happiness. Logical processes for 
determining ecological program policy 
may be effectively gauged by the 
amount of fairness in the process. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ETHICS 
For the scholarly experts 
familiar with the Chesapeake Bay 
through teaching and research, there 
is concern that the environment be 
protected, but permitting use for 
human needs. Interestingly they 
suggest the ecology of the 
environment may be balanced through 
restoration; this requires effort to 
return the Chesapeake Bay to its 
condition each time man exploits the 
water system. In fact considerable 
care was expressed about unsupported 
calls for preservation. 
In allowing for social condi-
tions differences between Blacks and 
Whites the college faculty members 
concluded that conflict in decision-
making was likely when considering 
the policy for management of the 
Chesapeake Bay. Though positive, the 
conflict would produce fairness for 
parties involved only when the social . 
tradition holding blacks in disfavor 
was rectified. Similarly, the 
challenges may not generate absolute 
happiness for either party because 
the nature of the contest is to 
result in compromise. What is more 
likely to occur is a state of 
satisfaction depending upon the 
degree of compromise required in 
reaching settlement. While 
respecting the legitimacy and value 
of the legal system in handling 
conflict, there was expressed concern 
about the legal-rational process 
being exploited to the disadvantage 
of some. 
A worthwhile conclusion to the 
ideas expressed in this statement 
would relate the discussion and 
findings to ethics considering the 
Chesapeake Bay. 
The notion has been presented 
arguing the existence of universal 
good. It is possible to judge right 
and wrong. However, the perceptions 
held regarding good may vary along 
ethnic lines. Depending upon social 
custom, Blacks and Whites respond 
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differently to the forces of nature. 
Yet there are shared values among the 
races making it possible to reach 
resolution of conflict through 
compromise. 
Conflict has a positive effect 
in the process of concensus reaching, 
causing a system to be dynamic and 
ever-changing. Since changing or 
· constant dynamic conditions reflect 
the rule of nature, the occurrence is 
considered productive and expected. 
The result of conflict is to more 
closely simulate natural behavior. 
Fairness is impor tant in the 
decision-making process settling 
conflict between parties. Degrees of 
happiness result when fairness in 
decision making resolves challenges. 
The legal-rational process used for 
reaching fairness and happiness is 
critical to establishing policy 
affecting the environment. 
Initially the emphasis of this 
statement was to generate ethics 
relating to environmental decisions 
affecting Blacks and historical Black 
institutions of higher education in 
Maryland and Virginia. 
In offering rules or ethics 
useful in addressing issues discussed 
in this statement , it is necessary to 
draw on findings of the scholars and 
experiences of citizens in the 
Chesapeake Bay community. The 
recommendations can be stated to 
impact the general population 
influenced by the water system 
composing the Chesapeake Bay, and the 
Black college interests in ecological 
activities. 
1. Equity formulas based on 
research-supported findings be 
determined to allocate Chesapeake Bay 
resources. 
2. Determination be made of 
value perspectives of various racial 
and ethnic groups of the Chesapeake 
Bay respecting similarities and 
differences. 
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3. Adjustments be made to 
redress the historical inequities by 
targeting superior resources to those 
institutions traditionally serving 
the poor and oppressed, for example, 
the Black college. 
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Exploring the Psychological Bay 
Dr. John D. Balling, Research Psychologist, Smithsonian Institution, Chesapeake Bay 
Center for Environmental Studies, Edgewater, Maryland 
When each of us thinks of the 
Ch~sapeake Bay, we undoubtedly think 
of many different things. The 
quietly declining city of Harve de 
Grace. The rejuvination of 
Baltimore's Inner Harbor. The 
industry at Sparrow's Point. Sailing 
out of Annapolis. Crabs, oysters, 
skipjacks, and watermen. Expanses of 
unbroken marsh. Huge V's of 
migrating geese. The thrill of 
hooking a bluefish. A quiet cove on 
the Tred Avon River. A ferry service 
sadly gone. The threat of pollution. 
A proposed oil refinery at Norfolk. 
The impressive Chesapeake Bay Bridge 
Tunnel. The largest estuary in North 
America. The list is endless. 
Something as large and complex as the 
Bay defies definition, just as it 
defies conventional jurisdictional 
boundaries. Past and present systems 
of partitioning the Bay and its 
problems have resulted in disjointed 
management efforts and partial 
solutions at best. A major issue is 
whether there are any viable 
alternative methods for dealing with 
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the problems of the Chesapeake Bay. 
However, it is not completely 
accurate to state the question this 
way. Bays don't have problems; 
people do. It, is only when people 
interact with an environment that 
certain states of affairs are 
considered problems and that 
management efforts are initiated. 
Many of the difficulties experienced 
in dealing with the Chesapeake Bay 
are in large measure a function of 
the very nature of human beings. 
To extend this line of reasoning 
even further, the Chesapeake Bay may 
be bigger and more complex than the 
capacity of an individual human 
nervous system. For even the most 
experienced of us, our image of the 
Bay is derived from a very small and 
biased sample in time and space. If 
nothing else, the Bay has been and 
will be here a lot longer than any of 
us. We must recognize that our 
images are incomplete, imperfect, and 
subject to constant revision. We 
have no choice but to look at the Bay 
through biased, limiting spectacles. 
The question for us i s not how to 
avoid this dilemma but how to live 
with it. There are several 
alternatives . As the Gestalt 
psychologists demonstrated in the 
early twentieth century, the human 
mind needs order and pattern; without 
them, we could not think. These 
psychologists went further to show 
that people will invent order where 
there is none. (The interpretation 
of inkblots in psychiatric 
examinations is a common example.) 
The dark side of this proclivity is 
the tendency to manufacture 
superstitious explanations of 
phenomena or to judge people 
according to stereotypes. The bright 
side is the ability to discover 
pattern where none was realized 
before and to clarify previously 
unexplained data. From this point of 
view, all of us have the potential to 
discover some new solutions to the 
Bay's problems, just as we can all 
fall back on prejudice or "old wives' 
tales." Another approach to the 
dilemma of complexity accepts and 
exteµds the aphorism that "two heads 
are better than one." Perception of 
the Bay and its problems is unique 
for each of us. Thus, each of us has 
something unique to contribute to the 
solution. The differences in these 
perceptions can be radical or 
subtle--can lead to enlightenment or 
rejection, conflict or compromise. 
Nevertheless, given the proper forum, 
multiple views of reality can be 
combined, at least theoretically, to 
create better solutions. This paper 
will explore some of these biases and 
limitations in human cognition and 
offer some suggestions for dealing 
with such problems. 
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UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
As we all know, dealing with 
complex problems can take a great 
deal of mental effort. One easy way 
to avoid this cognitive strain is 
simply to deny the existence of the 
problem--a tactic which is not 
unknown in the arena of environmental 
affairs, although there may be many 
other reasons for such denial. A 
less drastic way to reduce mental 
effort is to simplify the problem, 
and this is something human minds do 
remarkably easily. However, unless 
explicit methods are used for 
information reduction, people will 
make systematic errors in the process 
of simplification. For example, 
environmental litigation proceedings 
are often characierized by the 
presentation of mounds of technical 
and numerical data to substantiate 
claims on both sides of an issue. 
This behavior is based on the 
widespread assumption that technical 
information and statistical data are 
particularly persuasive. However, 
research shows that people do not 
process such information very well. 
They tend to rely primarily on 
specific, concrete, anecdotal kinds 
of evidence and ignore statistical 
information. Given the bias to 
dispense with general numerical data 
when case-specific information is 
available, the real difficulty facing 
environmental decision-makers is how 
to incorporate these data into 
decisions at all. Many people 
involved in environmental discussions 
may need careful guidance, from 
trained statisticians for example, in 
order to effectively deal with the 
results of scientific research. 
Within broad boundaries, certain 
characteristics of human cognitive or 
mental processes shape our abilities 
to perceive environments, to 
recognize problems, to understand 
complex environmental issues, to 
bring long-range, large-scale 
considerations to environmental· 
problems, and to make decisions for 
the purposes of formulating 
environmental policy . The Nobel 
Prize winner Herbert Simon has 
pointed out one of the major 
difficulties people have in dealing 
with environmental problems; namely, 
The capacity of the human mind 
for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with 
the size of the problems whose 
solution is required for objectively 
rational behavior in the real 
world--or even for a reasonable 
approximation to such objective 
rationality. 
The only immediate solution to 
the problem posed by Simon is to 
attempt to characterize the specific 
limitations that people have in 
dealing with complex situations and 
try to develop heuristic procedures 
to counter these limitations. 
Heuristics are problem-solving 
methods that simplify complex 
problems by restricting the range of 
possible solutions on the basis of 
some evaluation of the structure of 
the problems. Although the success 
experienced by such methods may be 
significant, their danger is that the 
complexity will be inappropriately 
simplified, the evaluation of the 
problem's structure will be in error, 
and the solution selected from the 
restricted range will not be optimal. 
As Simon further asserts, 
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"Most problem solving can be 
represented as a search through a 
large space of possibilities. For 
real-world problems, the spaces are 
not merely large, but immense, and 
there is not the slightest change for 
either man or computer to search them 
for the solution that is absolutely 
best." 
When dealing with the Chesapeake 
Bay and its problems, the best that 
can be hoped for is the discovery of 
one among many possible satisfactory, 
workable solutions. From this point 
of view, Bay-related decision-making 
should be structured to encourage the 
expression and serious consideration 
of a great diversity of potential 
solutions. Using the problem space 
analogy, when each new solution is 
implemented, movement through that 
space has taken place, and 
possibilities for even better 
solutions tend to emerge on the 
horizon . There is no ultimate 
solution or set of solutions for the 
Bay. As has been suggested by the 
psychologist Donald Campbell, 
solutions and the environmental 
policies which drive those solutions 
should be considered by all parties 
involved as experimental and subject 
to change, rather than definitive. 
LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN JUDGEMENT 
What are some of the cognitive 
problems that place limitations on 
human judgment and problem solving? 
Two social psychologists, Richard 
Nisbett and Lee Ross, have argued 
that many mistakes in judgment grow 
out of excessive reliance on 
intuition in problem-solving. These 
authors portray people as "intuitive 
scientists who are gifted and 
generally successful, but whose 
attempts to understand, predict, and 
control events ••• are seriously 
compromised by specific inferential 
shortcomings." People often use 
heuristics that do not always work, 
and unfortunately, the resulting 
judgmental errors are anything but 
rare. As more and more technical 
information is gathered about the 
Bay, decision-makers require greater 
abilities to make inferences from 
statistical and numerical data. 
Should farming practices be altered 
to reduce the amount of various 
herbicides in the runoff? Should 
measures be taken to protect bluefish 
in face of their recent decline? How 
far will pollutants spread when 
Baltimore Harbor is dredged and what 
effects will they have on aquatic 
life? The more ably people can think 
in probabilistic. terms, the more 
likely they are to recognize both the 
strengths and weaknesses inherent in 
technical data and eal with them 
effectively. 
To illustrate the point, 
consider the following two 
hypothetical examples. Legislators, 
hearing testimony on population 
statistics for the blue crab from a 
representative of the Environmental 
Protection Agency based on extensive 
sampling over a 10 year period, would 
quite likely discount such estimates 
if a waterman reported a different 
experience in the course of his daily 
work. (A similar phenomenon has been 
documented in regard to hearings on 
automobile mileage estimates.) That 
is, systematically derived statistics 
regarding the fuel efficiency of a 
certain type of car were discounted 
when a powerful individual testified 
to the contrary, based upon personal 
experience with a single car.) The 
error here is that legislators, like 
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other people, often fail to consider 
either sampling technique or sample 
size adequately and give as much or 
more weight to one, necessarily 
biased, case as they give to many 
cases. 
Assume that along a particular 
river, there are 10 potential point 
sources of pollution of roughly 
similar magnitude. Eight produce 
largely pollutant A (among other 
things) while the other two produce 
pollutant B. Both are highly toxic 
to fish. Although all the pollution 
sources are supposedly controlled, a 
massive fish kill occurs. A test, 
which is 85% accurate, was used to 
distinguish between pollutants A and 
B. According to the test results, 
pollutant B was present in great 
enough concentrations to kill the 
fish. What is the likelihood that 
pollutant B actually killed the fish, 
assuming no other factors are 
involved? Very similar problems have 
been given to hundreds of people. In 
the present case, the typical 
response would be that the 
probability that pollutant B killed 
the fish is .85. However, the 
information provided actually leads 
to a probability of .41 that 
pollutant B killed the fish.l One of 
the main reasons for this error is 
that people tend to ignore the fact 
that there are eight potential 
sources of pollutant A, but only two 
for pollutant B. 
Although both examples are 
admittedly somewhat contrived, they 
do illustrate some of the very 
general difficulties that people, 
even scientists, have when making 
decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty. Environmental problems 
by virtue of their complexity, the 
limitations of available information, 
or the inadequacy of our 
conceptualizations for dealing with 
them, have the "best" solutions that 
cannot be known with certainty to be 
correct. These illustrations 
demonstrate the gap between judgments 
people make intuitively and.the 
inferences which should result from 
completely rational consideration of 
an issue or explicit calculation. 
Psychological research has shown that 
these gaps or biases are pervasive 
and systematic. They result from the 
simplifying heuristic strategies used 
by decision makers, whose cognitive 
capacity cannot otherwise efficiently 
process the information. 
The human brain has numerous 
other characteristics that make it 
difficult for people to make 
decisions when many different 
variables, both in number and in 
kind, are involved. One is simply 
the limit on the number of things 
that can be held and manipulated in 
working memory at any one time 
(usually somewhere between 5 and 9 
separate items). Thus, when dealing 
with complex problems, it is all too 
easy to commit sins of omission. In 
addition, the order of presentation 
of bits of information produces a 
bias. Items presented first and last 
tend to be remembered the best. 
Human minds are also notoriously 
affected by the context in which 
information is presented and are 
easily distracted by irrelevancies. 
There are many examples of social 
influences on individual decision 
making. The most dramatic may be the 
inhibiting effect of the presence of 
other prople on the likelihood that a 
bystander will help the victim of a 
crime, including murder, even when 
the time, effort, or exposure to 
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danger required by helping a person 
is low. More to the current point, 
most people would respond very 
differently to exactly the same 
information about the environmental 
effects of dredging Baltimore Harbor 
if the data were presented by an 
apparently angry young man, 
identified as an environmentalist, as 
opposed to a dignified older man, 
representing a corporation. However, 
if we do make this distinction, we 
are, in at least one sense of the 
word, not believing completely 
rationally. 
Because of the way people handle 
probabisistic information, judgments 
of the frequency and magnitude of 
environmental risks are often grossly 
inaccurate. The yearly number of 
deaths due to natural disasters, such 
as floods or tornadoes, tends to be 
greatly overestimated, largely 
because they are relatively rare, 
dramatic, highly publicized, and 
therefore memorable events. 
Knowledge of a recent sensational 
disaster, such as the Mount St. 
Helens eruption, or a vivid film, 
such as "Jaws," distorts risk 
assessments even more. On the other 
hand, the risk of death associated 
with unspectacular events which claim 
one victim at a time and which are 
common in nonfatal form tends to be 
greatly underestimated. Stroke is a 
prototypical example. These errors 
in hazard assessment have 
implications for behavior. For 
example, partly because people 
overestimate the degree of flood 
protection offered by dams and 
levees, they develop a false sense of 
security and build on the flood 
plain. When a rare flood does exceed 
the capacity of the dam, the damage 
may be considerably greater than if 
the flood plain had been left 
unprotected. Thus, given the choice 
between dealing with the visissitudes 
of nature on an unprotected flood 
plain or with the less probable, but 
ptoentially more catastrophic, 
hazards associated with dams and 
levees, people generally prefer to 
risk rare disasters. However, based 
on a long-run, cost/benefit analysis 
in terms of huan lives and property 
damage, this may not be the most 
rational decision. 
In another example of judgmental 
bias, people are frequently entrapped 
by the illusion of validity in which 
they typically demonstrate extreme 
overconfidence in their judgments. 
People, including experts, simply do 
not recognize how fallible their 
assumptions about the world really 
are. As a result, they do not 
exhibit appropriate caution 
concerning their judgmental 
abilities; that is, people express 
certainty in their judgments even 
when they can be shown to be 
incorrect a significant percentage of 
the time. Even more astounding is 
the fact that people persist in these 
perceptual and judgmental errors even 
after recognizing their incorrectness 
and illusory character. For example, 
people of all sorts consistently 
express extreme confidence in their 
ability to answer :factual" 
questions, such as "What was the 
first commercial passenger railroad 
in the United States?"2 even when 
they have continually received 
feedback which has shown them to be 
in error a high proportion of the 
time on similar items. In regard to 
environmental matters, specialists, 
such as planners, economists, or 
engineers, maintain high levels of 
confidence in the capability of their 
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discipline to solve problems despite 
historical evidence suggesting 
frequent failure. A case in point is 
the 1976 collapse of the Teton Dam. 
A review committee attributed this 
disaster, in part, to the unwarranted 
confidence of engineers who claimed 
to be absolutely certain that they 
had solved the many serious problems 
which had arisen during construction. 
In the seventeenth century, La 
Rochefoucauld observed that "Everyone 
complains of his memory and no one 
complains of his judgment." In 
actuality we probably have reason to 
complain about both. 
Thus, there are certain 
limitations to, and biases in, human 
thinking that must be accepted. 
These problems are particularly 
noticeable in tasks that involve many 
different kinds and sources of 
information. The question then 
arises as to how to recognize and 
cope with these problems. More 
specifically, how do they influence 
decision making and conflict 
resolution and what can be done about 
them? The impression should not be 
given that the human brain is 
hopelessly inadequate. In fact, it 
is the only computer that can 
recognize its limitations and devise 
methods for expanding or 
supplementing its abilities. The 
brain's forte is the recognition of 
problems and the abstraction of 
important variables out of the 
incredibly complex flux of 
stimulation which impinges upon our 
senses at every instant. The trick, 
then, in any complex decision-making 
process is to use the brain for what 
it does best and to rely upon 
explicit aids of one sort or another 
when the brain runs into serious 
problems. The significance of the 
above arguments about the limitations 
of human thinking depends upon 
acceptance of the assumption that 
subjective judgments are central to 
environmental decision making. The 
implications of cognitive bi~ses mean 
little if it can be assumed that all 
decision makers possess perfect 
information and the abilities to use 
it rationally and justly. These 
peculiarly human problems gain 
importance to the extent that 
expertise involves a large component 
of judgment, that the facts are not 
all available (if obtainable at all), 
that people are poorly informed or 
misinformed, and that people respond 
to the qualitative, as well as the 
quantitative, aspects of 
environmental issues. Clearly, the 
latter set of assumptions is more 
descriptive of the real world. 
THE ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES 
Human interaction with the 
environment is even more complex than 
described above since people 
generally do not respond to or deal 
with their worlds exclusively in 
terms of their congnitive judgments. 
Clearly, many people have a strong 
emotional attachment to Chesapeake 
Bay, or at least to certain locations 
on the Bay. There are also as many 
different ways to look at or perceive 
the Bay as there are users. Some see 
it primarily as a commercial 
resource, others see it as a place 
for sailing, yet others as habitat 
for water fowl. The list could go 
on, and most people probably view the 
Bay in a variety of ways. These 
perceptual and emotional responses 
are powerful and legitimate 
determiners of human behavior. They 
deserve consideration in management 
efforts. Although required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act 
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(NEPA) for environmental impact 
statements, perceptual, emotional, 
and aesthetic factors are rarely 
systematically considered in 
environmental decision, if at all. 
The usual excuses are that perceptual 
or emotional responses are completely 
unique within each individual and 
that such things cannot be measured. 
Neither case is true. There is a 
growing literature which demonstrates 
that many of the responses of the 
perceptual system to environmental 
variables can be reliably measured 
and there is often substantial 
agreement across individuals. For 
example, John Falk and this author 
have shown that, in general, people 
have a strong visual preference for 
"park-like" natural environments, 
that is, settings with short grass, 
scattered trees, and shrubs, 
regardless of whether they live in or 
around forests in the Eastern United 
States, in deserts, or in African 
rain forests. A joint report of the 
National Academy of Sciences and 
National Academy of Engineering on 
environmental indices suggests that 
the measurement of people's 
perceptions of environmental quality 
can improve our understanding of land 
use, coastal zone management, and 
other environmental areas. 
There are several potential uses 
for indices of perceived 
environmental quality. First, 
certain aspects of environmental 
quality, such as noise pollution or 
scenic quality, intrinsically involve 
the interplay between human observers 
and the environment. Certain 
standards for such inherently 
perceptual variables could be 
included in a comprehensive 
management plan for the Bay (cf. the 
Department of Agriculture's Roadless 
Area Review and Evaluation Program-
RARE II). Second, it is often of 
some interest to judge the congruence 
between perceptions of environmental 
quality and phys i cal environmental 
quality indices. As Kenneth Craik 
and Ervin Zube note, inconsistencies 
between the two types of appraisal 
could indicate: 
1. Eventual problems in 
credibility and consequent public 
acceptance of typical indices of 
environmental quality; 
2. problems of misunderstand 
a.nd misperception which may 
necessitate programs of public 
education; and 
3. inadequacies in existing 
measures of environmental quality. 
Measures of environmental perceptions 
may also provide a useful tool for 
the resulution of conflict in many 
areas. To the extent that the 
perceptions of the various parties 
involved are made explicit, the whole 
decision-making process is 
facilitated. Areas over which there 
is agreement (e.g., preservation of 
scenic quality) or disagreement 
(e.g., the maintenance of fishable 
waters) can be clearly identified and 
discussed independently of one 
another. 
With regard to environmental 
decision-making, the conceptions 
possessed by the various parties 
involved, such as local government 
officials, industry representatives, 
special interest groups, and federal 
officials, with regard to the goals 
of the decision-making process can 
vary greatly. Often these goals, 
(e.g., preventing the erosion of the 
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land tax base or avoiding costly 
repairs), are not explicitly stated 
in the discussion of specific 
alternatives, Withholding such 
information is often seen as a way to 
maintain power in the bargaining 
process. This method of attempting 
to control bargaining is ultimately 
destructive to finding a workable 
compromise solution. Current 
research in group problem-solving 
suggests that clear statements of 
individual goals are important for 
the development of trust and for 
achievement of solutions that are 
most agreeable to all. This argument 
suggests that environmental decision-
making might ideally be conceived as 
cooperative problem-solving rather 
than competitive bargaining. The 
traditional adversarial relationship 
of the parties in environmental 
decision-making actually tends to 
narrow the options and possible 
solutions considered while a more 
open, cooperative atmosphere may 
allow the discovery of more creative 
solutions. 
Environmental conflicts usually 
involve a clash of values. Although 
people's values are real and 
legitimate bases for disagreement, 
they are often stated and handled in 
ways that exacerbate differences. 
One party may champion clean air 
while another defends jobs and 
plentiful energy. There is no 
obvious right or wrong here, both 
sides have reasonable points of view. 
Arguments about which values--cleaner 
air or reduced unemployment--should 
be served are doomed to failure. The 
expressed values are so different 
that it is almost impossible to 
compare them. ("Which is better a 
rose or an ice cream cone? Even if 
you were willing to answer this 
question, your reply would probably 
not be very meaningful until you 
defined your dimensions of 
comparison. In terms of prettiness, 
roses win; but in terms of taste, the 
reverse is true.) The first step 
towards avoiding this dilemma is for 
each party involved to admit that the 
values expressed by everyone else 
whould be considered. Then, 
alternative solutions to the problem, 
such as building a coal-fired 
power plant, a nuclear plant, or no 
plant at all, could be explored in 
terms of the total set of values 
expressed by all parties. In 
general, when values can be made 
explicit, more areas of agreement 
than disagreement are found. The 
result if that the overall conflict 
may be focused and defused, 
permitting the determination of more 
innovative solutions that, in the 
long run, may also be more beneficial 
to all. 
MANAGING COMPLEX PROBLEMS 
Psychological research predicts 
that the more preliminary behaviors 
or precursory actions induced (e.g., 
agreeing to a published statement 
that environmental considerations are 
important, agreeing to a no-cost 
public education session, or 
supporting a local shoreline clean-up 
effort) the more likely that a 
person, group, agency, or 
organization will perform some target 
behavior (e.g., adoption of 
innovative methods for the disposal 
of hazardous wastes, designation of 
an area as wilderness, or cessation 
of overboard trash dumping). The 
theory suggests that the complex 
decision-making process on large 
issues can be broken down into a 
series of small steps for which 
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rather benign acts of endorsement or 
compliance are required at each 
stage. The sticky problem of 
adequate consideration of conflicting 
environmental values is somewhat 
easier to handle in a small step 
approach to problem resolution. An 
experienced mediator may be necessary 
for the successful completion of this 
process in an atmosphere of free and 
open debate. Although used rather 
infrequently, mediation has recently 
resulted in the satisfactory 
resulution of a number of 
environmental conflicts, 
Since Scott Gordon and Anthony 
Scott developed the economic theory 
of common property use in the early 
fifties, and particularly since 
Garrett Hardin's landmark paper in 
1968, the notion of the tragedy of 
the commons has had a profound impact 
on thinking in the area of resource 
management. The commons is a 
resource that people can more or less 
freely use for their own purposes; it 
is owned by no one. The tragedy 
occurs when individuals, each in 
pursuit of his or her best interests, 
begin to use the commons at a rate or 
intensity that forces the degradation 
of the resource. With regard to 
Chesapeake Bay, over-fishing would be 
the prime example. Recent simulation 
research has begun to delineate some 
of the ways the commons' tragedy can 
be avoided. Interestingly, neither 
information as to the nature of the 
commons' situation, nor specific 
instructions as to how to manage the 
resource for maximum harvests over a 
long period of time are very 
effective in curbing individuals from 
destroying a resource. Territorial 
division of the commons resource, 
such as is now done with national 
fishing water areas, helps some. 
However, one of the easiest and most 
effective ways to improve management 
of the commons is to allow and 
encourage communication among the 
individuals using the resource from 
the beginning. Open communication 
permits the involved parties to build 
trust and to adopt a long range 
perspective. This research points to 
the generalization that early and 
effective communication among 
potentially conflicting groups can be 
a significant, easy, and inexpensive 
method of improving environmental 
decision and increasing acceptance of 
environmental constraints. 
Simple communication may not be 
enough, particularly for complex 
real-world environmental issues 
existing in a cotentious climate. 
For example, we all recognize that 
some people are more persuasive than 
others; that some are more willing to 
listen, that problems can be 
camouflaged with sophisticated mounds 
of technical data, that people can be 
swayed by irrelevant arguments, that 
support is often won by discussions 
away from the bargaining table; and 
that the individuals or groups 
involved in a conflict often possess 
considerably different amounts of 
power. These factors, as well as 
many others, introduce biases and 
inequities into the decision-making 
process. All legitimate points of 
view may not be given the fair, 
rational consideration they deserve, 
even in a conflict where ostensibly a 
great deal of communication is 
occurring. Let me propose what, for 
some, will appear to be a rather 
radical and inhuman solution to some 
of the difficulties encountered with 
complex environmental problems--the 
use of what are called linear 
decision making models. 
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LINEAR MODELS FOR DECISION-MAKING 
Benjamin Franklin, with his 
typically sententious air, may have 
been the first to recommend using 
explicit linear models for making 
decisions . In a letter to his 
friend, Joseph Priestly, dated 
September 19, 1772, Franklin wrote: 
I cannot, for want of sufficient 
premises, advise you what to 
determine, but if you please I will 
tell you how ••• My way is to divide 
half a sheet of paper by a line into 
two colums; writing over the one Pro 
and over the other Con. Then, doing 
three or four days 'cosideration, I 
put down under the different heads 
short hints of the different motives, 
that at different times occur to me 
for or against the measure. When I 
have thus got them all together in 
one view, I endeavor to estimate the 
respective weights ••• [to] find at 
length where the balance lies ••• And, 
though the weight of reasons cannot 
be taken with the precision of 
algebraic quantities, yet, when each 
is thus considered, separately and 
comparatively; and the whole matter 
lies before me, I think I can judge 
better, and am less liable to make a 
rash step; and in fact I have found 
great advantage for this kind of 
equation, in what may be called moral 
or prudential algebra. 
Thus, Franklin suggested a 
useful method for making decisions 
which estimates the relative 
importance of pro and con arguments 
and then determines "where the 
balance lies." In essence, Franklin 
added the positive weights of the pro 
arguments with the negative weights 
of the con arguments and then decided 
for or against the matter depending 
upon whether the sum was positive or 
negative. That is, he used a simple 
linear model. 
Although the basic logic has 
remained the same, linear models for 
decision-making have recently been 
vastly improved and applied to many 
different real-world situations. 
They include the selection of 
students for graduate school, 
diagnosis of both mental and physical 
disorders, prediction of business 
failures, and the selection of 
ammunition for use by the police. 
Linear models can also be used to aid 
decision-makers in arriving at 
consistently better decisions, 
particularly in the face of seemingly 
incompatible information from 
disparate sources. In fact, research 
shows that linear models often do 
better, that is produce decisions 
that more frequently prove to be 
correct, than do experts. 
An extremely important added 
benefit derived from using explicit 
decision models for conflict 
resolution is that they make much of 
the decision-making process, open to 
public scrutiny. It is much easier 
to see what values and issues are 
being considered in the decision and 
whether any significant interests are 
being ignored. In most environmental 
decisions, there must be some 
amalgamation of the values of many 
different, often competing, groups, 
all of whom have stakes in the 
decision. Some technology for 
explicating, comparing, aggregating, 
and ultimately reconciling the 
inconsistent values of groups in 
conflict is clearly needed. The 
seeds of such a technology exist in 
linear decision models. 
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ONE METHOD FOR USING LINEAR MODELS 
There are a number of steps to 
successful use of linear decision 
models for conflict resultion. In 
almost all cases, their use requires 
intervention by a highly trained 
mediator or team of mediators. To 
date, these mediators have almost 
always been social scientists, 
although this is not necessary and 
possibly not always desirable. 
Problem Definition. Once the 
mediator is on the scene, the first 
task i's problem definition. Value 
issues must be separated from 
substantive questions. For example, 
in a debate over the need for a 
sewage treatment plant, the degree of 
concern about the health hazards 
associated with water pollution must 
be separated from the technical issue 
of how much ·of pollutant X is removed 
by secondary treatment of sewage. 
The dimensions of the problem must be 
carefully delineated and all the 
significant interests defined. The 
output of this stage is a list, or 
set of lists delineating the 
important value and content issues 
underlying the conflict which 
represent the various interests and 
concerns of the conflicting parties. 
At this stage of problem 
clarification and definition, there 
is little social science technology 
upon which to rely. The human brain 
is still the best tool both for 
picking out the necessary information 
and for coding it in the most useful 
way. Expert mediators can certainly 
facilitate this process by providing 
an atmosphere and a structure in 
which the conflicting parties can 
express their concerns and needs in a 
rational way. Establishing the trust 
of the parties involved and obtaining 
a clear statement of the issues 
underlying the conflict is probably 
one of the most important tasks of 
the mediator. 
Technical Advice. After the 
problem definition stage, the process 
enters a phase of diagnosis, data 
gathering, and interpretation with 
regard to the substantive or 
scientific issues involved. Experts 
are called in to help generate 
alternative courses of action. The 
experts are asked what can be done, 
not what ought to be done. They are 
specifically asked not to make 
statements regarding the social 
consequences of each action. 
Scientists and other subject matter 
experts are generally not in a 
position to represent the values of 
any given community, nor are they 
experts in determining or defining 
society's needs. Legislators, public 
officials, and the public itself 
should be left to make such 
determinations. This general point 
of view is similar to two Executive 
Orders, one issued in 1918, the other 
in 1956, concerning the role of the 
National Research Council. In point 
of fact, scientists are often 
requested to make judgments on public 
policy. Former Senator Muskie's call 
for a "one-armed scientist," that is 
one who did not qualify his or his 
advice with "on the other hand," 
exemplifies the politician's demand 
for an m1equivocal answer to the 
question of what ought to be done as 
well as to that of what can be done. 
When experts are asked to make policy 
statements about what ought to be 
done, a conflict can easily 
degenerate into an endless debate 
over the motives underlying a 
particular expert's recommendation of 
a particular course of action. The 
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typical argument revolves around the 
question of the extent to which that 
expert's advice is self-serving. 
However, such a person-oriented form 
of controversy is ultimately 
destructive to the conflict resultion 
process because it deflects the 
discussion from the real issues at 
hand. 
Policy Considerations. Parallel 
to the collection of technical data 
and expert opinions, the social 
values or policy considerations of 
all interested parties are 
categorized and given weights that 
reflect their relative importance to 
the conflict. This can be done in 
many different ways, but several 
factors are crucial. First, through 
some type of iterative procedure, the 
mediator must determine a set of 
value dimensions integral to the 
conflict. A significant amoWlt of 
distillation is usually necessary at 
this point to reduce the number of 
general issues of value conflict to 
some manageable size. For both 
statistical and psychological 
reasons, the upper limit on the 
number of variables that can be used 
successfully in these procedures is 
about 15. Second, the importance of 
these values to the conflict must be 
established. To the extent possible, 
the mediator should try to induce the 
interested parties to judge the 
importance of these values or 
concerns in an abstract, general 
sense, not tied to the specific 
conflict. Such a procedure tends to 
allow people to moderate extreme 
positions and to open the door to 
potential areas of compromise. 
Often, the parties involved in a 
conflict do not realize which areas 
of disagreement are most important to 
them, nor that substantial areas of 
agreement do exist . In the heat of 
battle, conflicting groups may be 
unwilling to order priorities 
unambiguously for fear of being 
forced to give up something. 
However, if the relative importance 
of the major concerns of the 
conflicting groups can . be set in 
general, a large stride has been 
taken towards clarifying the issue. 
Using Machines. There are also 
many different ways to decide upon 
the importance of the various social 
issues underlying the conflict. In 
general, ones that allow maximum 
freedom to the individual to express 
his or her feelings independent of 
social pressure are best. Here is 
where modern computers can be used 
very successfully. As has been found 
with programs for medical diagnosis, 
people are often more likely to 
reveal themselves to a "stupid," 
impersonal machine than to a 
potentially judgmental human being. 
As an added advantage, machines never 
forget to ask certain questions and 
they always ask their questions in 
the same way. Quick tabulation of 
results and rapid display to the 
interested parties are also possible 
with the use of interactive 
computers. Obviously, a computer 
will not always be avilable to 
facilitate the resolution of every 
environmental conflict, but 
electronic computing machines are 
becoming ever more common and they 
clearly can be used, under certain 
circumstances, to aid decision making 
and conflict resolution. 
Psychologists Kenneth Hammond and 
Leonard Adelman have successfully 
used computers in the resolution of a 
conflict over the type of bullet to 
be issued to members of the Denver 
Police Department. 
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Val ue Definition. But, how does 
s omeone actually express how 
i mpo r tant a value is to them? One 
method is t o have individuals rank 
order the dimensions of value from 
the most important to the least 
i mportant . Numerical ratings can 
then be given to each value t o 
provide additional information about 
the relative importance of each value 
dimension. The least i mportant 
dimension could be assigned the 
number 10 and the next least 
important assigned a number depending 
upon how many more times important it 
i s than the least important 
dimension, and so on up to the most 
important dimension. For example, 
with regard to some large-scale 
development project, assume that 
maintenance of an aesthetically 
desirable environment is the least 
important issue, and that concern 
over increased traffic flow is the 
next least important factor for a 
particular individual . That person 
would then assign a 10 to aesthetic 
de s irability. If the individual 
thought traffic flow was 
approximately 1 and 1/2 times as 
important an issue , 15 would be 
assigned to that variable, or 20 if 
it was t hought to be twice as 
important, etc. The scores assigned 
to each dimension are then scaled, 
tabulated, and presented to the 
concerned groups. It is quite easy 
to ge t different set s of ratings for 
the different parties involved in the 
conflict, and this method clearly 
points out specific area s of 
disagreement. At this point, 
however, the differences are a matter 
of degree, not of kind, s ince the 
parties i nvolved have already agreed 
on the basic d i mensions t ha t must be 
consider ed. 
. I 
Rating Alternatives. After the 
dimensions of the conflict are 
determined, they are given to experts 
to determine, to the best of their 
ability, how the alternative courses 
of action, determined in an earlier 
stage, would rate on the various 
dimensions. As an example, if the 
conflict is over construction of a 
power plant, some of the issues might 
be disaster potential, air pollution, 
provision of jobs, provision of 
power, impact on nonrenewable 
resources, long-term cost 
effectiveness, impact on property 
values, and degree of community 
control over any plant. A series of 
potential alternatives, such as no 
power plant at all, coal-fired plant, 
nuclear plant, and redistribution 
from existing plants, could all be 
rated on each dimension. Again, some 
sort of numerical scale would be 
used. In general, the more experts 
drawn from the ore different 
disciplines the better. If there are 
significant disagreements among the 
experts or if there are some issues 
which cannot be judged adequately, it 
is at least clear where more 
information needs to be gathered. 
Deciding. The next step is a 
rather mechanical one. For each 
proposed alternative, its numerical 
score on each dimension is multiplied 
by the importance rating for that 
scale, and these quantities are 
summed. The result is a single 
numerical vlaue, sometimes called a 
utility, for each alternative. 
Finally, the decision is made. The 
simplest procedure is to select the 
alternative associated with the 
largest number of maximum utility.2 
The general method for decision-
making suggested here is 
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scientifically, psychologically, 
socially, and ethically defensible. 
Although people are often suspicious 
of such a mechanical approach to 
making socially important decisions, 
linear decision models are more 
consistent and fairer than unaided 
human judgment. The method suggested 
here allows people to do the things 
that they do best and puts the 
onerous task of information 
integration on the shoulders of a 
mathematical technique. Social 
policy issues and technical issues 
are handled clearly and explicitly. 
The use of linear models also demands 
that complex problems be broken down 
into specific, manageable pieces. In 
fact, there is no reason why linear 
models could not be used several 
times to deal with sub-iddues within 
a more general conflict. Although it 
has rarely been done, linear decision 
models could be used to help resolve 
environmental conflicts. With such 
techniques, if you can master the 
trick of determining what the 
important issues underlying the 
conflict really are, then all you 
have to do is add. 
CONCLUSIONS 
No attempt has been made in this 
paper to develop a statement of 
ethical standards for use of the 
Chesapeake Bay. Rather, the premise 
has been that a moment of 
self-reflection about what we are as 
human beings would be helpful in 
thinking about what we can and cannot 
do. Some of our intrinsic 
characteristics and limitations that 
profoundly influence our abilities to 
deal with complex problems and make 
management decisions were documented. 
An attempt was made to show that any 
region or resource on the scale of 
the Chesapeake Bay is quite literally 
mind-boggling. Beyond that, it was 
argued that there is an incredible 
diversity of perfectly legitimate, 
but necessarily biased, points of 
view in regard to use of the Bay that 
have a right to be heard and 
seriously considered. As Jacob 
Bronowski has said, "We cannot know 
what the world is like in itself, we 
can only compare what it looks like 
to each of us, by the practical 
procedure of exchanging messages." 
There are methods, such as linear 
models for decision-making, which may 
facilitate this communication 
process. However, both the enormity 
of the issues relative to human 
abilities and the wide diversity of 
opinions militate against the 
possibility of "best" solutions or a 
set of fixed ethical standards. We 
possess neither the knowledge nor the 
wisdom to propose absolute solutions 
or standards. Although we must 
accept this fact, we need not 
despair. As mentioned throughout 
this paper, we do have some very 
considerable strategies and abilities 
for improving the situation for 
ourselves and the Bay. Let us humbly 
try to put them to good use. 
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Footnotes 
1. To calculate this probability 
correctly, Bayes' Theorem which 
embodies the relationship among 
conditions probabilities must be 
used. Let A= pollutant A 
actually released, B = pollutant 
B actually released, and TB= 
test result says pollutant B 
present. From the problem, we 
know that PA)• .8, P(B) = .2, 
P(TB IB) = .85, and hence P(TB 
IA) D .15. What we want to find 
is P(B 1TB), the probability that 
B was actually released given 
that the test results say this is 
so. By Bayes' rule, 
P(TB IB)P(B) 
P(TB IB)P(B)+P(Ts IA)P(A) 
= 
(.85) (.2) 
(.85) (.2) + (.15) (.8) 
.17 
.41 
.. D--
.17 + .12 
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2. Baltimore and Ohio. 
3. Throughout this discussion, any 
mention of cost factors have been 
explicitly avoided. Budget 
constraints can be figured into 
the equation, although doing so 
would not alter the way in which 
the general procedure is 
conducted. Generally, 
benefit-to-cost ratios would be 
calculated at the very end of the 
process, and judgments made on 
the basis of these ratios. 
Toward A Chesapeake Bay Use Ethic: 
The Environmental Movement's View 
Mr. Jon K. Hutchison, Assistant Professor of Landscape Architecture, University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
Western ethical thinking has not 
played a major role in the develop-
ment of resource protection systems. 
While folkways regarding resource 
management responsibilities can be 
cited, our western orientation has 
been one that views resources and 
natural systems as private property 
to be exploited for the owner's 
profit. The North American situation 
with its historic labor scarcity and 
resource abundance is an extreme 
example of the merger of economic 
systems and ethical thinking. This 
combination minimizes the development 
of systems which restrict access to 
natural sources of wealth. 
Prevailing Western ethical 
systems have assumed away the 
problems which could stem from 
essentially unrestricted pursuit 
of individual profits. Adam Smith's 
invisible hand was restrained only 
by poorly developed nuisance 
regulations until well into the 20th 
century. The purpose of this paper 
is to explore the possibility of 
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development of a use ethic which 
places emphasis on resource 
management responsibilities, rather 
than on wealth development. The 
paper further breaks with writings i n 
this field in that the focus is on a 
large water-based system, the 
Chesapeake Bay, rather than on land 
management. 
Following the Harvard Law of 
Sociology (in a country as big as the 
USA, you can find SO examples of 
anything), it is possible to cite 
several examples of environmental 
ethics. Informal ethical precepts 
are found within many specialized 
fields. The author, in research on 
soil and water conservation, found 
that farmers could easily identify 
practices which they felt violated 
community norms. Up-and-down slope 
plowing, failure to rotate crops, 
removal of grass waterways and 
similar violations of community-wide 
practices brought social sanctions on 
the deviant at the neighborhood 
tavern or feed store. Sportsmen 
release smal l fish , pass up shots at 
does and condemn those who harvest 
more than they need. Lobstermen in 
Maine have fairly elaborate rules 
which regulate access to the 
lobstering grounds. Despi te these 
examples, no attempt has been made to 
systematically bring together some 
general rules which could guide 
decision makers when faced with 
environmental choices. Even Aldo 
Leopold'sl writings on environmental 
ethics never explicitly catalog what 
he defines as moral r estrictions on 
the use of the environment in the 
struggle to survive. 
Serious problems face the 
effectiveness of an ethics approach 
to resource protection especially i n 
the case of an estuarine system. 
Heberlein,2 makes the point that 
ethi cs translated into social and 
psychological solutions are difficult 
to administer. "Psych fixes" which 
change the way an individual thinks 
must be communicated or taught, must 
be primary over competing values and 
must be activated in appropriate 
situations. The use of education in 
behavioral change has a high degree 
of slippage. 
"Soc Fixes," which change the 
rules which govern a particular 
situation, have similar weaknesses. 
The problems of legislating new rules 
are well known--indeed we see 
increased aversion to the very 
concept. High enforcement costs and 
low effectiveness, the requirement of 
high specificity and the need for 
high voluntary compliance reduce the 
effectiveness of soc fixes in 
environmental management. 
The development of a rationally 
based ethical system for governance 
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of the Chesapeake Bay system faces a 
series of further challenges. The 
Bay system covers a huge area, much 
of which is land. Most of the 
management decisions which impact the 
Bay are made miles away in the air, 
or in the watersheds which drain into 
t he Chesapeake. The new power plant 
in Pennsylvania, a potential oil 
spill in Virginia's piedmont, and the 
fertilizers and agricultural 
chemicals used in Maryland are 
Bay-related management decisions 
which are just as real as filling a 
wetland or flushing of a marine 
toilet. Often the impact of these 
l and based decisions is more serious 
than those made closer to the 
Chesapeake Bay. 
Just as many of the Bay's most 
important decisions are land based 
and remote, many of the effects are 
distant in time. The use of DDT and 
PCB's, for example, took years to 
develop as problems in the Bay. 
Actual delivery of the chemicals took 
time. More time was needed for 
concentration up the food chain. 
Even more time was needed for these 
hydrocarbons to affect the repro-
ductive success of bird populations. 
The costs of environmental 
damages and the "profits" made by 
failure to incorporate reasonable 
treatment levels in costs are also 
dispersed. In many cases one party 
benefits by passing environmental 
damages on to a person or place far 
distant. It is rare for environ-
mental costs and feedback damages to 
accrue to the "guilty" individuals. 
Those not typically party to the 
decision are usually involved without 
their knowledge or permission. 
It is difficult to trace 
problems back to their source because 
of the slowness of response and 
because of the geographic spread 
between cause and effect. It is even 
harder to anticipate the·Chesapeake's 
response to a proposed action miles 
away. The system is too large and 
too complex to fully understand. 
Given the seeming lack of 
congruence between actions and Bay 
responses, perhaps what is needed is 
more of a blind faith approach to use 
ethics. Many of the environmental 
ethics developed in simpler societies 
are the product of long term natural 
selection and the classical condi-
tioning model. Social systems on the 
margin of existence, were weakened 
or vanished when they made wrong 
decisions,.~.when their rules 
governing use of the environmental 
were inadequate. Other systems 
evolved as the environment in effect 
rewarded and sanctioned those who 
used it. The resulting environmental 
ethics in a functional, if not actual 
sense, established a series of rules 
which resulted in a better life for 
the individual or group. 
The absence of a Chesapeake Bay 
code of ethics is partially explained 
by the poor feedback provided by the 
Bay. As the downhill side of the 
system, little information flows back 
uphill to the areas where most 
impacting acts occur. Most of the 
real Bay management issues do not 
deal with in-Bay resources or in-Bay 
originated problems. The sanctions 
and rewards which flow from Bay in 
response to land inputs accrue to 
those who live or work on it, rather 
than those who impact it from a 
distance of time and space . For this 
reason a utility-based ethic will not 
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voluntarily develop. An ethic 
imposed by an outside agency will not 
enjoy support since we are asking (in 
many cases) upland residents to incur 
costs to protect or enhance Bay 
residents present and future. 
The basing of a Bay use ethic on 
an argument that the ethic will 
maximize individual returns or 
enhance the collective good runs into 
the problems outlined above. More 
animistic ethical systems which 
propose responsibilities to all that 
can suffer, all that is alive or all 
that is the work of a divine creator 
are unlikely to integrate well with 
western culture. Codes of this type 
cannot win ascendancy in our values 
hierarchy. 
A successful modern environ-
mental ethic must combine both 
science and compactness to provide 
guidance for Bay management. Drawing 
from the last decade's environmental 
movement, it is possible to assemble 
a list of general rules by which 
environmental actions may be judged. 
These rules, indeed the general 
orientation of the new environmental 
movement falls part way between a 
utilitarian view and an animistic 
approach to resource protection. 
Neither totally man-centered nor 
relegating humans to a lower level, 
this line of thinking is worthy of 
exploration. 
Two threads run through the new 
environmental movement that distin-
guishes it from previous conservation 
thought. The systems viewpoint is 
primary. The contributions of 
ecology, cybernetics, and computer 
modelling have led to a recognition 
that successful management of natural 
resources cannot be use or species 
specific. Moving even beyond 
multipurpose or multigoal planning , 
the new movement is heavily oriented 
around the long term protection and 
enhancement of large natural systems. 
The recognition of the intricate 
linkages and flows between system 
components forces upon the manager a 
larger context for evaluating action. 
Instead of goal achievement, we look 
at a series of indicators which 
provide a window on system perfor-
mance, health and stability. 
A second integrating thread to 
the new ethic is a reorientation of 
man's centrality in the general 
scheme. Mankind is viewed as part of 
nature, ne i ther having dominion over 
it nor being totally at nature's 
whim. An ecosystem which is healthy 
and resilient is viewed as one which 
is most likely to be healthy and 
satisfying for people. Having 
evolved with the natural system and 
having limited ability adapt to 
sudden perturbations, we must be 
careful to temper the degree to which 
we intentionally or inadvertently 
change our life support system. A 
system which is unhealthful for 
wildlife is apt to be unhealthy fo r 
humans. 
A third theme is not unique to 
more recent environmental thinking 
dating from G. P. Marsh (1830's) and 
the German foresters. Conserva-
tionists have long advocated the long 
term view. The new environmental 
movement has pushed up the time 
horizon. Instead of 40 year 
rotations on forested areas we now 
see advocates of 500 year planting 
plans. No-growth advocates, soil 
scientists and others look to (if not 
operationalize) indefinite futures. 
Environmental economists seriously 
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propose that we do not discount or 
reduce future benefits from environ-
mental stability, wilderness or 
protection of gene pools. 
Behind these general orien-
tations a series of ethical 
responsibilities may be discerned. 
These rules permit the decision maker 
to evaluate environmental decisions 
and judge policy adequacy. Most of 
the statements are interlinked, 
overlap and do not show complete 
independence. Some statements are 
highly specific do's and don't's 
while others are more general 
cautions. Taken as a whole they led 
to an ethic of stewardship for our 
resource base. They may permit a 
moderately high standard of living 
for an infinite horizon. 
Ethics of the new environmental 
movement: 
1. Ecosystems and resources are 
to be held in trust for future 
generations. 
2. The environment is to be 
used in a manner which will not 
damage the uses and rights of others 
both present and future. 
3. There is an upper limit on 
technology in terms of the rate at 
which problems can be solved and in 
terms of finite bounds on solutions. 
Not all problems have technical 
solutions. Problems can pile up 
faster than solutions. Solutions 
beget problems. 
4. There is an upper limit on 
management. Murphy's Law will 
continue to operate. A basic failure 
rate should be assumed. This rate 
will climb as systems become more 
complex and as time continues to 
progress. Our ability to control 
dangerous processes should be viewed 
very conservatively. 
5. There is an upper limit on 
the ability of social systems and 
individuals to adapt to change. The 
quality of life for individuals and 
the continuance of society is 
threatened by the rate of . change be 
it "good" or "bad". 
6. All components or members of 
a system are linked. Any change in a 
system will produce changes else-
where. You cannot do just one thing. 
Unforeseen results are to be 
expected. 
7. Avoid doing anything which 
is irreversible in a systems view. 
Decisions of this type should be 
explicitly made and should be open to 
widespread participatory input and 
review. Decisions of this type go 
beyond ownership rights. 
8. Avoid simplification of the 
system. The resilience of most 
systems is enhanced by complexity and 
interlinkage. Reduction of com-
plexity, while offering short term 
benefits will result in great 
oscillations in system performance 
over the long term. Specialization 
of food, energy, transportation and 
other basic systems is dangerous. 
9. Utilize the natural 
regulatory systems which are part of 
existing control process. While 
these controls may be enhanced, they 
should not be replaced by human 
systems. Crop rotation is an 
effective pest control mechanism 
since it apes nature's own control 
over "pest" build up. 
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10. Any ecosystem's human 
carrying capacity is defined by both 
objective or natural limiting factors 
and by human values. Usually nature 
will allow populations to build 
levels which exceed the quality goals 
of human groups. The two big factors 
in the degradation equation are how 
many people living at what level. 
Environmental quality technology can, 
within a prescribed range, mitigate 
the damage function. 
11. If high levels of population 
and/or resource use is maintained, 
two alternatives develop; suffering 
under the natural controls which 
arise from shortages and pollution or 
a serious loss of personal freedom in 
a political sense. With large popu-
lations, we must increase political 
control to either organize high 
throughput or to control man's 
natural tendency toward technological 
growth. There are very narrow 
practical limits on increasing both 
technical powers and individual 
freedom. 
12. The "interest" on environ-
mental capital determines the usable 
energy and material budget for 
humans. Better understanding of 
natural systems permit us to more 
closely estimate the flow within a 
subsystem in a given year. Most of 
our basic goods are flow resources: 
solar, timber, animal life, wind 
energy, air, water, soil. Many of 
these resources are being used in a 
manner that will pollute or exhaust 
them. 
13. Uniqueness confers value. 
Any resource which is absolutely 
unique has absolute value and 
therefore merits protection. We must 
recognize that a buffer is needed for 
.""l'\ 
protection. We cannot preserve just 
the last Kirtland's warbler , but a 
reasonable population if uniqueness 
is to be protected. 
The above list of ethical guides 
is probably not exhaustive. They are 
also open to interpretation and are 
difficult to translate to daily 
situations. For the general popu-
lation these problems may well 
prevent their use as a practical 
device in Bay management. For the 
large corporation, the representative 
legislative body or for the 
regulatory agency the guides may 
provide a structure by which to 
evaluate proposed actions and past 
directions. If nothing else, the 
XI-6 
guide statements may serve to 
structure the debate over how the Bay 
is to be managed. 
Perhaps the biggest problem with 
the ethical guides is that they are 
premature. We must first establish 
what we are trying to achieve in Bay 
management before we try to develop 
operational rules. The basic unmet 
need in all environmental planning is 
to determine the energy and materials 
requirements for a meaningful and 
rewarding standard of living. In an 
increasingly resource-scarce world 
this determination must include our 
moral responsibilities for assuring 
distributive access to wealth ••• a 
more just division of the pie. 
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